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The case of Northern Ireland is heralded by many as a consociational success 
story. Since the signing of the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement in 1998, 
significant conflict transformation has taken place in the form of a considerable 
reduction in levels of violence and the establishment of power sharing between 
unionists and nationalists. This thesis, however, asks whether consociational 
arrangements are transforming conflict in a different way: through mitigating the 
salience of ethno-national identities. It argues that if this is taking place, it would 
be demonstrated in the focus of the election campaigns of Northern Ireland’s 
political parties, which would be almost exclusively based around socio-
economic issues affecting the whole population, rather than narrow single 
identity concerns. Elections contested using Proportional Representation – 
Single Transferable Vote (PR-STV) offer the greatest potential to induce 
moderation, as this electoral system is preferential and allows inter-party lower 
order preference votes (or transfers) to be cast. It should, therefore, be in the 
interest of parties to maximise their support by moderating their campaigns with 
the intention of attracting inter-bloc transfers. If this is occurring, it would 
demonstrate a shift from traditional unionist versus nationalist politics to a more 
inclusive political system that is less concerned with ethno-national divisions. 
On the whole, however, this has not been realised. Although election 
campaigns are today less strident than they were in the pre-1998 era, it remains 
the case that they usually foreground single identity symbolism, as it is this that 
resonates with voters. Whilst consociational power sharing has been very 
successful in reducing levels of violent conflict and facilitating elite level 
cooperation between unionists and nationalists, it has been much less 
successful in reducing divisions within wider society. This indicates a 
dissonance between ‘high’ politics and society in Northern Ireland. The 
conclusions of this thesis also highlight a disparity between what political theory 
argues may happen and what actually does, as demonstrated by the practice of 
politics. It is the novel way in which this research tests its hypothesis that makes 
an original contribution to knowledge. This is achieved through the unique 
application of ethno-symbolism to analyse political party election campaigns. 
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Having grown up in rural Devon with, to my knowledge, no Irish or Northern 
Irish ancestry, my interest in the Northern Ireland conflict originates from a 
somewhat unprecedented source. During a family holiday to Scotland as a 
twelve year old in August 2002, I was taken to Ibrox to watch a ‘friendly’ 
association football match between Glasgow Rangers and Leeds United. Whilst 
the union flags and Scottish Saltires fluttering in the stands were to be 
expected, the presence of a third flag – the Ulster Banner – came as a surprise 
to someone unfamiliar with the link between sectarianism in Northern Ireland 
and football in Glasgow. Equally surprising to me were the exclamations of 
contempt that rang throughout the stadium whenever Leeds’s Robbie Keane or 
Ian Harte – both Republic of Ireland international players at the time – were on 
the ball.  
 
After a 1-1 draw, the home supporters showed further contempt outside the 
stadium towards a man with dyed green hair (the colour of Rangers’s bitter 
cross-city rivals, Celtic) who, in a bizarre twist, later removed and proudly held 
up a scarf emblazoned with ‘Ulster Volunteer Force’. It was these displays of 
Northern Ireland related sectarianism in Scottish football that first ignited my 
interest in the conflict. A fascination with the case of Northern Ireland and other 
ethnic conflicts continued through the negotiations culminating in the re-
establishment of power sharing in 2007, and other events, such as the arrest of 
Radovan Karadzic, accused of committing war crimes in Bosnia during the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, a year later. This interest was an important factor 
influencing my decision to pursue an undergraduate degree in International 
Relations in 2008 and a master’s degree in Global Politics in 2011. 
 
Although violent divisions in ethnically plural societies can be successfully 
regulated through the recognition and accommodation of opposing groups, as 
the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement and other conflict management 
settlements have shown, an important question is whether group identity can be 
overcome. If so, a more important question still is whether consociational 
institutions established by such settlements can work to facilitate moves away 
from narrow ethnic identification towards a shared identity. The case study of 
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Northern Ireland is significant as the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 is 
heralded by many as confirmation of the ability of consociationalism to provide 
successful conflict management in a divided society (Taylor, 2009a, p. 10). If 
consociational institutions can work to facilitate a shift from ethnic divisions to a 
unifying identity, it would, therefore, surely be Northern Ireland where this is 
most likely to take place. The hypothesis of this thesis is thus as follows: 
 
Due to the endurance of the consociational institutions implemented in Northern 
Ireland by the Good Friday Agreement, a common Northern Irish identity may, 
over time, come to be shared by the majority of the population (McGarry and 
O’Leary, 2009a, p. 83). 
 
This research aims to test whether a genuinely shared identity is showing any 
significant signs of being realised. McGarry’s and O’Leary’s argument is 
interpreted as being based on the premise that because consociationalism 
facilitates cooperation between unionists and nationalists at the political elite 
level, this may have the ability to trickle down and engender greater inter-
communal interaction within wider society. This may in turn bring about a 
common identity that transcends ethno-national divisions and is shared by most 
inhabitants. It is important to emphasise that McGarry and O’Leary (2009a, p. 
83) make no guarantee of this being achieved and argue that if it is, it will be the 
work of at least twenty years. They nevertheless offer no indication of the 
starting point for this prognosis (it could, for example, be the implementation of 
consociational arrangements in 1998 or the re-establishment of power sharing 
in 2007 after a five year suspension). It is, however, thought that if a common 
identity is likely to come about, Northern Ireland would be showing notable 
indicators of progress seventeen years after the signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement. To determine if this is so, this study asks the following research 
question as a proxy in order to test its hypothesis: 
 
Does the preferential method of the Proportional Representation – Single 
Transferable Vote (PR-STV) electoral system induce political parties to 
moderate the single identity symbolism and rhetoric of their election campaign 
literature with the aim of attracting inter-communal lower order preference 
votes? (see, for example, McGarry and O’Leary, 2006b, p. 274). 
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Rather than test the hypothesis using a primarily quantitative framework (see, 
for example, Nolan, 2012, 2013, 2014; Tonge and Gomez, 2015), this study 
seeks to do so through a qualitative analysis of electoral politics. The rationale 
for this is that the election campaigns of political parties are considered to be an 
effective indicator of public opinion. Indeed, as rational actors, parties seek to 
win widespread support by appealing to as many people as possible. It is, 
therefore, logical that election campaigns reflect the opinions of the people in 
order to achieve this. In ethnically divided societies such as Northern Ireland, 
most parties identify with one particular group, with their support derived almost 
exclusively from this respective community. It is argued that if ethnic identities in 
plural societies are being overcome, the link between political parties and a 
particular group would weaken and their election campaigns would reflect this 
by no longer being focused on divisions and being instead almost exclusively 
concerned with socio-economic issues affecting all members of society.  
 
This thesis seeks to exploit a gap in the literature by providing a unique analysis 
of this within the context of the PR-STV electoral system, which is used for all 
elections in Northern Ireland except those to the Westminster Parliament (for 
which first past the post is used). The incentive for parties to moderate away 
from their traditional single identity symbolism and rhetoric is greater due to the 
possibility of attracting lower order preference votes under PR-STV, which is not 
a feature of most other electoral systems. The incentive for moderation is 
therefore enhanced as parties do not have to convince voters from outside of 
their traditional ethno-national bloc to vote solely for their candidates, which 
may be considered to be too great a task in a divided society, but rather only to 
give them a lower order preference vote. It is, therefore, argued that party 
election campaign moderation is most likely to be achieved under elections 
contested using a preferential electoral system. In Northern Ireland, it is 
expected that the incentives for this would be greatest for elections to the 
European Parliament, as the comparatively low district magnitude of three seats 
results in candidates needing to reach a higher vote threshold to be elected. 
With Northern Ireland electing as a single multimember constituency for these 
elections, the incentives for parties to moderate are enhanced due to the 
presence of an ethno-nationally diverse electorate, rather than a smaller 
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constituency, which is more likely to be comprised mostly of members of one 
particular community. 
 
If present day campaigns for elections in Northern Ireland contested using PR-
STV are based significantly on socio-economic issues, with little or no concern 
for ethno-national matters, it demonstrates that conflict transformation is taking 
place in the form of institutions implemented by the Good Friday Agreement 
facilitating moves away from unionist and nationalist divisions towards a shared 
and genuine Northern Irish identity. Conversely, if ethno-national issues take 
precedence, it indicates that divisions within wider society continue to be 
especially deep and override socio-economic concerns. If the latter is found to 
be true, it demonstrates that whilst consociationalism has facilitated many 
examples of interaction and cooperation between the two communities at the 
political elite level, the significantly ethno-national focus of party election 
campaigns indicates that there is little or no replication of this at a societal level. 
This would suggest the presence of a dissonance between ‘high’ politics and 
wider society in Northern Ireland.  
 
In concluding that the latter is indeed true, in that party election campaigns 
remain primarily based around ethno-national issues, this thesis questions the 
profoundness of consociational theory. Whilst recognising that McGarry and 
O’Leary (2009a, p. 83) provide no guarantee that the institutions established by 
the Good Friday Agreement will work to overcome the significance of unionist 
and nationalist identity, it is argued that the extent of consociationalism is its 
ability to mitigate violent conflict and facilitate inter-group power sharing. In 
coming to this conclusion, this research identifies an important middle ground 
between consociational proponents and its critics. On the one hand, it 
recognises that only consociationalism can achieve the successful management 
of violent conflict in divided societies. On the other, however, it is sympathetic to 
concerns that recognising and accommodating different groups simply freezes 
the conflict in time. It nevertheless concludes that identities in divided societies 
are too significant to be genuinely overcome. 
 
This study applies an ethno-symbolist understanding of nationalisms as a 
framework in order to answer its research question and test its hypothesis. The 
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significance of this approach lies in its ability to explain the continued 
importance of national identity by claiming that it is myths, memories and 
symbols dating to the pre-modern era that link the (ethnic) past and the 
(national) present (Smith, 1998, p. 180. See also Smith, 2009; Githens-Mazer, 
2006). It is these that political parties in Northern Ireland, and indeed in many 
other ethnically plural societies, utilise in order to identify with a particular 
community. In addition to providing the overall foundation of this study, an 
ethno-symbolist framework is employed to conduct a content analysis of the 
symbolism and rhetoric of party manifestos to determine changes over time and 
for different elections (for example, those to the Westminster Parliament, 
Northern Ireland Assembly, European Parliament and local councils).  
 
This analysis is complemented by interviews with more than thirty politicians 
and other political activists, community leaders, religious representatives and 
journalists. The purpose of these interviews is firstly to ascertain why the PR-
STV electoral system was chosen as the main voting system for Northern 
Ireland and the potential impact that it was thought it may have. Secondly, they 
are intended to analyse how political actors and the parties they represent 
understand, interpret and use PR-STV and how this influences their election 
campaigns. Finally, interviews were conducted with community leaders and 
other such activists to gauge the extent of communal divisions in present day 
Northern Ireland in order to complement the manifesto analysis and research 
into PR-STV undertaken for this study. Data from a participant observation 
exercise and a comparative analysis will also be included, and is intended to 
strengthen the conclusions of this research. 
 
This research makes an original contribution to knowledge by testing its 
hypothesis of whether consociational institutions may work to overcome unionist 
and nationalist identities in Northern Ireland using a novel research question. To 
analyse the effects of PR-STV on how parties campaign, this study makes a 
unique application of ethno-symbolism in order to determine whether any 
moderation is taking place. As it is largely not occurring, this indicates the 
existence of a disparity between the theory of political science and the practice 
of politics, in that whilst the former claims that consociationalism may work to 
break down identities, in practice this is not realised. This represents a 
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significant finding in highlighting limitations to the practical application of political 
theory. The findings of this research play an important role in demonstrating the 
practical impact of consociationalism in Northern Ireland, which can also be 
cautiously applied to other divided societies with these arrangements for conflict 
management. 
 
 
Chapter outline 
Chapters One to Three constitute the literature review of this thesis, the aim of 
which is to locate this research within the context of existing work. Chapter One 
addresses theories of nationalism, defines ethno-symbolism, and provides a 
historical and contemporary background of the unionist and nationalist 
traditions. Chapter Two considers the ways in which divisions in plural societies 
can be effectively managed through an analysis of the largely opposing 
consociational and centripetal approaches. It then explores conflict 
management in Northern Ireland through an examination of the Good Friday 
Agreement and contemporary politics in the region. Chapter Three analyses 
electoral politics in divided societies through an exploration of voting systems 
that have been recommended for such cases and plays a particularly important 
role in defining PR-STV. It then provides an examination of electoral 
arrangements in Northern Ireland and of the present electoral environment. 
Chapter Four serves as a methodology and analyses the research methods 
employed by this study, in addition to ethical considerations.  
 
Chapters Five to Seven are based primarily on empirical research and are 
designed to answer the research question and test the hypothesis of this study. 
Chapter Five seeks to determine why PR-STV was selected for elections to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and the process associated with this, before 
considering debates around the use of the system. It then uses data from 
interviews to analyse how political parties perceive and understand PR-STV, 
and examines transfer data to determine if there is any correspondence 
between how parties use the preferential electoral system and the levels of 
lower order preference votes they receive. Chapter Six provides a content 
analysis of election campaign literature from all major parties in Northern Ireland 
and is intended to analyse any changes in focus throughout the post-Good 
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Friday Agreement era. Chapter Seven examines party campaign strategies, 
consociationalism and present day communal divisions in Northern Ireland in 
order to explain why the two identities remain so significant. This is 
complemented by a brief comparative analysis of two other consociational 
cases: Brussels and Malaysia. Finally, this study concludes with an overview of 
its findings and identifies several potential avenues for further research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One – Ethno-symbolism 
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It is impossible to understate the role of ethnicity and nationalism as causes of 
division in many plural societies (see, for example, Guelke, 2012, p. 20). A clear 
example of this is the case of Northern Ireland, as whilst there is a religious 
dimension to its divisions, the major source of conflict is ethno-nationality 
between British unionists, who favour maintaining the present constitutional link 
with the United Kingdom, and Irish nationalists, who desire a united Ireland, 
although it should be noted that these ideals are not entirely universal within 
either community (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009a, p. 31). This chapter is 
structured by firstly exploring the key characteristics of nationalism and why it is 
such a significant phenomenon in plural, or divided, societies, by analysing the 
characteristics of ethno-symbolism. It then turns its attention to the origins of 
divisions between unionists and nationalists on the island of Ireland, from the 
plantation of Ulster in the seventeenth century, through to partition and the 
establishment of Northern Ireland in 1921, to the present day. Finally, an 
overview of unionism and nationalism is drawn, with particular focus placed on 
the political ramifications of these identities, including the ethno-symbolist 
characteristics of both. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the theoretical 
and historical framework that forms the foundation of this thesis. 
 
 
Defining ethno-symbolism 
Githens-Mazer (2006, p. 4) identifies three broad fields of theories of nations 
and nationalisms – modernism, primordialism and perennialism. Firstly, the 
position of modernism is that the relationship between the state and the nation 
is fundamentally important, and this is brokered by elites and/or state 
institutions, the purpose of which is to establish a unifying political identity within 
the state (Githens-Mazer, 2006, p. 5). Smith (1998, pp. 22-23) draws attention 
to a number of defining characteristics of the modernist approach. He asserts 
that for modernists the nation is a political community within a designated 
territory; it is a wholly modern product, ‘both recent and novel’; it is created and 
deliberately constructed by elites who influence the masses to achieve their 
objectives, whilst ‘possessing certain resources’; it is divided socially into a 
number of different groups; and, finally, the principles of the nation are to be 
found in citizenship and social communication. From these characteristics, 
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Smith (1998) highlights various fields of the modernist approach which seek to 
explain the establishment of nations and nationalisms – the role of industrialism 
(Gellner, 1964); capitalism (Nairn, 1977); the state and nation (Giddens, 1985; 
Breuilly, 1993); political messianism (Kedourie, 1960); and invention and 
imagination (Hobsbawm, 1990; Anderson, 1991). 
 
According to Hutchinson (1994, p. 6), modernists reject the position of 
primordialists that nations are shaped by distinctive cultural attributes and argue 
instead that modernisation has encouraged the rise of nationalisms, with 
nationalist elites inventing nations. Modernists such as Gellner (1983, p. 138, 
quoted in Hutchinson, 1994, p. 6) are, however, willing to concede the existence 
of some nations prior to the modern era – England, for example – but argue that 
this was ‘merely accidental’. Although there are many different explanations for 
the rise of nations and nationalisms within modernism, such as those identified 
by Smith (1998), all modernists agree that nations are invented by nationalist 
elites (Hutchinson, 1994, p. 7). The form of nationalism most associated with 
modernism is civic democratic political, which uses a threshold principle to 
determine whether nations are large enough to support a capitalist market 
economy and, if so, are entitled to claim the status of a self-determining, 
sovereign, independent state (Hobsbawm, 1990, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 
121). Breton (1988, pp. 99-102, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 212) extends this 
definition by claiming that membership of a civic nation is determined not by 
ethnic attributes but rather in terms of citizenship. Civic nationalism is based on 
the type of nation created as a result of the French Revolution, and which 
flourished in Europe between 1830 and 1870, with Germany, Hungary and Italy 
notable examples from this time (Hobsbawm, 1990, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 
121). 
 
The second broad field of theories of nations and nationalisms identified by 
Githens-Mazer (2006, pp. 4, 5-6. See also, Shils, 1995; van den Berghe, 1995; 
Grosby, 1995; Geertz, 1963) is primordialism. This approach suggests that the 
nation is either a result of enduring patterns of human culture, social and 
political organisation, or is based on ‘otherness’ and/or a number of conceptions 
of genetic fitness, which are socio-biological in character. The pre-
modern/modern divide within theories of nations and nationalisms is therefore 
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irrelevant to primordialists, as it does not account for either of the 
aforementioned explanations of the establishment of nations. In defining 
primordialism, van den Berghe (1978, pp. 403-04, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 
146) argues that not only is shared ethnicity and race important to bring about 
nationalisms and to establish nations, so also is kinship, as ethnic groups were 
‘inbreeding super-families for most of human history’. The form of nationalism 
most associated with primordialism is ‘ethno-linguistic’ (ethnic), with smaller 
groups entitled to establish their own states based on a shared ethnicity 
(including race) and/or language, which is in contrast to the civic vein of 
nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1990, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 121). Modernist and 
primordialist theories of nations and nationalisms are important as they are 
considered to be polar opposites, with perennialist theories such as ethno-
symbolism bridging the gap between them (Githens-Mazer, 2006, pp. 7-15, 86-
87).  
 
The third broad field of theories of nationalisms is thus perennialism, which 
Githens-Mazer (2006, p. 7) defines as the belief that ‘the phenomenon of the 
nation has occurred and/or recurred throughout history’, and is part of recorded 
history rather than part of the human condition or nature. He argues that in 
order to ‘(re)construct, (re)invigorate, or transform’ a community into a modern 
nation, some nations reach back to pre-modern era myths and memories of the 
collective, and these nations therefore bridge the gap between pre-modern and 
modern. Other communities utilise processes of ‘(re)discovery, 
(re)appropriation, (re)affirmation and (re)imagination’ in order to demonstrate 
their cultural or political legitimacy, which is necessary for their transformation 
into a nation. Smith (1998, pp. 22-23) identifies a number of defining 
characteristics of perennialism. The nation is ‘a politicised ethno-cultural 
community’ with common ancestry; it is enduring and immemorial with a long 
history and has its roots in a historic homeland; it is ‘a community of ‘the 
people’’ and therefore reflects their needs, with members possessing particular 
qualities; it is a seamless whole; and, finally, its fundamental principles are an 
authentic culture and ancestral ties. On this basis, ethno-symbolism fits within a 
perennialist approach to nations and nationalisms (Githens-Mazer, 2006, p. 7). 
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Whilst recognising the importance of politics, Hutchinson’s (1994, p. 41, quoted 
in Smith, 1998, pp. 177-80) analysis of cultural nationalism argues that it is 
impossible to overlook the recurrent and continuous significance of culture. 
Hutchinson (1987, pp. 12-14, quoted in Smith, 1998, pp. 177-78) explains the 
cultural nationalist argument as being that ‘the essence of a nation is its 
distinctive civilisation, which is the product of its unique history, culture and 
geographical profile’, and the aim of cultural nationalism is to reunite the nation 
by reaching back to its creative life principle. As the nation is an organic entity, 
the state and its institutions are ‘accidental’ and a result of the processes of 
modernity (Hutchinson, 1987, p. 13, quoted in Githens-Mazer, 2006, p. 86). 
Cultural nationalists are, however, keen to demonstrate that despite looking 
back to ‘a presumed glorious past’, their recurrent approach seeks to revive an 
ethnic historicist vision of the nation to construct a community which is both 
integrated and autonomous (Hutchinson, 1987, p. 34, quoted in Smith, 1998, 
pp. 178-79).  
 
Hutchinson (1987, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 180; Githens-Mazer, 2006, p. 86) 
also recognises the importance of memories and symbols in defining the nature 
and history of nations, and in attaching people to a particular nation, whilst 
reinforcing the role of historical memory. He makes three conclusions from his 
analysis of cultural nationalism (Hutchinson, 1987, pp. 29-30, quoted in Smith, 
1998, p. 178). The first is ‘the importance of historical memory in the formation 
of nations’ and the second ‘that there are usually competing definitions of the 
nation’, which is resolved by trial and error whilst interacting with other 
communities. The third is that due to the significance ‘of their power to convey 
an attachment to a specific historical identity’, cultural symbols are central to 
group creation. Hutchinson (1987, quoted in Smith, 1998, pp. 179-80) thus 
repudiates any primordialist theories of nations and nationalism, and also 
distances himself from modernist positions, as he rejects the idea that nations 
are invented and instead emphasises the importance of reaching back to the 
ethnic past and the revival of cultural traditions, whilst stressing the significance 
of historical memory and religion. 
 
Although supportive of the emphasis cultural nationalists place upon the 
significance of, for example, a unique culture and history, historical memory and 
16 
 
the centrality of cultural symbols in explaining the creation of nations and 
nationalisms, Smith (1998, p. 180) criticises Hutchinson for focusing only on the 
movement back from the present to the (ethnic) past and argues for the need 
for this to be supplemented by an analysis of the movement forward from the 
past to the (national) present. To facilitate this, Smith (see, for example, 1986; 
1998, ch. 8; 2009) formulated and founded the ethno-symbolist approach. 
Githens-Mazer (2006, p. 7) explains ethno-symbolism as recognising the 
modernity of nations, yet argues that some of the political and/or cultural 
characteristics of a nation pre-date this era. Furthermore, ethno-symbolists 
claim that some nations may in fact be ‘based on pre-modern cultural, political 
and ethnic groups, which are (re)constituted in a modern period as nations’. 
This shared ethnic past is rooted in the ethnic group or ethnie, defined by Smith 
(1986, p. 32, quoted in 1998, p. 191) as ‘named human populations with shared 
ancestry myths, histories and culture, having an association with a specific 
territory, and a sense of solidarity’. At the heart of ethnicity is the ‘myth-symbol 
complex’ and the mythomoteur, which across generations and through the 
ethnic group diffuses the myths, memories and symbols associated with that 
group, which preserves and maintains the form of the group’s identity over time, 
and the ethnie is distinctive because of those myths, memories, symbols and 
values (Smith, 1986, quoted in Githens-Mazer, 2006, pp. 7-8).  
 
Smith (1986, p. 198, quoted in Githens-Mazer, 2006, p. 8) argues that national 
myths, memories and symbols must be meaningful and potent enough to unite 
and excite the nation politically or culturally. He also asserts that ‘the myth of a 
common origin in time and place’ is vital to ethnic communities, as it marks ‘the 
foundation point of the group’s history, and hence its individuality’, and identifies 
the importance of a collective name, association with a homeland, emblems, 
festivals, customs, etc (Smith, 1981, p. 66, quoted in 1998, p. 191; 2009, p. 25). 
Smith (2009, p. 25) outlines three general factors to explain the significance of 
these characteristics. Firstly, they play a crucial role in shaping social structures 
and cultures, and in defining and legitimising a community. Secondly, they 
provide communities with distinctive symbols, such as religion, language and 
customs, which enable their differentiation from other communities, and divide 
‘us’ and ‘them’.  Finally, these characteristics have helped maintain continuity 
with past generations of the community, which has been enhanced by the 
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acceptance of collective symbols such as anthems, flags and national holidays 
– the form of which remains largely fixed, despite the possibility of their 
meanings changing over time.  
 
These symbols create and maintain communal bonds and contribute to a sense 
of national identity. Therefore, whilst ethno-symbolists agree with modernists 
that nations are active communities rooted in a particular historical epoch, they 
disagree with modernist approaches over their failure to link ethnicity to the 
formation of nations (Smith, 2009, pp. 20-21). Ethno-symbolists also repudiate 
primordialist notions of nation and nationalism formation, and focus instead on 
cultural affinities, shared historical memories and ethnic symbolism, rather than 
physical kinship ties (Smith, 1998, p. 192). There is, nevertheless, the possibility 
of the meanings of collective identities changing over time, with this influenced 
by ‘structural circumstances, strategic imperatives, and the social psychological 
needs of group members’ (Smithey, 2011, ch. 2). For example, in post-Good 
Friday Agreement Northern Ireland, some unionists report a change in their 
identity that has been brought about by former republican paramilitaries 
participating in a power sharing government within the jurisdiction of the UK 
(Hancock, 2013, pp. 63-64). Examples such as this do not, however, suggest 
moves away from a particular ethnic identity but rather that changes can take 
place within it, whilst the salience of identities mean that they are unlikely to 
ever be fully overcome. White et al (2013, pp. 240-41) argue that divided 
societies such as Northern Ireland struggle to overcome identity conflict 
because different groups feel threatened by each other and cooperation 
between them demands inter-ethnic trust, which is often not present due to the 
narratives of ethnic identities reinforcing negative stereotypes about the ‘other’. 
 
Ross (2009) explains why the culture and symbolism that ethno-symbolists 
consider to be so important in forming and defining nations and nationalisms 
often results in conflict in divided societies. He argues that it is not cultures or 
cultural differences that cause conflict, but they are rather ‘the lenses through 
which the causes of conflict are refracted’ (Ross, 2009, p. 5. See also Eller, 
1999; Posner, 2004; Avruch and Black, 1993, pp. 133-34). Ross (2007, quoted 
in 2009, p. 5) states that these differences result in cultural contestation, which 
intensifies when fundamental group identity issues are involved, often polarising 
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participants. There are several ways in which this contestation is manifested in 
divided societies (Ross, 2009), which will be explored with a focus on their role 
in the Northern Ireland conflict. Firstly, symbolic landscapes are significant to a 
group’s identity and include, but are not limited to, emotionally important public 
spaces and sacred sites, and representations in mass media, theatre and 
literature (Ross, 2009, p. 6). In Northern Ireland, the display of flags and 
emblems and the painting of murals are important ways in which both 
communities claim ownership of a particular area, establishing it as their own 
symbolic landscape (Bryan and Stevenson, 2009; Smithey, 2009). 
 
Secondly, psychocultural narratives are emotionally powerful accounts of 
events that make judgments of the role of one’s own group and that of 
opponents, often alternating in portraying one’s own group as strong or 
vulnerable depending on the situation (Ross, 2009, p. 8. See also Kaufman, 
2001). An example of this in Northern Ireland is unionists portraying themselves 
as triumphant over nationalists during the Twelfth of July commemorations of 
the Battle of Boyne of 1690, when Catholic King James was defeated by 
Protestant King William (Smithey, 2009, p. 96), but vulnerable to what they 
considered to be an affront to their culture by nationalists during the 2012-13 
protests and riots against the decision to limit the flying of the union flag at 
Belfast City Hall (Devenport, 2012). Thirdly, collective memories that blend key 
events, metaphors, heroes and moral lessons connect group members through 
time and space, and are recited as narratives which serve as group memory 
repositories (Ross, 2012. See also Kaufman, 2001; Devine-Wright, 2003, p. 11; 
Halbwachs, 1980). Examples include important historical events such as the 
Battle of the Boyne for unionists and the Easter Rising for nationalists.  
 
Finally, psychocultural dramas are conflicts emanating from differing opinions of 
the history and contemporary identity of a group, and can focus on material 
resource allocation or cultural differences such as religion, language and 
popular culture (Ross, 2009, p. 12. See also Ross, 2007). The competing 
constitutional claims of unionists and nationalists over Northern Ireland 
constitutes a psychocultural drama, with the former arguing that Ulster’s unique 
geography and history marks it out as distinct to the rest of the island of Ireland, 
whilst the latter dispute this (Morag, 2008). These areas of cultural contestation 
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are important as they demonstrate the ways in which ethno-symbolic 
characteristics of nations and nationalisms can result in conflict in ethno-
nationally divided societies, and are significant to this study as Northern Ireland 
is affected by many of these phenomena.  
 
 
The island of Ireland – a divided society 
 
Pre-partition 
Despite Northern Ireland having existed as a political entity only since 1921, 
divisions have been present on the island of Ireland since well before the 
twentieth century (see, for example, O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, ch. 2; 
Connolly, 1996; Kennedy and Johnson, 1996). O’Leary and McGarry (1996, p. 
54) note that nationalist history in Ireland began in 1169 with the first Norman 
invasion, which, as Clayton (1998, pp. 44-45) asserts, was authorised by the 
first and only English Pope with the aim of replacing Irish Catholicism with 
Roman Catholicism. Unionist history in Ireland began with the establishment of 
the first plantation in Ulster by English and Scottish settlers in 1609 – a 
significant event as it marks the beginning of the presence of two main 
traditions on the island (O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, p. 54). O’Leary and 
McGarry (1996, p. 55) argue that the plantations are the ‘one indisputable 
historic cause of the current conflict’ in the region, and without them ‘Northern 
Ireland would not exist’. Morag (2008, p. 264) draws attention to the unique 
position of the province of Ulster within Ireland, with mountains and lakes 
making it largely inaccessible from the rest of the island prior to the 
development of roads in the 1800s. Its coastal areas were, therefore, more 
easily accessible from Scotland, making it a convenient entry point to the 
province from the British mainland. The uniqueness of Ulster’s location on the 
island is one of a number of factors which has for centuries fuelled the 
perception amongst unionists that the region is closer in character to Britain 
than the rest of Ireland and thus provides them with a national homeland for 
their British cultural and national identity. 
 
Despite the settlers consisting of two distinct ethnic and religious communities – 
the Anglican-English and Presbyterian-Scottish – they did not blend with the 
20 
 
indigenous Irish and, over time, merged to develop a unified Ulster-British 
identity (Morag, 2008, p. 265). The colonisers deprived the native Irish of their 
access to the land and by the eighteenth century the latter were almost 
completely landless, with Protestants being densely concentrated, and 
outnumbering Catholics, in Antrim, Down, Armagh and Londonderry, with 
significant populations in Tyrone and Fermanagh (O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, 
pp. 56-57). In addition, the Catholic Church was disestablished (Githens-Mazer, 
2006, p. 2). The linkage between religion, ethnicity and politics has been 
apparent since the era of early modern Ireland, which Beckett (1981, quoted in 
Coakley, 2002a, p. 5) considers to have begun with the Renaissance in 1603. 
O’Leary and McGarry (1996, pp. 61-62) argue that ‘to change one’s religion… 
was to change one’s ethnicity and one’s political status’, and few therefore did 
so (see also Coakley, 2002a).  
 
The failure of the British to successfully penetrate the island of Ireland and 
establish a British national identity enabling Catholics and Protestants to 
transcend their differences is the ultimate factor behind the persistence of the 
two traditions and subsequent conflict (see O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, pp. 64-
74, 101-02). Although the two islands were formally bound in the Act of Union of 
1801, this was incomplete, with Ireland governed differently to the rest of the 
kingdom, and its legal and religious institutions organised in opposition to the 
interests of the nationalist majority, which resulted in rebellions against the 
union by nationalists and republicans throughout the nineteenth century 
(O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, p. 73). It was the inequality faced by the native 
Irish population at the hands of the British and the Protestant minority, both 
before and after the Act of Union, which culminated in the rise within the 
majority group of a cultural nationalist movement on the island (see, for 
example, Githens-Mazer, 2006, ch. 4).  
 
Hutchinson (1987, p. 50, quoted in Githens-Mazer, 2006, pp. 88-90) identifies 
three stages of the crystallisation of cultural nationalism in Ireland. The first 
occurred in the mid-1700s and was instigated by Irish antiquarians, which was 
followed by a movement of historical scholars and poets in the 1830s (the 
second stage). The intentions of these movements were to utilise a Gaelic past 
in order to unite Ireland’s divided religious communities, and encourage the 
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establishment of an artistic and secular Irish nation. Githens-Mazer (2006, p. 
88) argues that the second stage of cultural nationalism was a reaction to 
events such as the Act of Union and sought to distinguish an Irish nation from 
the British state. This movement was ultimately the result of the aforementioned 
failure of Britain to unite the inhabitants of Ireland under a single British identity, 
and serves to further demonstrate the existence of antagonism between the 
native Catholic Irish and the settler Protestant British on the island prior to 
partition. 
 
Githens-Mazer (2006, pp. 90-91. See also Paul-Dubois, 1911; Mitchel, 1983; 
Morash and Hayes, 1996) emphasises the importance of the Famine to cultural 
nationalism in Ireland. He asserts that the native Irish generally blamed the 
Anglo-Protestant ‘other’ for its occurrence, which resulted in the perception of 
the union amongst the former as being ‘inherently exploitative’ – a position 
underpinned by the myths, memories and symbols of historic events such as 
the disestablishment of the Catholic Church. It was the Famine, coupled with 
initiations such as the Catholic Emancipation and the repeal movement, which 
led to the third and final stage of the crystallisation of cultural nationalism in 
Ireland, characterised as a ‘movement of poets and folklorists’ during the late 
1800s (Githens-Mazer, 2006, pp. 89-90. See also Hutchinson, 1987). Despite 
Britain making a number of concessions to the native, Catholic Irish during the 
post-Famine era, including buying out Anglo-Irish landlords across Ireland – 
with the exception of east Ulster – and passing the land to Irish peasants, land 
questions persisted, which enabled nationalists to build up political support 
bases, winning a significant number of parliamentary seats in Ireland from the 
1870s (O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, pp. 85-87). This was achieved firstly due to 
the success of the Home Rule League and its successor, the Irish 
Parliamentary Party, and later Sinn Fein (see, for example, Foster, 1989, pp. 
608-13). 
 
Cultural nationalism also played a role in response to the land questions, with 
myths and memories of eviction and emigration before, during and after the 
Famine leading to the belief that land ownership would restore the nation and 
prevent a recurrence of past deprivations (Githens-Mazer, 2006, pp. 93-94). 
The unsatisfactory nature of land reform frustrated cultural nationalists and 
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facilitated their espousal of the ideal of a de-anglicised ‘Irish Ireland’, which was 
crystallised in institutions such as the Gaelic Athletics Association (GAA) and 
the Gaelic League, which promotes the Irish language, and culminated in the 
Gaelic revival of the late nineteenth century (Githens-Mazer, 2006, pp. 84, 94. 
See also Hutchinson, 1987, p. 115). The GAA was instrumental in the revival of 
Gaelic sport, particularly hurling, linking athleticism with cultural nationalism 
(McGarry and O’Leary, 1995, p. 224). This demonstrates the importance of 
cultural nationalism to understanding the struggle for home rule throughout the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as the recurrence of the myths, 
memories and symbols associated with Ireland’s Gaelic past was used in order 
to unify the Irish nation around a common, shared heritage. Kennedy and 
Johnson (1996, pp. 44-47) state that the home rule movement towards the late 
nineteenth century was also being fuelled by the perception amongst the 
nationalist majority that they were being overtaxed by the British. Bew (2011, 
ch. 1) argues that the question of self-government for Ireland had a distinct 
religious/sectarian dimension, which was evident at the 1885 general election 
when candidates campaigning for home rule were victorious in every 
constituency with a Catholic majority, which is unsurprising given that this was, 
and remains, the predominant religious denomination of the native Irish 
population. 
 
The issue of home rule divided the island. Whilst many nationalists were 
committed to the cause for aforementioned reasons, when the British prime 
minister at the time, William Gladstone, introduced the first Home Rule Bill in 
1886, it was met in unionist majority Belfast with ‘shock, dismay and even 
disbelief’ (Bew, 2011, ch. 1). Unionists responded by stressing the benefits of 
the union, particularly to Ulster, which they argued home rule would undermine 
(Kennedy and Johnson, 1996, pp. 52-53). They continued to maintain this 
position when the British government introduced a further Home Rule Bill 
between 1912 and 1914, yet despite its implementation being delayed due to 
World War I, London’s response to the republican-led Easter Rising in Dublin, 
which was ruthlessly put down and saw a number of leaders executed, resulted 
in a huge increase in sympathy for home rule activists (McKittrick and McVea, 
2001, pp. 3-4). This culminated in the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, which 
was designed to satisfy the conflicting demands of unionists and nationalists 
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(McKittrick and McVea, 2001, p. 4). The Anglo-Irish Treaty of the following year 
established the Irish Free State, with dominion status within the British Empire, 
and allowed for Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK (see Anglo-Irish 
Treaty, 1921).  
 
Post-partition 
It was decided that two home rule parliaments would be established: one in 
Dublin, as the capital of a twenty-six county Irish Free State, and the other in 
Belfast, the capital of a six county Northern Ireland (Ulster with the exception of 
the counties of Cavan, Monaghan and Donegal to ensure a Protestant majority, 
as lobbied for by unionists) (O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, pp. 98-100). Although 
unionists had long opposed home rule, they soon saw the benefits of having 
their own parliament, as it provided a ‘bulwark against the untrustworthy 
intentions of London governments and the claims of Irish republicans’, and 
facilitated the maintenance of their British cultural and national identity (O’Leary 
and McGarry, 1996, pp. 98-100). The home rule movement in the Irish Free 
State became divided, and a civil war ensued throughout 1922 and 1923 
between pro and anti-Anglo-Irish Treaty forces (see Foster, 1989, pp. 506, 511-
15). The former was comprised of Irish nationalists, ultimately the Provisional 
Government and its state institutions, and the latter of republicans, most notably 
the Irish Republican Army and Sinn Fein, who were aggrieved at the failure of 
the Treaty to establish a republic entirely independent from Britain and its 
empire, from which the pro-Agreement forces emerged victorious. This 
demonstrates the presence of, and divisions between, nationalism and 
republicanism on the island of Ireland long before the outbreak of conflict in 
Northern Ireland in the late 1960s. A republic was later declared for the twenty 
six counties in the 1937 constitution, which was accepted by the UK and fully 
implemented in 1949 (see Coakley, 2002b, p. 4; Foster, 1989, pp. 566-67). 
 
Northern Ireland’s population ratio at the time of partition was two-thirds unionist 
and one third nationalist, and the ‘imperfections’ of the division of the island, 
particularly the inclusion of Fermanagh and Tyrone in the North, with their 
significant nationalist populations, resulted in unionist dominance of politics and 
wider society for half a century (see O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, pp. 100-01, 
ch. 3; McKittrick and McVea, 2001, pp. 7-13). Politically, this was achieved 
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through measures such as the revision of the local and national electoral 
system from PR-STV to first past the post and the gerrymandering of 
constituency boundaries in order to increase the likelihood of unionist victory 
(McKittrick and McVea, 2001, pp. 7-9). Unionists also used Northern Ireland’s 
legal system to assert their dominance, with the implementation of measures 
such as legislation designed to outlaw symbolic displays by nationalists 
(O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, pp. 127-28). The Flags and Emblems (Display) 
Act of 1954, for example, banned the display of all flags except that of the union 
and was not repealed until 1987 (Bryan and Stevenson, 2009, p. 71; Bryan et 
al, 2010, p. 7). Bryan and Stevenson (2009, pp. 70-71) refer to measures such 
as this as part of a wider regime of unionist control of Northern Ireland’s public 
space, with the union flag flown all year round from many government buildings. 
Economically, nationalists were discriminated against in areas such as 
employment and public benefits, notably in housing, in which community 
segregation was enforced in order to prevent the establishment of mixed 
communities and to maintain electoral results favourable to unionists, which 
O’Leary and McGarry (see 1996, ch. 3) refer to as unionist ‘hegemonic control’.  
 
Some argue that the approach of nationalists and republicans in the Irish Free 
State (and, later, the Republic of Ireland), such as Michael Collins aiding IRA 
attacks on Northern Ireland during the early 1920s and the 1937 constitution 
asserting that the Irish national territory was the entire island of Ireland, 
aggravated unionist fears, strengthened loyalism and justified the discriminatory 
stance of Stormont against the Catholic minority in the eyes of Protestants (see, 
for example, Kennedy, 1988, quoted in Ruane and Todd, 1998, p. 59). The 
implementation of ‘O’Neillism’, in reference to the former Northern Irish prime 
minister, Terence O’Neill, which attempted to modernise the region and 
encourage better community relations during the 1960s, led to civil rights 
protests by nationalists and the eventual suspension of Stormont and 
implementation of direct rule in 1972 (see O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, ch. 4). 
O’Duffy (1999, p. 525) argues that it is the historic nature of ethnic and religious 
divisions in Ireland, and later in Northern Ireland, between British and Irish 
nationalisms that made it such a challenging case for conflict management. In 
providing an overview of the origins of the unionist and nationalist traditions on 
the island of Ireland, an ethno-symbolist approach has been utilised in order to 
25 
 
explain the historical character of divisions between the two, which culminated 
in Northern Ireland with the outbreak of violent conflict. 
 
Kennedy-Pipe (2006, pp. 44-45) asserts that the first incident of violence during 
the unrest that was to later become known as the ‘Troubles’ occurred in Derry in 
October 1968 when civil rights activists clashed with police. The result was the 
separation of urban populations along ethno-national lines and intense 
sectarianism in the years that followed, which was met by the establishment, or 
in some cases reestablishment, of republican and loyalist paramilitary groups. 
British troops were deployed in Northern Ireland in August 1969 in attempt to 
stem the conflict and were initially welcomed by the nationalist population in the 
belief that they would provide them with some protection against the unionist-
dominated government and police. However, events such as Bloody Sunday in 
January 1972, during which thirteen unarmed civilians were shot dead by 
soldiers of the Parachute Regiment in Derry, led to this being dispelled and to 
sympathy amongst many Catholics towards the aims of republican 
paramilitaries (McKittrick and McVea, 2001, p. 76). The violence first seen in 
1968 was to engulf Northern Ireland for the next thirty years, with republican 
and loyalist paramilitary groups, British troops and the police all belligerents 
contributing to the sectarian divisions that remain today. It was recognised 
almost from the outbreak of conflict that an agreement was necessary in order 
to manage the level of violence, however this was not achieved until 1998 and 
after the deaths of more than 3,500 people (McKittrick and McVea, 2001, p. 
325). Before Chapter Two analyses how this agreement was reached and the 
form it takes, this study will explore the characteristics of the two major ethno-
nationalist communities in Northern Ireland. 
 
 
Ethno-national identity in Northern Ireland 
 
Protestantism/Unionism/Loyalism 
The vast majority of Protestants in Northern Ireland are unionists and their 
ultimate objective is to maintain the current link between the region and Britain 
as part of the UK (McKittrick and McVea, 2001, p. 2). They make up 48 per cent 
of the population (Devenport, 2012). Protestants mostly identify as British, with 
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63 per cent doing so in a 2009 survey (NILT, 2009), and fear the alternative to 
maintaining the link with Britain – a united Ireland in which they envisage Irish 
nationalists to attack their religious, political and economic interests (McKittrick 
and McVea, 2001, p. 2). Furthermore, O’Dowd (1998, p. 77) argues that 
unionists have tended to define themselves in terms of what they are not rather 
than what they are (principally, not Irish Catholic or nationalist), and blame 
others for this negativity, from the aggressive nature of Irish nationalist politics 
to the inconsistency of British governments in their policy towards Northern 
Ireland. Porter (1996, quoted in Dixon, 2000, pp. 206-09) identifies three 
strands of unionism.  
 
Firstly, ‘cultural’ unionism is an ideology based on ‘common religious or cultural 
practices’ and one which believes that Northern Irish politics ‘should be shaped 
by a Protestant-British ethos’ (Porter, 1996, quoted in Dixon, pp. 206-07). 
Proponents of this strand consider the values associated with British unionism, 
such as the defence of religious and civil liberties, to be superior to those of 
Irish Catholicism or nationalism. They are largely unwilling to grant any cultural 
concessions to, or accommodate within Northern Ireland, Catholics/nationalists 
and the ideology, Porter (1996, quoted in Dixon, pp. 206-07) argues, therefore 
‘relies on a notion of Britishness unrecognisable in Great Britain’ and 
‘exaggerates the role of Protestantism in the maintenance of civil and religious 
liberty’. Smithey (2011, p. 57) claims that the difficulty that cultural unionists 
have in engaging with nationalists is a result of their ‘intense focus’ on 
Britishness and the UK, and a strong appreciation for their interpretation of 
British identity, which is not shared by nationalists. The ideology can be adapted 
to justify sectarian attitudes and, politically, has traditionally been associated 
with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) (Dixon, 2000, p. 206). Theoretically, 
cultural unionism conforms to Hobsbawm’s (1990, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 
121) aforementioned definition of ethnic nationalism and features both 
primordial and perennial characteristics. 
 
Secondly, ‘liberal’ unionism is an ideology based on citizenship, as opposed to 
the need for a shared culture as argued for by cultural unionists, and offers ‘a 
political vision without confessional bias’ (Aughey, 1989, p. 19, quoted in Dixon, 
2000, p. 207; Porter, 1996, p. 127). Porter (1996, pp. 127-28) states that this is 
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rooted in a ‘British political way of life’, which is culturally blind in political affairs, 
encourages plurality and therefore appeals across the sectarian divide. Liberal 
unionism focuses on Northern Ireland’s position within the UK and its 
Britishness in common with the rest of the state, and the centrality of the 
Westminster government in upholding this (see Porter, 1996, pp. 129-37). 
Aughey (1995, p. 12, quoted in Porter, 1996, pp. 132-33) further defines the 
ideology as being based around a union comprised ‘of citizens united not by 
creed, colour or ethnicity but by a recognition of the authority of the union’, 
which is embodied by the British state. Liberal unionism therefore differs from 
cultural unionism as it is principally concerned with citizenship, whilst cultural 
unionism stresses the importance of a common religion and culture.  
 
Politically, Porter (1996, p. 20) argues that liberal unionism is not confinable to a 
single unionist party but is most likely to attract support from within sections of 
the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), and is advocated by the former UUP and later 
UK Unionist Party (UKUP) politician, Robert McCartney. Porter (1996, ch. 4, 
quoted in Dixon, 2000, pp. 207-08) makes two key criticisms of liberal unionism. 
Firstly, the British institutions and symbols that it supports are perceived by 
many nationalists to be exclusive and biased towards unionism, and, secondly, 
citizenship may not be a sufficient political identity for which to substitute 
religious and cultural institutions and to unite the two communities. Similarly, 
McGarry and O’Leary (1995, quoted in Smithey, 2011, p. 57) criticise liberal 
unionism for failing to take into account the impact of historic British colonialism 
in Ireland. O’Dowd (1998, pp. 80-81) also critiques Porter for not recognising 
that the approach is a form of nationalism itself – for example, it is nationalism 
which underpins issues such as identity and citizenship – and this is the very 
ideology it claims to wholeheartedly reject. On the basis of Porter’s definition, 
liberal unionism is a form of civic nationalism (see, for example, Hobsbawm, 
1990, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 121). 
 
Finally, ‘civic’ unionism is explained by Porter (1996, p. 170) is an ideology 
which considers ‘the quality of social and political life in Northern Ireland’, and 
the inclusion within this of unionists, nationalists and other non-unionists, and is 
more important than the maintenance of the union. Porter (1996, ch. 5, quoted 
in Dixon, 2000, p. 208) identifies three key elements of this ideology. Firstly, 
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liberal unionism’s support for British institutions is rejected in favour of Northern 
Irish institutions that both communities are able to pledge allegiance to. It is 
principally this that has led Dixon (2000, p. 208) to argue that civic unionist 
ideology anticipates to some degree the consociational Good Friday 
Agreement. Secondly, as a result of the position of the region as part of the UK, 
nationalist culture should be afforded ‘due recognition’ as opposed to ‘parity of 
esteem’ in order to reflect Northern Ireland’s current constitutional status. 
Finally, civic unionists stress the need for the engagement of unionism in civil 
society, whereby both communities may be able to establish some common 
ground in order to overcome their differences.  
 
Dixon (2000, pp. 208-09) makes two criticisms of civic unionism. Firstly, he 
argues that Porter exaggerates the potential of Northern Ireland’s 
‘disappointing’ civil society to transcend community divisions in the region and, 
secondly, suggests that the ideology suffers from a lack of a realistic political 
strategy from which to achieve its goals, and is threatened altogether as it does 
not share the priorities of cultural and liberal unionists. As a result, Porter’s 
account of civic unionism is not wholeheartedly advocated by either of the two 
main unionist parties, the DUP or the UUP. However, as both now support 
Northern Ireland’s power sharing institutions, elements of this ideology are 
undoubtedly incorporated within their positions. This indicates a moderation of 
political unionism throughout the ongoing peace process. 
 
The UUP was founded in the pre-partition era and has strong connections to the 
Orange Order, a Protestant organisation which prohibits Catholic membership 
(Clayton, 1998, p. 41), and to the Ulster Unionist Council. The party governed 
continuously from the establishment of Northern Ireland as a political entity in 
1921 until the dissolution of its parliament in 1972, whilst maintaining its position 
as the largest party until the early 2000s (see, for example, McKittrick and 
McVea, 2001). British political parties have played a minor role in Northern Irish 
electoral politics, with the Conservatives the only party of any significance. They 
have been allied to the UUP to varying degrees throughout each other’s 
histories and have also single-handedly contested some elections in Northern 
Ireland, with very limited success, whilst the most recent UUP-Conservative 
alliance was formed in 2009 under the short lived Ulster Conservatives and 
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Unionists – New Force (UCUNF) banner (Tonge and Evans, 2010, p. 743). The 
Conservatives have traditionally been, and indeed arguably continue to be, the 
most pro-union of the mainstream British political parties (see, for example, 
Cameron, 2008; 2010). 
 
Aughey (1990, p. 189. See also McIntosh, 1999; Farrington, 2001, pp. 50-52) 
cites Bruce’s argument that ‘the core of unionist ideology is evangelical 
Protestantism’, which further indicates the inextricable link between unionism 
and religion in Northern Ireland. Wallis and Bruce (1986, p. 13, quoted in 
Aughey, 1990, p. 189) also stress the impact that this has had on unionist 
politics in the region and cite the mainstream DUP as an organisation to which 
Protestantism is of particular importance (see also Smyth, 2008). The party was 
co-founded by Ian Paisley in 1971 with strong links to the Free Presbyterian 
Church (of which Paisley was a founding member) and was established  with 
the intention of challenging the UUP’s fifty year dominance of Northern Irish 
politics by seeking to appeal to working class voters (Bew and Gillespie, 1993, 
p. 40). Bryan and Stevenson (2009, p. 81) emphasise Paisley’s utilisation of his 
fundamental religious position to oppose the nationalist civil rights movement 
during its emergence in the late 1960s. These characteristics, along with the 
initially hard line stance of the DUP in opposing the peace process, have led to 
some defining the party’s position as loyalist, despite an absence of links 
between the party and paramilitary organisations (see, for example, Smithey, 
2011, ch. 3). Amid divisions within the UUP regarding support for the Good 
Friday Agreement, it was superseded by the DUP as the largest unionist party 
in the early 2000s, with the latter having since moderated its traditionally hard 
line stance and agreeing to share power with its republican opponents, Sinn 
Fein, in 2007 (de Breadun, 2008, pp. 379-83). 
 
Loyalism is an important ideology of Northern Ireland’s Protestant community 
and one that shares many similarities with cultural unionism. McAuley (2004, 
pp. 524-25) asserts that loyalism’s defining characteristics are a strong sense of 
devotion to Northern Ireland, and loyalty to the British Crown and the union flag. 
He also stresses the commitment of loyalists to a distinctively British ‘series of 
shared social norms, symbols and actions’, and an attachment to their own 
interpretation of a ‘British way of life’. Underpinning loyalism is a contractual 
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relationship between loyalists and the British state, complete with rights and 
duties. Although the British state and population does not always reciprocate 
this loyalty, this does not, however, mitigate the pro-unionism of loyalists (Miller, 
1978; P. Mitchell, 1999; Shirlow and McGovern, 1997, quoted in McAuley, 
2004, p. 525). Wright (1973, p. 233, quoted in Clayton, 1998, p. 43) also claims 
that the majority of loyalists are anti-Catholic and anti-Irish. These 
characteristics show clear links between loyalism and cultural unionism, 
however a defining difference between the two is the willingness of the former 
to use physical force in order to maintain and promote their objectives (see 
Ervine, 2002; Smithey, 2011; Bruce, 2001). Smithey (2011, p. 58) asserts that 
loyalists are to be found principally in working class areas and include 
evangelical Protestants, paramilitaries and loyal orders.  
 
Loyalism has traditionally been associated with two main paramilitary 
organisations: the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defence 
Association (UDA) (Bruce, 2001). Established (in the case of the UVF in its 
contemporary form) in response to the outbreak of conflict, Ruane and Todd 
(1996, pp. 94-95, quoted in McAuley, 2004, pp. 525-26) state that the UVF and 
the UDA sought to offer the ‘violence and militancy’ at this time that many 
Protestants considered to be necessary in order to combat ‘being pushed out of 
their traditional areas and workplaces’, as this was a threat to their existence 
which was not being ‘effectively met by the state’. McAuley (1995, quoted in 
2004, pp. 526-27) argues that the core philosophy of loyalist paramilitaries was 
to offer a form of counter terrorism to republican paramilitaries, although 
ordinary Catholics were often targeted, until a loyalist ceasefire was achieved in 
1994, which subsequently resulted in the gradual transformation of these 
organisations away from violence. Despite this, it is, for example, alleged that 
senior UVF members were involved in the instigation of rioting in response to 
the decision in 2012 to limit the flying of the union flag over Belfast City Hall 
(McDonald, 2013a). 
 
The loyalist ceasefire coincided with the ascendancy of a ‘new’ form of political, 
as opposed to paramilitary, loyalism (see Ervine, 2002; McAuley, 2002; 2004; 
2005; Bruce, 2001). This is most evident in the Progressive Unionist Party 
(PUP), the political arm of the UVF, which despite being established in the 
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1970s, did not enjoy any significant electoral success until the mid-1990s, 
largely due to the release from prison of key UVF figures such as David Ervine 
and Billy Hutchinson, who, unlike their predecessors, were prepared to criticise 
unionism and the British state (McAuley, 2002, p. 108). Whilst maintaining an 
‘intensely unionist’ focus, the PUP offers a socialist, working class alternative to 
the traditional right-wing/centre-right conservatism of the DUP and UUP 
(McAuley, 2002, pp. 109-13). A second loyalist party, the Ulster Democratic 
Party (UDP), the political wing of the UDA, could trace its roots to the mid-1970s 
and, similarly to the PUP, sought to offer an alternative to the traditional unionist 
parties (see McAuley, 2005, pp. 234-37). The UDP based its appeal around 
providing the people with a voice and promised effective leadership, both of 
which it claimed the UUP and the DUP were failing to achieve (McAuley, 2005, 
p. 325). Aside from winning two ‘top up’ seats in the Forum election of 1996 and 
therefore being permitted to participate in the all-party peace negotiations, the 
UDP’s electoral success failed to advance beyond local government level and it 
was subsequently dissolved in the early 2000s.  
 
It is likely that the limited success of loyalist parties, in particular the PUP, 
during the mid to late 1990s can be at least partly attributable to the loyalist 
ceasefire of 1994, which encouraged more moderate unionists disillusioned with 
the UUP and the DUP to support them (Smithey, 2011, p. 59). Despite the 
failure of these parties to successfully penetrate the mainstream political arena, 
the shift in focus from paramilitarism to politics during the 1990s did, however, 
demonstrate a moderation of the traditionally hard line stance of loyalism. 
Although violent loyalist paramilitarism is today largely confined to the past, the 
decline of support within the loyalist community for the Good Friday Agreement 
during the post-1998 era culminated in events such as the aforementioned flag 
protests and riots of 2012-13, and is linked to the ‘divided and dispirited’ nature 
of loyalism (Gillespie, 2006, pp. 149-50). This suggests that loyalists do not 
share the optimism of republicans, which may be a result of – or indeed a 
contributing factor to – their lack of political success. 
 
There are a number of cultural traditions and symbols that are used by the 
unionist community to demonstrate their Britishness and attachment to Britain. 
McAuley and Tonge (2010, pp. 269-70) recognise that a fundamental 
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characteristic of Britishness for unionists is the Protestant religion and that it is 
the evangelical values of this denomination of Christianity that make up a 
central thread in the ethnic identity of unionists in Northern Ireland. They also 
highlight the politicisation of Protestantism in the region, with, for example, 
churches influencing unionist political parties. Southern (2007, pp. 83-84) 
identifies other main sources of the Britishness of unionists as the union flag, 
the monarchy and the national anthem, as well as ceremonies commemorating 
those from Northern Ireland who fought in wars for Britain. This final point of 
identification is particularly salient and merits further discussion.  
 
The primary example of this is the role of the Ulster Division in the Battle of the 
Somme during World War I (Officer and Walker, 2000, pp. 297-301). With at 
least five thousand men from the Division either dead or injured, this is a 
significant example of the willingness of people in Northern Ireland to make the 
ultimate sacrifice for Britain, and the event has remained on the consciousness 
of unionists ever since. As is the case in Britain, Armistice Day has become an 
important event within Northern Ireland’s unionist community and has provided 
members with the opportunity to parade the union flag, reconvene the tradition 
of the British Army and demonstrate unity with Britain and its former empire. It is 
an example of a collective memory which has the ability to unite unionists 
across time and space. A further way in which unionists in Northern Ireland 
have been keen highlight their Britishness is through utilising their connection 
with Scotland, primarily by emphasising the Ulster-Scots language and 
Presbyterianism in order to demonstrate this (Officer and Walker, 2000, p. 303). 
The examples included are evidence of the importance to unionism of a shared 
culture, symbols, myths and memories which ethno-symbolists argue play a 
crucial role in the formation of nations and ethnic communities. 
 
The idea of Britishness, however, appears to have taken on a different meaning 
in Northern Ireland than in the rest of the UK. Officer and Walker (2000, pp. 
294-95) argue that unionists struggle to convince people in Britain that they are 
not ‘less than British’ or ‘semi-detached’ from Britain. This problem, however, 
has never been resolved to the advantage of unionists, as they have often been 
labelled as ‘not quite British’ or ‘unBritish’ by those in Britain who fail to realise 
that Britishness means different things to different people and communities 
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(Officer and Walker, 2000, pp. 294-95). It is nevertheless true that unionists in 
Northern Ireland represent a particular form of Britishness which will now be 
explored in comparison to that usually associated with the island of Britain.  
 
McAuley and Tonge (2010, p. 281) argue that Northern Ireland features an 
‘ultra’ Britishness which is linked to a religious persuasion and political 
nationalism unrecognisable in the rest of the UK, and this explains the 
distinctive nature of the British identity of unionists. It must be questioned why 
the sense of Britishness felt by many unionists in Northern Ireland is so different 
to that in Britain and contributing factors for this will be now be considered. 
Southern (2007, pp. 73-74) identifies a first to be a result of the patriotic loyalty 
and strong sense of Britishness felt by unionists no longer being shared with 
those on the mainland due to the marginalisation of the importance of the 
Protestant religion and the monarchy having taken place in Britain but not in 
Northern Ireland. Similarly, Patterson (2012, p. 250) states that unionists have 
been accused by some of having a sense of Britishness which the multicultural, 
secular, liberal mainland has long since shed itself of. It has been suggested 
that this different conception of British identity may be due to the physical 
separation of Northern Ireland from the island of Britain and also its political 
separation until 1972 (Southern, 2007, p. 73). Furthermore, Officer and Walker 
(2000, p. 303) assert that it is this changing sense of Britishness in Britain which 
renders the basis of aforementioned attempts by unionists to draw similarities 
between themselves and the Scots to ‘take little notice of the realities of 
contemporary Scotland’. This reinforces the argument of Weight (2002, p. 532, 
quoted in Southern, 2007, p. 73) that to people in Britain, unionism’s sense of 
Britishness appears to be ‘feverish and old fashioned’. 
 
A further factor to explain why the sense of Britishness in Northern Ireland 
differs to that in Britain can be found in the keenness of unionists to differentiate 
themselves from Irish nationalists. Whilst nationalism in Britain is largely civic in 
form, in Northern Ireland many unionists feel the need to resort to culture and 
symbolism in order to demonstrate their British national identity. Despite a 
significant number of Protestants having identified as ‘Irish’ prior to the outbreak 
of the Troubles, Southern (2007, p. 77) considers the widespread decline in the 
years since to be a result of the association of this identity with a paramilitary 
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campaign designed to dissolve the union. Furthermore, McAuley and Tonge 
(2010, p. 280) assert that nationalists in Northern Ireland are still viewed by 
some in the unionist community as ‘IRA sympathisers’ and the Irish Republic is 
considered by these unionists to be ‘a confessional and backward state’. These 
negative connotations explain why, since the outbreak of the Troubles, many 
unionists have shunned an Irish identity. Ignatieff (1993, pp. 177-78, quoted in 
McAuley and Tonge, 2010, p. 272) provides an example of unionists 
differentiating themselves from nationalists in the practice of painting 
kerbstones the colours of the union flag. He states that when asked why this 
was necessary in Northern Ireland and not in Britain, those responsible argued 
that the mainland British ‘are not up against what we’re up against’ and that in 
Northern Ireland ‘it’s just us and the Taigs (Catholics)’, hence the need to ‘show 
our colours’. Participation in activities such as this is evidence of unionists 
conforming to cultural and ethno-symbolist accounts of nationalism in order to 
differentiate themselves from Irish nationalists, and their perceived need to do 
this goes some way to explaining why this sense of Britishness is so alien in 
Britain due to the mainland British not being confronted with a perceived ‘other’, 
or opposite, community and national identity. 
 
Southern (2007) draws attention to the existence amongst unionists of an Ulster 
identity, which despite being linked to a sense of Britishness, possesses many 
unique characteristics. As is the case with Britishness in Northern Ireland, a 
range of cultural attributes and symbols are used in order to support this 
identity. Many are associated with loyalism and include, for example, the Ulster 
flag, flags of paramilitary organisations such as the UVF and the UDA, murals, 
bonfires, the Orange Order and Orange folk songs (Southern, 2007, pp. 85, 87). 
Others, such as painted kerbstones and murals depicting the Crown, are 
ultimately British symbols being utilised in a uniquely Northern Irish way 
(Southern, 2007, p. 86). Many cultural traditions and symbols of Ulsterness are 
thus used simultaneously with those of Britishness. The Orange Order is an 
example of an organisation which whilst being ‘a potent institutional expression 
of Protestant culture and Ulster particularism’, links the defence of the Faith with 
Britishness and the continuation of the union, and, as such, the Order parades 
the union flag alongside the Ulster Banner (Southern, 2007, p. 85; McAuley and 
Tonge, 2007, quoted in 2010, p. 270).  
35 
 
 
Bryan and Stevenson (2009, p. 71. See also Bryan, 2000) highlight the 
predominantly Protestant tradition of parading, which has become a potent 
symbol of the unionist community in Northern Ireland, with many parades 
orchestrated by the Orange Order and other fraternal organisations such as the 
Black Institution and the Apprentice Boys of Derry. The marching season 
culminates in the Twelfth of July celebrations, commemorating the Battle of the 
Boyne of 1690, in which Catholic King James was defeated by Protestant King 
William, and this date has assumed a deep symbolic significance within 
unionism (Bryan and Stevenson, 2009, p. 68). There is a traditional proliferation 
of the display of British, Ulster, unionist and loyalist flags and emblems during 
the summer months to coincide with this (Bryan et al, 2010, p. 7). The Twelfth 
commemorations are an example of a psychocultural narrative of a historical 
event being utilised by unionists to control the symbolic landscape, even if only 
in the temporary form of marches during July. McGarry and O’Leary (1995, p. 
226) cite the British and loyalist flags and emblems displayed by supporters of 
the Northern Ireland association football team as a further example of the 
utilisation of a combination of both Ulster and British symbolism by Protestants, 
who make up a disproportionate number of the team’s followers, in part due to 
Northern Ireland home matches being played at Windsor Park, the stadium of 
traditionally Protestant Linfield FC, although the club has had Catholic players. 
 
Southern (2007, pp. 85-86) argues that rather than being contradictory, the co-
presence of British and Ulster symbolism demonstrates the duality of cultural 
bonds amongst unionists in Northern Ireland. He suggests that this duality is a 
feature of the rest of the UK, with the existence of English, Scottish and Welsh 
identities, and regional dimensions of Britishness. Hill and White (2012, p. 73. 
See also Jarman, 1997, p. 215) draw attention to a revival of distinctly Ulster 
symbolism, particularly on murals, during the mid-1980s by the loyalist 
community in response to what they perceived to be a weakening of the British 
government’s jurisdiction over Northern Ireland. Whilst this example supports 
Todd’s aforementioned argument that it is loyalists, rather than unionists, who 
are most likely to identify with Ulsterness, this position is too simplistic as it is 
not only loyalists within the Protestant community who support, for example, 
Orange Order parades and the flying of the Ulster flag. Likewise, as 
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aforementioned, loyalist identification is not restricted to the culture and 
symbolism of Ulster, as that of Britain is also utilised. As such, Southern (2007, 
pp. 85-86) argues that a sense of Ulsterness alone does not define unionist 
identity as Britishness is also important, and as such many attach greater 
sentiment to British culture and symbols than to those of Ulster. Furthermore, 
he suggests that some unionists consider the use of Ulster symbolism 
alongside British to encourage division and to be an ‘abomination’ due to their 
belief in the predominance and cultural superiority of the latter, indicating a 
greater association with Britishness amongst these unionists. Ultimately, 
however, the British and Ulster cultures in Northern Ireland are not mutually 
exclusive, and both have played a crucial role in the formation, and 
maintenance, of unionist identity. 
 
Catholicism/Nationalism/Republicanism 
In seemingly direct contrast to unionists, the vast majority – 66 per cent (NILT, 
2009) – of Northern Catholics identify as Irish and consider a united Ireland to 
be the ‘natural political unit’ of the island, whilst regarding the entity of Northern 
Ireland to be unsatisfactory and, to many, illegitimate (McKittrick and McVea, 
2001, p. 2). Catholics make up 45 per cent of the population (Devenport, 2012). 
It is, nevertheless, necessary to note that not all Catholics in Northern Ireland 
support a united Ireland. Whilst this is their traditional and historical position, 
recent opinion polls suggest that approximately half of the Catholic population 
would opt for Northern Ireland to remain in the UK in a referendum on its 
constitutional future (Devenport, 2013). This, however, does not demonstrate a 
softening of nationalist sentiment. Rather, it is likely a result of many 
considering the institutions established by the Good Friday Agreement to 
adequately represent and provide for them. As will be demonstrated, there is an 
ideological distinction between nationalist and republican ideology in Northern 
Ireland, which has its roots in the Irish Civil War. On the basis of Hobsbawm’s 
(1990, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 121) aforementioned definitions, Irish 
nationalists subscribe to a civic form of nationalism, whilst republicanism is 
traditionally associated with ethnic nationalism. Mainstream republicanism is 
today, however, usually considered to be largely civic in character (see, for 
example, McLaughlin, 2002). 
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Todd (2002, p. 73) refers to the existence of a ‘classic nationalism’ amongst 
Northern nationalists after the establishment of Northern Ireland, which was 
characterised as being the nationalist ideology of the era prior to partition, and 
focused on an Irish nation of the entire island, and the sovereign statehood and 
right to self-determination of this nation. Northern nationalists thus consider the 
partition of the island to be unnatural and their primary aim, at least as a long 
term aspiration, is the reunification of Ireland independent of Britain (Todd, 
2002, pp. 71, 73). From the outset of the establishment of Northern Ireland, 
nationalists refused to recognise its legitimacy. They boycotted its parliament 
upon its inauguration in June 1921, as well as every other state institution, and 
this refusal to participate undoubtedly contributed to the discrimination they 
were to be subjected to throughout the next fifty years, not least because it 
absolved Protestants of blame for developing Northern Ireland with a unionist 
bias, as nationalists had passed on the opportunity to influence this (Elliott, 
2000, p. 383). They were, however, prepared to stand for election to the 
Northern Ireland Parliament and took their seats after 1925, leading to the 
establishment of the Nationalist Party in the North, which had ten MPs by 1927 
(Elliott, 2000, p. 396). 
 
The discrimination faced by nationalists took the form of unjust housing and 
employment allocation, and intimidation and cultural humiliation, and it is the 
prioritisation of principles of justice that distinguished Southern from Northern 
nationalism during the era of the unionist-dominated parliament (Todd, 2002, 
pp. 73-74). Initially, there was a greater desire to remedy this discrimination 
than to bring about a united Ireland (Todd, 2002, p. 74). Ruane and Todd (1998, 
p. 61) claim that the establishment of a welfare state after World War II and 
O’Neillism of the 1960s, during which the prime minister reconciled with 
nationalists by, for example, visiting a Catholic school and inviting two taoisigh 
to Stormont (Elliott, 2000, p. 409), resulted in a less intense form of nationalism 
in the North, with less of a focus on nationhood. Despite the Nationalist Party 
having fallen out of favour with the community during this period due to its 
frequent abstinence at Stormont and the ‘sulkiness and whinging’ of its MPs 
(Elliott, 2000, p. 397), the party responded to O’Neillism by accepting the role of 
official opposition in the Northern Ireland Parliament. This diminishment of 
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nationalist intensity in Northern Ireland was, however, short lived (Ruane and 
Todd, 1998, p. 61). 
 
Todd (2002, p. 74) argues that the civil rights movement of the late 1960s 
resulted in a ‘major ideological crisis’ within Northern nationalism, presenting it 
with a choice between justice or nationalism. The community opted for the 
former, as opposed to unity, and in doing so led a movement which played a 
highly significant role in bringing down the Stormont regime. She argues, 
however, that events such as Bloody Sunday, when British soldiers shot dead 
fourteen unarmed Catholic civilians in Derry (see, for example, Elliott, 2000, p. 
421), had the effect of reinvigorating a desire for Irish unity amongst the 
community. August 1970 saw the formation of the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP), which was nationalist, reformist and committed to a 
united Ireland as its long term, chief aim (Bew and Gillespie, 1993, p. 30). This, 
the party believed, should be achieved by consent, and unlike the Nationalist 
Party, its MPs were full-time politicians in the Northern Ireland Parliament prior 
to its dissolution in 1972 (Elliott, 2000, p. 423). It was a founding member, and 
later leader, of this party, John Hume, who provided the answers to 
nationalism’s most pressing questions: ‘Cooperation with or antagonism 
towards unionists and the British?’, and ‘A strong nationalism (which would 
provoke unionists and bring no immediate gains) or a moderate reformism 
(which was likely to be equally ineffective)?’ (Todd, 2002, pp. 74-75).  
 
Todd (2002, p. 75) states that Hume’s response was to Europeanise and 
internationalise the problem by switching the arena from Northern Ireland and 
the UK to the EU, the island of Ireland and the United States, whilst formulating 
legitimacy principles which required nationalism and reform, as opposed to 
simply one or the other. Hume focused on an Irish national identity for Northern 
nationalists with a strong Irish dimension and role for the Republic in Northern 
Ireland, and a right to self-determination for the island. This not only shaped the 
ideology of the SDLP, but also came to make up significant principles of 
Northern nationalism, which later became key components of the Good Friday 
Agreement. Maginness (2002, p. 33) argues that Hume’s approach also had 
implications for nationalism in the Irish Republic, changing constitutional 
39 
 
nationalist positions and thinking both amongst the population as a whole, and, 
more specifically, within political parties.  
 
Todd (2002, pp. 77-79) further explores this new orientation of nationalism in 
Northern Ireland in order to determine how it can be categorised. She argues 
that it is not classic nationalism as it does not assume that the state and nation 
should coincide, and national self-determination is instead based on agreement. 
Neither is it pluralism, as this takes place within state boundaries and does not 
prioritise ethno-national groups. Todd (2002, pp. 78-79) instead suggests that it 
is possible that this new orientation of Northern nationalism is a combination of 
liberal nationalism, regionalism and republicanism as it includes characteristics 
of all three. Firstly, she argues that it supports the institutionalisation of national 
culture and the prioritisation of national rights required for nationalist consent 
and state legitimacy, whilst recognising the equality of other nations, which are 
inherent principles of liberal nationalism. Many within the SDLP subscribe to this 
and advocate the gradual weakening of the British state in Northern Ireland to 
ease its eventual transition to a united Ireland, should a majority support this. 
Secondly, she asserts that the new nationalism can be viewed as regionalism in 
that it emphasises multiple links, such as North-South bodies, and autonomy of 
the region, whilst lessening the focus on state sovereignty, which fits with 
Hume’s aforementioned account of the Europeanisation and internationalisation 
of Northern nationalism.  
 
Finally, Todd (2002, p. 78) identifies that the new nationalism includes elements 
of republicanism, with a principle of self-determination which must be satisfied 
by referendums in both Northern Ireland and the Republic, which was important 
to Hume. Maginness (2002, pp. 35-36), unsurprisingly as a senior member of 
the SDLP, is keen to highlight the ‘outstanding achievement’ of the party in 
ensuring that the fundamental principles of Hume’s philosophy were included in 
the Good Friday Agreement. In many respects he is right to refer to it in these 
terms – after all, the Agreement was supported by a significant majority of the 
nationalist community in Northern Ireland, demonstrating the resonance of 
Hume’s ideology (Wilford, 1999, p. 300). The electoral fortunes of the party in 
the period since 1998 have, however, declined, with Sinn Fein superseding it as 
the Catholic community’s largest party (see, for example, Mitchell et al, 2002). 
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The evolution of Irish nationalism in Northern Ireland from partition to the peace 
process and beyond has been traced in order to analyse the changing nature of 
the ideology and the impact that this has had on nationalist politics. 
 
Irish republicanism is an important ideology for many Catholics in Northern 
Ireland. McLaughlin (2002, p. 41) identifies three core principles. First is a 
commitment to full democracy and the sovereignty of the people. Second is a 
rejection of sectarianism and a commitment to the unity of people of all 
religions. The third and final principle is a commitment to Irish unity and the 
establishment of a thirty two county sovereign Irish Republic with national self-
determination. McLaughlin (2002, p. 41) broadens the definition of ‘Irish 
republicans’ from what he considers to be a term usually used to describe Sinn 
Fein’s members and supporters, to one which includes all those who are 
committed to the ‘complete freedom of the people of Ireland’. Based on this 
definition, there are clearly many parallels to be drawn with republicanism and 
Irish nationalism. However, as aforementioned, divisions between the two have 
a long tradition on the island, with opposing positions regarding the form of 
home rule an example of their ideological differences. Also, whereas 
nationalists are committed to achieving their objectives by peaceful means, this 
has not always been the case for republicans. Arthur (2002, p. 88. See also 
Tamir, 1995, p. 430) argues that for many years the outlook of republicanism 
was ethnocentric and as such it considered its nationalism to be superior to that 
of others, and was unwilling to recognise the ‘other’ and engage in dialogue with 
them, as this was ‘drowned out’ by ‘the sound of the bomb and the bullet’.  
 
Politically, MacGinty (2006, p. 133) argues that ‘conventional wisdom’ during 
the height of the conflict was that the SDLP attracted nationalist voters opposed 
to violence, whereas republicans voted for Sinn Fein and accepted the 
legitimacy of violence as a political strategy. Although he emphasises the 
dogmatism of this analysis, traditionally there has been a degree of truth to it, 
demonstrated by the significant increase in Sinn Fein’s share of the vote after 
its decision to pursue its objectives by wholly peaceful means, which is at least 
in part due to the nationalist electorate considering Sinn Fein’s eschewal of 
violence to legitimise the party (see, for example, Mitchell et al, 2002, p. 32). As 
the SDLP is traditionally nationalist and Sinn Fein traditionally republican, there 
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is a significant ethno-nationalist ideological distinction between the two largest 
parties representing the nationalist bloc, which is largely absent in the unionist 
rivalry between the DUP and UUP, as they are closer on the basis of their 
ethno-national positions (Tilley et al, 2008). 
 
Republican paramilitary organisations, which were numerous and came to 
prominence around the outbreak of the conflict, were major perpetrators of 
violence. The most significant of these were the several groups styling 
themselves as the ‘IRA’. The post-partition IRA fell out of favour amongst 
Northern nationalists during the 1950s and early to mid-1960s (see, for 
example, Elliott, 2000, pp. 402-06). The response to the outbreak of disorder 
from the Northern Irish authorities, however, particularly the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC), revitalised support for the IRA, which was fuelled by 
injustices such as internment without trial (Elliott, 2000, pp. 420-21). In 1969 the 
IRA split, resulting in the formation of the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA 
(PIRA), with the latter disagreeing with, for example, what they considered to be 
the organisation’s failure to adequately protect Catholics in Northern Ireland 
during August 1969 (Smith, 1997, pp. 86-87). Whilst the former was dissolved 
shortly after, the PIRA were arguably the most prominent republican 
paramilitary organisation throughout the conflict and led a campaign which 
included numerous bombings in Britain, such as that of the Grand Hotel in 
Brighton in 1984 (Smith, 1997, p. 177), designed to bring about a united Ireland 
and disrupt the peace process. Another important republican group was the 
Irish National Liberation Army, which notably assassinated Airey Neave, the 
Conservative spokesman on Northern Ireland, in March 1979 (Smith, 1997, p. 
90). 
 
The hunger strikes of 1980-81 against the conditions of political prisoners in 
Northern Ireland were hugely significant in demonstrating the political appeal of 
republicanism amongst Catholics, with prisoner and hunger striker Bobby 
Sands elected as MP for Fermanagh-South Tyrone at a by-election in 1981 
(Arthur, 2002, p. 91; McKittrick and McVea, 2001, p. 143). Despite being 
founded in 1905 (Githens-Mazer, 2006, p. 152) and having gone through 
various reincarnations before a split established the party as the political wing of 
the PIRA in 1970, Sinn Fein did not rise to prominence until the public outcry in 
42 
 
response to the Enniskillen bombing of 1987 challenged the principles of the 
PIRA (Arthur, 2002, p. 92). This led to the Sinn Fein-SDLP dialogue of 1988, 
which resulted in the party’s ideological move towards peace and its 
subsequent inclusion in the negotiations culminating in the Good Friday 
Agreement (see, for example, Arthur, 2002, p. 92; McGarry and O’Leary, 2009, 
p. 23).  
 
The transition of republicanism from paramilitary violence to politics was vital in 
achieving the PIRA ceasefire of 1994, renewed in 1997, and its full 
decommissioning of weapons, confirmed in 2005 (Smith, 1997, p. 212; de 
Breadun, 2008, pp. 58, 367-69). The INLA also announced a cessation of 
activities shortly after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, and today the 
comparatively small Real IRA and Continuity IRA are the only remaining 
republican paramilitary organisations (de Breadun, 2008, p. 171. See also 
MacGinty, 2006, p. 131). Despite these groups being responsible for attacks 
such as the Omagh bombing in 1998 and the Massereene Barracks shooting in 
2009 (see, for example, de Breadun, 2008, pp. 168-69; Matthews, 2012, p. 
343), the majority of republicans remain committed to achieving their objectives 
by peaceful, political means. Sinn Fein is today the second largest political party 
in Northern Ireland, having superseded its SDLP rivals in the early 2000s, and 
is a growing political force in the Irish Republic (see Mitchell et al, 2002). As 
such, MacGinty (2006, p. 129) asserts that republicanism is no longer defined 
by the ‘zero-sum strategy of a united Ireland or nothing’ as it was at the height 
of the conflict, but rather by its ‘more complex issue agenda’ and engagement in 
‘a new landscape of political environments and institutions’. The moderation of 
republicans has been met with unionist willingness to share power with them, as 
demonstrated by the DUP-Sinn Fein pact of 2007, with Martin McGuinness, 
previously a senior PIRA member, now serving as deputy First Minister (see, for 
example, Guelke, 2009; Bryan and Stevenson, 2009, p. 81). 
 
The culture and symbolism which scholars such as Hutchinson, Smith and 
Githens-Mazer consider to be so influential to nationalism and nation building 
will now be explored in relation to Northern nationalism and republicanism. It is 
firstly important to note that many characteristics are shared with the Irish 
Republic (and indeed the wider Irish diaspora), and are therefore best 
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presented as a sense of Irishness. Additionally, however, there are aspects of 
these ideologies which are unique to nationalists and republicans in Northern 
Ireland. This duality is not dissimilar to that of unionism, which, as 
aforementioned, includes a sense of Britishness with links and similarities to 
Britain, and Ulsterness, which is uniquely Northern Irish. Just as unionists and 
loyalists consider Ulster to be their historic homeland, many nationalists and 
republicans both North and South believe that the island of Ireland is their 
ancestral home – their insula sacra (Smith, 2003, pp. 151-54). This derives from 
the island’s pagan Celtic, and later monastic, culture, St Patrick, its beauty, and 
Irish art such as the Book of Kells (see also Sheehy, 1980).  
 
Smith (2003, pp. 152-54) suggests that it was the pervasive and enduring 
nature of these characteristics, and of Ireland’s Gaelic culture and language, 
which helped facilitate the revival of Gaelic society towards the late mediaeval 
period, and during subsequent aforementioned stages of cultural nationalism, 
culminating in the home rule movement. Smith (2003, p. 154) also argues that 
opposition to the Protestantism of British settlers on the island after the 
Reformation served to unite the native Irish and reinforce the perception of what 
they consider to be their territory as insula sacra. There is clear evidence of this 
cultural nationalist position being utilised by Northern nationalists and 
republicans today to depict the island of Ireland as a sacred place with a unique 
Gaelic culture. Examples include the use of the Irish Language on murals – for 
example, those demanding that the British Army Fag ar sraideanna (leave our 
streets) – and the depiction of culture such as Gaelic games. This use of 
symbolism indicates a sense of attachment amongst nationalists and 
republicans in Northern Ireland to the island of Ireland as their ancestral 
homeland, complete with a unique culture reaching back to the early first 
millennium (Smith, 2003, p. 154). This supports the enduring legacy of the 
island as insula sacra. 
 
A fundamental defining characteristic of Irishness is religion and, more 
specifically, Roman Catholicism. Religious devotion in both the Irish Republic 
and Northern Ireland is much higher than the European average, with a 1989 
survey indicating that eighty six per cent of Roman Catholics in the latter attend 
church at least once a week, whilst the former has the highest level of church 
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attendance of all western polities (Rose, 1971, pp. 248, 264, 427, quoted in 
McGarry and O’Leary, 1995, pp. 173-74). The at least once weekly attendance 
of Catholics in Northern Ireland is significantly higher than that of Protestants, 
despite the latter’s thirty nine per cent being higher than, for example, Britain’s 
twenty one per cent at least once monthly attendance. Smith (2003, p. 152) 
argues that religious identity is a crucial component fuelling belief amongst the 
native Irish that their island is insula sacra. He claims that events such as St 
Patrick’s mission in the fifth century were instrumental in the establishment of a 
distinct Christian Ireland, assuming a Catholic (and later Roman Catholic) 
character, resulting in the growth of a Gaelic-Catholic identity during the late 
mediaeval period.  
 
The linkage between religion, culture and nationalism in Ireland has recurred 
throughout human history. Githens-Mazer (2006, p. 95. See also Smith, 2003, 
p. 18) argues that the political nationalism espoused by figures such as 
O’Connell and Parnell during the nineteenth century cannot be considered to be 
secular, as is common with many political ideologies, as their objectives 
‘transcended the political quest for human autoemancipation’ due to the ‘depth 
and dynamism’ of the linkage between religion and the Irish nation during this 
era. The Famine played a pivotal role in the growth of myths, memories and 
symbols amongst the Catholic Irish, distinguishing their community from that of 
the ‘non-Irish’, non-Catholic Protestants, with widespread belief that the former 
were suffering at the hands of the latter and the British, which contributed to the 
rise of religious nationalism in Ireland at this time (Miller, 1973, p. 18, quoted in 
Githens-Mazer, 2006, p. 97. See also Githens-Mazer, 2006, p. 99). Collective 
memories of the Famine continue to provide a psychocultural narrative for 
nationalists that portrays them as vulnerable to the will of unionists. 
 
White (2007, pp. 48-51) also links religion with Irish nationalism, and, similarly 
to Githens-Mazer, argues that religious and national identity effectively merged 
in the nineteenth century against British imperialism on the island. He speaks of 
the need at the time for the Irish people to be united by a common bond and 
asserts that Catholicism ‘served this function perfectly’ as it unified them in their 
devotion to the same faith. The unification of Catholics around their faith in 
opposition to the British – or indeed what they perceived to be the ‘other’ – has 
45 
 
been evident in Northern Ireland in, for example, the civil rights movement of 
the late 1960s against the discrimination of nationalists by unionists and the 
British state (O’Duffy, 2007, pp. 64-65). Although a degree of secularisation has 
taken place in the Republic throughout the mid to late twentieth and early 
twenty first centuries (see, for example, White, 2007; Foster, 2008), the impact 
and effects of the link between Catholicism and Irish nationalism is still evident 
today – an example being the role of Catholicism in the perception amongst the 
Irish of their cultural homogeneity (White, 2007, p. 50). It is therefore this 
religion that the majority of nationalists, both North and South, feel a dedication 
to as a defining characteristic of their cultural nationalism. 
 
Language is a further area of identification for nationalists. Although the Irish 
language enjoyed a revival amongst the native Irish population during the home 
rule movement, with organisations such as the Gaelic League playing a crucial 
role, after partition there was limited promotion of the language in Northern 
Ireland, despite it being taught in Catholic schools (McGarry and O’Leary, 1995, 
p. 221. See also, for example, MacDonagh, 1992, pp. 104-25; Brown, 1985, pp. 
45-78). With English the first language of Northern nationalists, McGarry and 
O’Leary (1995, pp. 221-22) assert that Irish was treated with contempt by 
unionists who, prior to the implementation of direct rule in 1972, obstructed any 
potential of a Gaelic revival in Catholic schools and discouraged or prohibited 
the use of Irish names and street names. They argue that unionist disdain of the 
Irish language is due to their fear that Gaelicisation would be public policy in a 
united Ireland. However, McGarry and O’Leary (1995, p. 222) argue that this 
concern would be unlikely to materialise due to the bilingual status of the 
Republic of Ireland and, furthermore, suggest that the Irish language has more 
of a symbolic than practical relevance to the Irishness of Northern nationalists 
and republicans, with, for example, Sinn Fein’s enthusiasm of Irish being at 
least partly as it is ‘a badge of difference’. Language remains a bone of 
contention to this day, with SDLP and Sinn Fein proposals to give official 
recognition to Irish in Northern Ireland struggling to find support within unionism 
(Belfast Telegraph, 2011), and the issue epitomising the symbolic clash 
between British and Irish nationalisms (McGarry and O’Leary, 1995, p. 223). 
This is an example of a psychocultural drama, in which the importance that one 
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group places on a particular characteristic – in this case language – is disputed 
by the other. 
 
A further demonstration of a unique Irish culture is to be found in sport. McGarry 
and O’Leary (1995, p. 224) draw attention to the popularity of the GAA in the 
Irish Republic and amongst nationalists in Northern Ireland, and its role in the 
promotion of Gaelic games – for example, hurling (or camogie for females), 
handball and Gaelic football. They argue that the GAA is ‘constitutionally 
committed to strengthening Irish national identity’, and historically refused 
membership to members of the British security services, boycotted British 
sporting events and banned members from taking part in ‘foreign games’, all of 
which have since been revoked (McDonald, 2001). The traditional aim of the 
Association was the promotion of Irish culture in opposition to that of the British 
and Anglo-Irish Protestants, and it is claimed by McGarry and O’Leary (1995, p. 
224) that the GAA is ‘the most successful cultural nationalist organisation in 
Ireland’, with its games taught in Catholic schools in Northern Ireland. 
Association football support also serves as an important area of identification on 
the island, with international teams divided between the Republic of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland (McGarry and O’Leary, 1995, pp. 225-26). Whilst Northern 
Protestants overwhelming support Northern Ireland as their first preference, 91 
per cent of Northern Catholics opt for the Irish Republic, according to a survey 
conducted in the early 1990s (Sugden and Bairner, 2003, p. 79, quoted in 
McGarry and O’Leary, 1995, p. 226). The examples of the importance of the 
GAA to Northern nationalists and their widespread support for the Republic of 
Ireland association football team serve to illustrate the cultural significance of 
sport to this community in Northern Ireland. 
 
Until now sources of ethno-symbolism associated with a general sense of 
Irishness, applicable to both Northern and Southern nationalists, have been 
discussed. There are, however, a number of characteristics unique to Northern 
Ireland. Although the Irish tricolour flag, with green representing Catholics, 
orange Protestants and white harmony between the two, is the national flag of 
the Irish Republic, it is used in unique ways by Northern nationalists and 
republicans. An example is the painting of kerbstones with these colours in 
primarily working class, majority Catholic areas of Northern Ireland (Githens-
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Mazer, 2005, p. 9). Other examples include the use of the colours of the 
tricolour, the shamrock, the Starry Plough and various Celtic symbols on murals 
in these areas (Githens-Mazer, 2005, p. 9). This enables nationalists and 
republicans to demonstrate control over the symbolic landscape in areas such 
as west Belfast. 
 
However, the employment of symbols on murals such as illustrations of Bobby 
Sands and other hunger strikers from the 1980s, in addition to those associated 
with paramilitary organisations (Bryan et al, 2010, p. 26), indicates the existence 
of a Northern nationalist and, in particular, republican identity, which despite 
being inextricably linked to the culture of the Republic, utilises characteristics 
which are unique to Northern Ireland. These are examples of collective 
memories of key events with the ability to connect people over time and space 
being utilised to demarcate the symbolic landscape. Davies (2001, p. 158, 
quoted in Hill and White, 2012, p. 81) argues that murals serve as a means for 
the Catholic community to contest the control of the state over the visual 
environment. This is evidence of the distinctiveness of nationalists and 
republicans in the region and differentiates them from their Southern 
counterparts, which is likely to be beneficial in reassuring unionists of the 
potential for the preservation of Northern Ireland’s confederal institutions should 
the unification of the island of Ireland occur (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009, pp. 
83-84). 
 
Northern Irish / ‘Other’ 
It is worth briefly mentioning that whilst unionism and nationalism constitute the 
two main national identities in Northern Ireland, there is the existence of a 
Northern Irish identity, which it is claimed up to 30 per cent of the population 
subscribe to (Nagle and Clancy, 2012, p. 88; NILT, 2009). It is based on the 
idea that both unionists and nationalists have ‘shared values rooted in a 
common regional culture’, which has the potential to establish a shared political 
culture (Finlay, 2006, p. 6, quoted in Nagle and Clancy, 2012, p. 88). There is 
some limited evidence of younger Protestant and non-religious members of 
society identifying as Northern Irish, as opposed to either British or Irish (Tonge 
and Gomez, 2015, p. 294). Politically, a shared Northern Irish identity is a 
concept often associated with the non-sectarian, cross-community Alliance 
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Party (Nagle and Clancy, 2012, p. 88). Alliance was formed in 1970 and seeks 
to highlight the financial cost of community divisions, for example through the 
duplication of services, and the inadequacies of Northern Ireland’s 
consociational institutions, such as the Assembly favouring the votes of those 
designated as ‘unionist’ or ‘nationalist’ for legislation requiring cross-community 
support (Farry, 2009).  
 
Electoral support for Alliance is, however, limited and, at 7.7 per cent of first 
preference votes at the 2011 Assembly election, falls significantly below the 
percentage of the population claiming their identity to be Northern Irish (Whyte, 
2011). Nagle and Clancy (2012, p. 89) offer an explanation for this discrepancy 
in arguing that whilst there is undoubtedly some support for a Northern Irish 
identity, it is likely that the term means something different to a person of a 
unionist background than to one of a nationalist background. For nationalists, it 
may refer to a regional identity on the island of Ireland, whilst unionists may 
consider ‘Northern Irishness’ to be a regional identity within the UK. This is likely 
to explain the aforementioned evidence of younger members of the non-
religious and Protestant communities identifying as Northern Irish, as they 
consider Northern Ireland’s constitutional status within the UK to have been 
settled by the Good Friday Agreement (Tonge and Gomez, 2015, p. 294). 
Although a Northern Irish identity does indeed exist, it is currently showing few 
signs of significantly impacting upon the salience of unionism and nationalism 
(Tonge and Gomez, 2015, p. 294). 
 
MacGinty (2001) argues that a consociational system that legitimises both 
unionism and nationalism struggles to establish shared symbols which resonate 
with both communities due to their continued existence and recognition. He 
makes two general observations to underpin this argument. Firstly, in the 
relatively few areas where new ‘neutral’ or ‘inclusive’ symbols have been 
developed, these have little history due to the long presence of two 
communities with their own sets of symbolism, and they therefore often find little 
inter-bloc empathy as a result of their non-organic nature (MacGinty, 2001, pp. 
17-18). In support of this, it is very difficult to imagine, for example, an image of 
a flax plant – the symbol of the Northern Ireland Assembly – eliciting the same 
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empathy from unionists as the union flag or the affinity that many nationalists 
have with the Irish tricolour.  
 
Secondly, and because of this and the continued existence of two distinct 
ethno-national blocs, it is symbols that are traditionally associated with the 
unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland that remain capable of 
mobilising people (MacGinty, 2001, p. 18). This is undoubtedly a contributing 
factor to explain the limited support garnered by the Alliance Party and also at 
least partly explains the continued utilisation of ethno-symbolist characteristics 
in election campaigns by the four major parties in the region. MacGinty’s 
position on this issue is broadly in line with ethno-symbolist approaches, which 
posit, briefly, that nations and nationalisms emerge organically from an ethnic 
community with a unique history and culture, and reach back to pre-modern 
myths and memories in order to complete this transition (see, for example, 
Hutchinson, 1987; Smith, 1998; Githens-Mazer, 2006). As a common Northern 
Irish identity and the symbols associated with it are not rooted in a historical 
context, they are thus unlikely to find much resonance amongst the region’s 
population. 
 
 
Summary 
Whilst the characteristics of nationalisms often date back centuries or even 
millennia, it has been demonstrated that their significance remains to the 
present day, despite the meanings of cultural identity being malleable over time. 
This is often particularly acute in plural, or divided, societies in which 
nationalities can be considered to be distinctive and largely opposing, and 
where what a member of a certain nationality is not can be just as important as 
what they are. This chapter has explained the continued importance of 
nationalisms by applying an ethno-symbolic approach. It has then turned to the 
case study of Northern Ireland, providing a historical overview of divisions 
between unionism and nationalism firstly on the island of Ireland and later in 
post-partition Northern Ireland. Finally, the role of nationalisms in shaping 
politics and society in Northern Ireland has been demonstrated through an 
analysis of unionism and nationalism, with particular emphasis placed on the 
significance of ethno-symbolism to the two identities. This chapter ultimately 
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serves as a historical and theoretical framework for the thesis, which will be 
utilised throughout in order to explain the continued importance of unionist and 
nationalist identities in Northern Ireland. 
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Chapter Two – Politics in plural societies 
 
 
The way in which plural societies should be governed is a much contested field 
of political and social research. The purpose of this chapter is to explore 
existing literature around this debate in a way that allows for subsequent 
chapters to build on this by addressing the important issue of electoral politics in 
societies comprised of multiple groups. It begins by defining plural societies and 
analyses when they can be considered to be divided, before turning attention to 
conflict management, exploring the two major, largely opposing, debates of 
consociationalism and centripetalism. The focus then shifts to the need for 
conflict management in Northern Ireland and how this was achieved in the form 
of the consociational Good Friday Agreement of 1998. The provisions of the 
Agreement are analysed, along with debates around the most effective means 
of conflict management in Northern Ireland and subsequent developments. 
Finally, a summary is drawn with the intention of bringing together the positions 
expressed in the literature to enable important observations and arguments to 
be formulated. 
 
 
Defining plural societies 
Lijphart cites Eckstein (1966, p. 34, quoted in Lijphart, 1977, pp. 3-4) to define a 
plural society in asserting that a particular society is plural if it is divided by 
segmental cleavages, which, amongst other characteristics, may be ethnic, 
racial, linguistic, cultural, religious, regional or ideological in nature. 
Furthermore, Eckstein suggests that segmental cleavages exist ‘where political 
divisions follow very closely, and especially concern lines of objective social 
differentiation, especially those particularly salient in a society’. In order for 
societies to be considered plural they must of course feature a minimum of two 
segmental cleavages, or communities, but may be comprised of many more 
(Lijphart, 1977, pp. 3-5). Associated with some plural societies is the concept of 
a deeply divided society. Nordlinger (1972, p. 9, quoted in Guelke, 2012, p. 30) 
claims that a plural society can be considered to be deeply divided when ‘a 
large number of conflict group members attach overwhelming importance to the 
issues at stake, or manifest strongly held antagonistic beliefs and emotions 
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towards the opposing segment, or both’. It is clear from these definitions that 
there is a distinction between plural and divided societies in that the latter is 
characterised by the presence of conflict, which may be violent or non-violent. 
When Nordlinger writes of the ‘issues at stake’, it is assumed that he is referring 
to the aforementioned segmental cleavage characteristics identified by Eckstein 
and interpreted by Lijphart in defining a divided society. It is, therefore, worth 
exploring the most salient of these in greater depth. 
 
Guelke (2012, ch. 2) identifies and explores several key characteristics of plural 
societies, which often contribute to them being considered divided. It is 
important to note that those included are not exhaustive, and many cases are 
defined by more than one of these characteristics. Firstly, religion is a major 
source of division (Guelke, 2012, pp. 16-18). As with all segmental cleavages of 
plural societies, religious communities may be geographically concentrated 
within a particular area of a society or may be dispersed across it. Guelke 
(2012, p. 16), however, argues that conflict in religiously divided societies tends 
to occur in regions in which one religion predominates. He cites Nigeria as an 
example of a society divided by both religion and geography, with violence 
emanating from the existence of a Muslim dominated north and majority 
Christian south. Examples of religiously divided societies in which communities 
are much less clearly distributed include Lebanon and Northern Ireland, 
although in the case of the latter religion is ultimately an indicator of national or 
ethnic difference, rather than a source of division in its own right. 
 
The example of Northern Ireland follows to a further potential characteristic of 
how a plural society may be divided: ethno-nationally. Whilst ethnicity and 
nationality can be considered to be two different characteristics, they will be 
explored in tandem due to their often inextricable connection with one another 
(Guelke, 2012, p. 20). Hutchinson and Smith (1996, p. 7, quoted in Guelke, 
2012, pp. 20-21) identify several characteristics of an ethnic community, 
including a common name, ancestry and culture, and shared historical 
memories, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity. Race, as well as 
being a significant potential source of division in societies, is often (sometimes 
incorrectly) conflated with ethnicity (Guelke, 2012, p. 19). It is clear from this 
that ethnicity shares many commonalities with nationality. In emphasising the 
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significance of nationality as a major dividing characteristic in some plural 
societies, McGarry and O’Leary (2009a, p. 26) have developed the concept of a 
‘pluri-national’ society. They argue that in these cases national identity is 
durable and is politically salient, with major political parties and civic 
associations being nationalist in character. Northern Ireland can be considered 
to be divided along ethno-national lines, as it is comprised of (mostly British) 
unionists and (mostly Irish) nationalists, with the traditional position of the 
former being that the region should remain part of the UK and the latter 
favouring the political reunification of the island of Ireland. As the case of 
Northern Ireland is the centre piece of this research, great emphasis will be 
placed on ethno-nationalism as a source of conflict in divided societies. 
 
Language is the final characteristic of plural societies to be explored, although 
there are many others, including class, ideology and regionalism. Guelke (2012, 
pp. 18-19) notes that as is the case with many of the aforementioned 
characteristics, language may in some case be a marker of division, which has 
given rise to the concept of an ‘ethno-linguistic’ society. This may be more acute 
in some plural societies than in others. For example, Belgium’s linguistic 
divisions are largely geographical, with the state split between Flemish 
speakers in the northern region of Flanders, French speakers in the southern 
region of Wallonia and bilingual Brussels (Pilet, 2005, p. 399). In this case, 
language is clearly a key source of division. In Northern Ireland, however, 
language is much more a characteristic of ethno-nationality, as despite 
nationalists identifying with the Irish language and unionists with Ulster-Scots, 
English is the principal language of both communities (McGarry and O’Leary, 
1995, p. 207). As has been demonstrated, the characteristics of plural societies 
can often become sources of division and conflict, which may be violent, as in 
the cases of Nigeria, Lebanon and Northern Ireland, or non-violent, as in 
Belgium. Attention will now turn to ways in which this conflict can be managed. 
 
 
Defining conflict management 
Yakinthou and Wolff (2012, p. 1) define conflict management as ‘a process that 
aims at channelling the violent manifestation of an incompatibility of goals 
between two or more parties into a political process where their disputes can be 
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addressed by non-violent means’. Whilst recognising that conflict management 
may eventually lead to conflict resolution, for example when the dispute 
becomes less politically salient, they argue that the main objective ‘is to find and 
sustain an institutional arrangement in which conflict parties have greater 
incentives to abide by political rules of dealing with their dispute than to use, or 
revert to, violence in pursuit of their incompatible objectives’. McGarry and 
O’Leary (2009a, pp. 16-18) identify two options for conflict management in 
plural societies. The first is integration, the proponents of which consider 
identities to be malleable and transformable, and oppose political mobilisation 
around ethnic, national, cultural or religious divisions. It is often preferred by 
majority communities within states but also by small minority groups, such as 
immigrants.  
 
A second option is accommodation. Accommodationists often view identities as 
fixed and inflexible, and strive to encompass ‘dual or multiple public identities in 
many-roomed political mansions’. In deeply divided societies, McGarry and 
O’Leary (2009a, pp. 17-18, 83) consider an integrationist approach to be 
unsuitable as a means of conflict management, as accommodation and the 
clearly designated representation that it offers is usually the preferred choice of 
minorities. Similarly, Lijphart (1977, quoted in Taylor, 2009a, p. 4) argues that 
accommodation offers ‘a far more realistic democratic option for deeply divided 
societies’ than integration or majoritarian rule. Two major arms of the 
accommodation approach are consociational and centripetal power sharing, 
which are usually considered to be opposing methods. Given their salience as a 
potential means of conflict management in divided societies, the two will be 
explored and compared. 
 
Consociationalism 
McGarry and O’Leary (2009a, p. 16-17) define consociationalism as an 
accommodative arrangement for power sharing which includes all significant 
groups in legislative and executive institutions, and one which promotes 
proportionality within public administration, with a preference for proportional 
electoral systems. It is an elite-orientated, ‘top down’ model (Dixon, 1997, p. 1). 
The origins of consociationalism are to be found primarily in the work of Lijphart 
(see 1969; 1977). Although a system for managing divided societies based on 
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this theory had been in place in the Netherlands since 1917 (Lijphart, 1968) – 
and a number of other states thereafter – he is largely credited with having 
formulated its characteristics into an approach for fragmented, but stable, states 
(Lijphart, 1969). Lijphart (1969) refers to this theory as ‘consociational 
democracy’ and first applied it to cases such as Austria, Switzerland, Belgium 
and the Netherlands. Lorwin (see 1971) also applies the concept of 
consociationalism to states featuring ‘segmented pluralism’, and, similarly to 
Lijphart at the time, focuses exclusively on democratic states and nations, 
therefore neglecting deeply divided societies (Lorwin, 1971, p. 144).  
 
Lijphart (1977, pp. 25-44) identifies four defining characteristics of 
consociational democracy. Firstly, ‘government by a grand coalition’, which 
includes the political elites of all significant segments within a society, is 
necessary to ensure inclusiveness and representation, and is argued to be the 
most important element of consociationalism. Secondly, a ‘mutual veto’ is 
required in order to provide political protection for minority segments and 
facilitate their continued participation in a grand coalition. Thirdly, 
‘proportionality’, in which segments are represented in government and society 
based upon their population size, is necessary. Whilst opinion differs over which 
electoral system is most conducive to consociational societies, such as party list 
PR or PR-STV (Mitchell, 2014), most consociationalists agree that some form of 
proportional representation is needed (Wolff, 2012, pp. 24-25). Finally, 
‘segmental autonomy’ is needed to allow segments to exercise decision making 
power over areas concerning only their members.  
 
Lijphart (1969, pp. 217-19) identifies three factors that are conducive to the 
successful implementation and operation of consociationalism. Firstly, the 
existence of an external threat is necessary in order to encourage cooperation 
between elites from different segments. Secondly, a multiple balance of power 
is needed, as this reduces the probability that a particular segment will aim to 
dominate, as is likely in societies with two evenly matched segments or in those 
in which one segment has a majority. Finally, it is argued that it is important that 
the decision making apparatus is not overloaded, as burdens on this may hinder 
the successful maintenance of consociational power sharing. Over time, 
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however, these favourable factors for the establishment of consociational 
settlements have been amended, with some removed and others included.  
 
By the mid 1980s, Lijphart (1985, pp. 119-28, quoted in Bogaards, 1998, p. 478) 
had amended his aforementioned second factor from the requirement of a 
multiple balance of power to the need for there to be no majority segments and 
for groups to be of a similar size. He removed the necessity for the decision 
making apparatus to not be overloaded but the requirement of an external 
threat remained. Lijphart (1985, pp. 119-28, quoted in Bogaards, 1998, p. 478) 
additionally added several other factors that he considered necessary for 
consociationalism to be sustained. These included a geographical concentration 
of segments, a small population size, the existence of overarching loyalties, a 
tradition of elite accommodation, socioeconomic equality and a small number of 
segments. These amendments reflect the change over time in Lijphart’s 
application of consociational democracy to include situations requiring conflict 
management, rather than only European democracies (see Lijphart, 1985, 
1996). 
 
Rather than focusing on the presence of an external ‘threat’, for example one 
which recommends partition, McGarry and O’Leary (2009a, pp. 37-38, 42) 
argue that benign external intervention can facilitate the implementation of a 
consociational agreement in divided societies, despite early work on the 
approach neglecting this. They highlight that methods such as mediation and 
the use of pressures or incentives can play a crucial role in encouraging parties 
to reach agreement. McGarry and O’Leary (2009a, pp. 38-42) cite Northern 
Ireland as an example of where external input has been vital in achieving a 
settlement, not only from the British and Irish governments but also the United 
States. This demonstrates that conflict management is not always solely 
internal, as outsiders can play a positive role in its implementation and 
operation. Consociational agreements, or at least settlements with significant 
consociational elements, have been credited with achieving conflict 
management in societies such as Lebanon, Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Macedonia and Northern Ireland (Taylor, 2009a, p. 6). 
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Consociationalism is not, however, without its critics. The main critique levelled 
against it is that this form of power sharing entrenches ethno-national divisions 
at the expense of the rights and identities of individuals, and does not offer a 
stable, lasting settlement (Wolff, 2012, p. 40). Wolff (2012, p. 40) argues that 
this criticism is unsubstantiated as it refers to corporate, rather than liberal, 
consociationalism, which accommodates communities based on an ascriptive 
criteria (McGarry, 2007, p. 172). He cites the works of Lijphart (1995) and 
McGarry and O’Leary (2008a; 2008b) in demonstrating that contemporary 
consociationalism ‘favours self-determined over predetermined groups in its 
institutional prescriptions and arrangements’. Wolff (2012, p. 40) supports this 
with recent evidence by arguing that whilst the 1995 Dayton Agreement in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is corporate to some extent, most other consociational 
settlements (for example, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and the 2006 St 
Andrews Agreement in Northern Ireland, and the 2005 Iraq constitution) are 
inherently liberal as defined by McGarry and O’Leary (2008a; 2008b). Despite 
Lijphart (see, for example, 1977) proposing consociationalism as a means of 
achieving democracy in plural societies, Wolff (2012, pp. 42-43) claims that in 
divided societies, liberal consociationalism is a theory of conflict management, 
rather than democracy. This is significant as many critics focus their argument 
on their perception of the approach as undemocratic. Attention will now be 
turned to a rival method of accommodative conflict management. 
 
Centripetalism 
Centripetalists, like consociationalists, are largely supportive of the need for 
accommodative power sharing to manage conflict in divided societies (McGarry 
and O’Leary, 2009a, pp. 16-17). Where the two approaches differ, however, is 
in the centripetalist argument that power sharing should not be solely 
accommodative and should also include some integrationist principles, as 
accommodation and integration are not mutually exclusive (see, for example, 
Horowitz, 2003; O’Flynn, 2009). This disagreement is rooted in the belief that 
intergroup divisions in plural societies are not as fixed and entrenched as 
consociationalists claim (Nagle and Clancy, 2012, p. 83). Reilly (2012, p. 57) 
asserts that centripetalists consider the most effective means of conflict 
management not ‘to replicate existing ethnic divisions in the legislature and 
other representative organs, but rather to put in place institutional incentives for 
58 
 
cross-ethnic behaviour in order to encourage accommodation between rival 
groups’. The approach is, therefore, critical of elite-driven methods such as 
consociationalism, which centripetalists believe entrenches divisions. Both 
Horowitz (2003) and O’Flynn (2009) argue that executives would better serve 
democracy and conflict management if they were to be comprised of a voluntary 
intergroup coalition of moderates, as opposed to a mandatory coalition selected 
using the d’Hondt procedure, as prescribed by many consociationalists and in 
place in Northern Ireland.  
 
Reilly (2012, p. 62) argues that centripetalism is of most benefit to societies in 
which demographics favour inter-party and inter-communal vote-pooling, such 
as those where communities are numerous and small in size, and where they 
are regionally spread and intermixed. To facilitate this, centripetalists reject 
proportional representation for divided societies as they argue that it 
encourages smaller parties that are more likely to base their appeal around 
narrow ethno-national issues. Instead, they recommend non-proportional 
electoral systems such as the Alternative Vote (AV), as parties and their 
candidates are required to garner a higher percentage of votes in order to be 
elected, which incentivises a broader appeal and vote-pooling (see, for 
example, Horowitz, 2003). Reilly (2012, p. 57) suggests that this is ‘perhaps the 
clearest distinction between centripetalism and other approaches’ to conflict 
management, as proportional representation is often considered to be a cause 
of, rather than a solution to, ethno-national politics. Fiji is perhaps the most 
significant example of a society in which a centripetal approach to power 
sharing has been implemented, with elections contested using AV (McGarry 
and O’Leary, 2009a, pp. 62-63). 
 
The main critique of centripetalism as a means of conflict management in 
divided societies is that it is ultimately majoritarian in nature (Reilly, 2012, p. 
63). In support of this, Bingham Powell (2000, p. 26, quoted in Reilly, 2012, p. 
63) argues that the approach is focused on the aggregation of votes, parties 
and opinions, whilst other methods stress the importance of the proportional 
representation of all points of view in legislative arrangements. Although he 
acknowledges that centripetalism is a majoritarian model, Reilly (2012, p. 63) 
asserts that its majoritarianism is focused on broad-based parties and inclusive 
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coalitions, rather than majorities and minorities formed around ethno-national 
divisions. As such, he does not consider the majoritarian nature of 
centripetalism to impact upon its ability to deliver successful conflict 
management. 
 
 
Establishing consociationalism in Northern Ireland 
Due to the presence of two distinctive and largely opposing ethno-national 
communities in Northern Ireland, many consider a wholly accommodative 
approach such as consociationalism to have the greatest potential to succeed in 
regulating inter-bloc conflict (see, for example, McGarry and O’Leary, 2009a; 
O’Neill, 2009; Lijphart, 1996). In the mid 1970s, however, Lijphart (1975, pp. 
105-06) rejected consociational democracy as a means achieving conflict 
management in Northern Ireland and instead suggested partition as an 
alternative which he considered to be more likely to succeed. Lijphart believed 
the region did not conform to enough of his aforementioned favourable 
characteristics for the implementation of consociationalism, in addition to three 
other factors (see Lijphart, 1975, pp. 99-100). Firstly, in the mid 1970s there 
was an imbalance of power in Northern Ireland between the Protestant majority 
and Catholic minority. Secondly, Lijphart believed the idea of a grand coalition 
government to be unacceptable to Protestants due to their ties with the UK 
providing them with ‘normative standards of governmental organisation’, which 
is ‘competitive not coalescent’, and they would therefore reject this as it would 
not offer a majoritarian system with an opposition.  
 
Finally, Lijphart stressed the need for ‘some degree of national solidarity’, which 
he believed to be lacking in Northern Ireland due to the allegiance of Catholics 
to the Republic of Ireland and the loyalty of Protestants to the British Crown. He 
considered all of these factors to be an affront to the potential success of 
consociationalism. Lijphart’s position at this time is further underpinned by the 
failure of the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973, which implemented a 
consociational power sharing executive between unionists and nationalists, and 
was brought down by a strike by Protestant workers within just five months 
(Fisk, 1975, quoted in Taylor, 2009a, p. 8). Despite being unsuccessful, the 
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Agreement is evidence of a consociational settlement for conflict management 
being considered during the early days of the Northern Ireland conflict. 
 
Although supportive of consociationalism as a means of managing divided 
societies, McGarry and O’Leary (2009a, pp. 26-28) criticise Lijphart’s 
foundational work for not focusing on pluri-national places comprised of more 
than one significant national identity, such as Northern Ireland. They draw 
attention to the fact that none of the aforementioned states which Lijphart 
initially applied consociational democracy to are pluri-national and all are 
instead divided along religious, linguistic or political lines. McGarry and O’Leary 
(2009a, p. 31) argue that this approach was problematic, as when Lijphart 
(1975; 1977, pp. 134-41) came to provide an analysis of the potential for 
consociationalism to manage Northern Ireland’s divisions, he inaccurately 
explained the conflict as being rooted in religion, as opposed to nationality. 
They consider the issue of Lijphart overlooking pluri-national places in his 
foundational work to be instrumental in his failure to initially see the importance 
of nationality when considering consociationalism for Northern Ireland (McGarry 
and O’Leary, 2009a, p. 31). 
 
By the 1990s, however, Lijphart (1996) had changed his opinion that a 
consociational settlement would be unsuccessful as a means of conflict 
management in Northern Ireland and now considered it to be the only realistic 
means of achieving this. The rationale behind this significant change of position 
can be attributed to the region now featuring many of the aforementioned 
favourable factors which he identified to be necessary for its successful 
implementation. Northern Ireland already featured some of these factors, for 
example, being a small region it has a small population size and a geographical 
concentration of segments. It additionally has a small number of segments – 
primarily unionism and nationalism – with overarching loyalties. By the 1990s, 
however, the existence of an ‘external threat’ to Northern Ireland was present in 
the form of partition of the region in an agreement between the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland, which O’Leary (1989, p. 588, quoted in Bogaards, 1998, p. 
486) considered to be the only alternative for conflict management should 
consociationalism fail.  
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, although at first Northern Ireland had a 
Protestant majority and Catholic minority, by the time of the signing of the Good 
Friday Agreement in 1998 this majority-minority population ratio had narrowed, 
with 53 per cent of the population Protestant and 44 per cent Catholic (Taylor, 
2009a, pp. 8-9). Therefore, despite the existence of a majority group – which 
Lijphart (1985, pp. 119-28, quoted in Bogaards, 1998, p. 478) claims is 
detrimental to the successful implementation of consociational power sharing – 
it has only a small majority and the aforementioned figures indicate that the 
region features segments of relatively equal size, which he considers to be a 
favourable condition in order for consociationalism to succeed. This also 
addressed the first specific concern of Lijphart (1975, pp. 99-100) that 
consociationalism was not suited to Northern Ireland due to the imbalance of 
power between the Protestant majority and Catholic minority. As McGarry and 
O’Leary (2009a, p. 31) highlight, this additionally overcame Lijphart’s second 
concern that Protestants would be unable to accept a grand coalition 
government, as once their demographic hegemony was reduced, their British 
cultural preferences would wane. All of these factors explain why Lijphart 
considered a consociational power sharing agreement to be essential for 
conflict management in Northern Ireland at this time. 
 
As is the case with many conflict management settlements, an additional factor 
which was required in order to establish, and continues to be necessary in order 
to maintain, consociational power sharing in Northern Ireland is external input. 
Guelke (2009, pp. 104-05) argues that the Anglo-Irish Agreement was 
instrumental in institutionalising British-Irish intergovernmentalism, which was 
key to facilitating negotiations between Northern Irish political parties during the 
1990s. He asserts that the Agreement encouraged the close relationship 
between the UK and the Republic of Ireland which saw the two states jointly 
launch the peace process in the Downing Street Declaration of December 1993, 
and sustain their cooperation and commitment through to the agreement upon 
and implementation of a consociational peace settlement in the form of the 
Good Friday Agreement in 1998, and its reinforcement in the St Andrews 
Agreement of 2006.  McGarry and O’Leary (2009b, p. 337) also argue that 
intergovernmental relations between the UK and the Republic of Ireland were 
fundamental to the facilitation of an agreement between unionists and 
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nationalists. They cite the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 as a treaty between 
the two states which ‘created strong incentives to induce internal power sharing 
(consociation)’, as it recognised that cooperation between unionists and 
nationalists was necessary for devolution to be achieved, and established the 
British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, which was designed to 
‘accommodate the rights and identities’ of both communities in Northern Ireland 
and for the first time offered the Republic of Ireland an input in Northern 
Ireland’s affairs (McKenna, 2012). This is an early example of the governments 
of the UK and the Republic of Ireland recognising the potential of 
consociationalism as a means of conflict management in the region. 
 
McGarry and O’Leary (2009b, p. 337) additionally cite the publication of the joint 
Framework Documents by the UK and the Irish Republic in 1995 as being vital 
to the development of consociational power sharing in Northern Ireland, as they 
prefigured the majority of the content of the Good Friday Agreement, offering 
protections and incentives for unionists and nationalists willing to engage in 
peace negotiations. There are a number of ways in which the Documents 
achieved this (Melaugh, 2012). Firstly, they committed the governments of the 
UK and the Republic of Ireland to support devolution in Northern Ireland based 
on the consociational model. Secondly, they also included important provisions 
such as offering Northern Ireland the ability to determine its own future 
constitutional status, the commitment of the British government to Irish self-
determination, and the pledge of the Irish Republic to amend its territorial claim 
over Northern Ireland. Finally, the Framework Documents pledged the 
commitment of the UK and the Irish Republic to support and ensure equality for 
unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland, which was particularly significant 
in assuring the latter that the inequality they faced during unionist majoritarian 
rule, and which was a major contributor to the outbreak of the conflict, would be 
overcome. 
 
McGarry and O’Leary (2009a, pp. 32-33, 41) argue that this is important as 
these proposals created the conditions necessary for the facilitation of a peace 
agreement in the region, as successful negotiations between unionists and 
nationalists would have been unlikely had these assurances not have been in 
place, and external influence was crucial to this, particularly in garnering 
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unionist support. They additionally assert that the proposals played a significant 
role in facilitating the paramilitary ceasefires and decommissioning which were 
necessary in order for the peace agreement to succeed (McGarry and O’Leary, 
2009b, p. 337). Cash (2009, pp. 243-44) and Morison (2009, p. 282) also 
highlight the role played by the US and the European Union in encouraging and 
supporting the UK and the Irish Republic in their attempts to facilitate a 
resolution to the conflict. The US was particularly important throughout the 
peace process, from pressuring the British government to involve the Irish 
Republic in Northern Ireland’s affairs during the early 1980s, to providing a 
Special Envoy for Northern Ireland in the mid 1990s, headed by George Mitchell 
who would later chair the negotiations culminating in the Good Friday 
Agreement (MacGinty, 1997, pp. 2, 4, 8-9). 
 
It is important to consider why the Good Friday Agreement succeeded where 
the Sunningdale Agreement had failed. After all, both were consociational 
settlements with cross-border dimensions (Wolff, 2001, p. 11) and the Good 
Friday Agreement was famously referred to by the then deputy leader of the 
SDLP, Seamus Mallon, as ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’ (O’Duffy, 2007, p. 
167). Many contributing factors for its success have already been addressed, 
such as entrenching the principle of self-determination, recognising both 
identities and establishing North-South bodies, as well as the existence of a 
close British-Irish intergovernmental relationship, all of which were absent from 
the Sunningdale Agreement (Wolff, 2001, p. 11). Indeed, Kerr (2006, p. 87) 
argues that there was no great public shift in favour of a consociational 
settlement leading up to the Good Friday Agreement. Rather, it was an 
‘overriding unity of purpose’ of the British and Irish governments to achieve 
power sharing in Northern Ireland, which was absent at the time of 
Sunningdale, that was instrumental to its success.  
 
A further important factor to explain the success of the Good Friday Agreement 
is the British government’s abandonment of its ‘twin track’ approach to conflict 
management in Northern Ireland, which O’Duffy (2007, p. 90) explains as being 
designed to defeat paramilitaries and encourage power sharing between 
moderate unionists and nationalists. Whilst this had been its policy at the time of 
the Sunningdale Agreement, and as such only the UUP, SDLP and Alliance 
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were signatories, by the 1990s it was recognised that the inclusion of political 
parties with links to paramilitaries, in particular Sinn Fein, was vital to the 
achievement of a sustainable consociational settlement (O’Kane, 2004). The 
prospect of a place at the negotiating table in turn facilitated republican and 
loyalist ceasefires, as a cessation of violence was a necessity in return for 
participation, which was absent at the time of the Sunningdale Agreement. The 
specific provisions of the Good Friday Agreement will now be explored in 
greater depth. 
 
 
The Good Friday Agreement 
The Agreement (officially the Belfast Agreement) was signed on 10th April 1998 
by the British and Irish governments and all significant political parties in 
Northern Ireland (except the DUP and UKUP, who voluntarily withdrew from 
negotiations) (Kerr, 2006, p. 87). It was divided into three distinct strands, as 
follows. 
 
Strand One 
This dealt with internal democratic institutions and established a legislative 
Assembly comprised of 108 members elected in Northern Ireland’s existing 
eighteen Westminster constituencies (Kerr, 2006, p. 88). Although each 
constituency was originally going to return five members, this was raised to six 
in order to give smaller parties a greater opportunity to gain representation 
(Hansard, 9th July 2013 cols 316-18). Elections to the Assembly are contested 
using PR-STV, a proportional system in which candidates are numerically 
ranked in order of preference, as this is conducive to the election of smaller 
parties and minorities, and allows for voters to transcend parties and blocs, 
should they choose to do so (McGarry and O’Leary, 2006b, p. 274). Members 
are required to designate as ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘other’, and the two former 
designations are provided with vetoes, as passage of key legislation requires 
cross-community support, by either ‘parallel consent’ – a majority of both 
unionists and nationalists – or a ‘weighted majority’ – two fifths of both unionists 
and nationalists, and a three fifths majority of the Assembly (McGarry and 
O’Leary, 2009a, p. 34).  
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Interestingly, executive ministerial positions are decided using the d’Hondt 
method sequencing procedure, with posts allocated proportionally on the 
strength of parties’ representation in the Assembly – d’Hondt being more 
commonly used in the division of seats in a legislature (Kerr, 2006, p. 88; 
O’Leary et al, 2005). Executive selection is, however, flexible, with this being 
demonstrated in 2010 when the newly created position of Justice Minister was 
allocated to the Alliance Party, despite the default d’Hondt mechanism dictating 
that the post should be awarded to a different party (BBC, 2010). This occurred 
because the selection of Justice Minister was politically sensitive and none of 
the candidates put forward by other parties achieved the necessary cross 
community support, as the devolution of policing and justice powers was 
designated as a key piece of legislation and therefore required this. The 
executive is headed by the First Minister and deputy First Minister, who, despite 
their names, operate as a diarchy, and it was decided during negotiations that 
they would be elected jointly in proportion to party strengths (the First Minister 
coming from the largest party and the deputy from the second largest) by 
mutual agreement of at least half of both unionists and nationalist members of 
the Assembly (Kerr, 2006, p. 88). The election procedure for this office was, 
however, amended in 2006 and this will shortly be more thoroughly explored. It 
has been clearly demonstrated that Northern Ireland’s internal institutions are 
consociational in character, with its accommodative principles inherent to both 
the legislature and the executive. 
 
Strand Two 
It is important to note that the confederal provisions of both Strands Two and 
Three of the Good Friday Agreement are not traditionally associated with 
consociational settlements (O’Leary, 2001, pp. 62-69), which has led to some 
(see, for example, Dixon, 2005) to argue that the Agreement is not actually 
consociational. Others, however, recognise that liberal consociationalism can 
go beyond purely accommodative principles to include elements of integration 
and power dividing, which O’Leary (1999) refers to as ‘power sharing plus’ and 
Wolff (2009) terms ‘complex power sharing’. The need for this is based around 
the argument that power sharing and territorial self-governance are not, on their 
own, able to provide sufficient conflict management and further dimensions are 
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therefore necessary to address the complexities of the competing demands of 
parties involved in a conflict (Wolff, 2009, p. 120). 
 
In light of this, the emphasis of Strands Two and Three was on external 
linkages and roles for external actors. Within Strand Two, this took the form of 
the North-South Ministerial Council, the aim of which Kerr (2006, p. 89) explains 
as being to bring together ministers in Northern Ireland with their counterparts in 
the Irish Republic to consult and cooperate on several areas of all-Ireland 
interest. O’Leary (2001, p. 63) identifies a dilemma in that unionists were 
concerned that if the North-South Ministerial Council could continue after the 
collapse of the Assembly, nationalists would aim to bring about this; whilst 
nationalists worried that if the Assembly could survive without the North-South 
Ministerial Council, this would be a target for unionists. The solution was to 
ensure that neither could function without the other; that they were to be 
‘mutually interdependent’. The main function of the North-South Ministerial 
Council is to link Northern nationalists to their preferred nation state, the 
Republic of Ireland, and to provide a vehicle through which they can hope to 
persuade unionists of the benefits of Irish reunification (O’Leary, 2001, p. 63). 
 
Strand Three 
A second confederal component of the Good Friday Agreement is the British-
Irish Council, which links the British and Irish governments, all of the UK’s 
devolved governments, and those of its Crown dependencies within the British 
Isles (O’Leary, 2001, p. 65). Its aim is to ‘promote harmonious and mutually 
beneficial development of the totality of the relationships among the peoples of 
the UK and the Republic of Ireland’ (Kerr, 2006, p. 89). O’Leary (2001, p. 65) 
argues that the Council provides unionists with a further link to the rest of the 
UK and is a mechanism through which they could retain a connection to their 
state of preference in the future, should a reunited Ireland be realised. He also 
asserts that despite being ‘weaker’ than the North-South Ministerial Council, the 
British-Irish Council is intended to compensate unionists for any ground they 
may consider to have conceded to nationalists through the establishment of the 
former (O’Leary, 1999, p. 26; 2001, p. 65).  
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Kerr (2006, p. 89) highlights the irony that when such a body was proposed 
under the terms of the Sunningdale Agreement it was met with opposition from 
unionists, yet they were supportive of it during the Good Friday negotiations as 
it provided them with a balance to the North-South Ministerial Council. The 
British-Irish Council, nevertheless, is afforded less importance than its 
counterpart, as it is not mutually interdependent of the Assembly and is, 
therefore, a voluntary body (O’Leary, 2001, p. 65). The provisions of Strands 
Two and Three are an example of a strong intergovernmental relationship 
between the UK and the Republic of Ireland facilitating conflict management in 
Northern Ireland that goes beyond regulating national self-determination to 
include integrative and power dividing principles (see, for example, O’Duffy, 
2007, ch. 8). It is also necessary to highlight this as an example of a ‘trade off’ 
facilitates by British-Irish intergovernmentalism, whereby nationalists are 
compensated for their compromise on the sovereignty of Northern Ireland by 
North-South bodies and vice versa for unionists. 
 
Other provisions 
The Good Friday Agreement, for the first time, safeguards the religious, national 
and political rights and liberties of all in Northern Ireland in a bill of rights, and 
promised the establishment of an Equality Commission (Kerr, 2006, pp. 89-90). 
Despite being vague on the issues of decommissioning of paramilitary weapons 
and the release of paramilitary prisoners, the Agreement did provide for the 
reform of policing, which resulted in the publication of the Patten Report, 
designed to enhance the acceptability of policing amongst all communities, and 
its partial implementation (Kerr, 2006, p. 90; McGarry and O’Leary, 2009a, pp. 
33-34). 
 
 
Consociational debates in Northern Ireland 
Centripetalists argue that intergroup divisions in Northern Ireland are not as 
fixed and entrenched as consociationalists claim and believe that executives 
would better serve democracy and conflict management if they were to be 
comprised of a voluntary intergroup coalition of moderates with an opposition 
(Nagle and Clancy, 2012, p. 83; Horowitz, 2003; O’Flynn, 2009). It is important 
to note that, although for different reasons, some political parties favour a switch 
68 
 
to voluntary coalition executive formation. The Alliance Party, for example, 
believes that this would encourage greater moderation and aid the creation of a 
shared society in Northern Ireland (Farry, 2009). Horowitz (2003) and O’Flynn 
(2009) do nevertheless recognise that ethno-national political parties are 
inherent to Northern Ireland and, therefore, the electoral system that would best 
facilitate the formation of a moderate voluntary coalition is very significant.  
 
It is, however, on this issue that Horowitz and O’Flynn differ. Horowitz (2003, 
pp. 93, 99) argues against the use of PR-STV in Northern Ireland, as 
implemented by the Good Friday Agreement, as although it is a preferential 
system, elections are contested in multimember constituencies and candidates 
have low quotas to reach to win a seat, resulting in some seats being won on 
first preference votes alone, which reduces the incentives for candidates and 
parties to moderate to appeal beyond their own bloc. He instead recommends 
AV, a non-proportional preferential system that uses single member 
constituencies in which candidates must achieve more than 50 per cent of the 
vote to win the seat (Hain, 1997, pp. 124-26). This requirement, Horowitz (2003) 
claims, can encourage candidates and parties to moderate in the hope of 
attracting support from outside of their own communal bloc, which in turn can 
facilitate, through vote pooling, the formation of an intergroup coalition of 
moderates and the exclusion of ‘hard liners’ from government. Conversely, 
O’Flynn (2009, pp. 271-73) argues that PR-STV ‘has not led to a hardening of 
political attitudes’ or increased polarisation, and instead agrees with McGarry 
and O’Leary (2009a, pp. 55-56) that there has been a noticeable moderation of 
Sinn Fein policy since the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. 
Although O’Flynn accepts that PR-STV is more geared towards the principle of 
accommodation than that of integration, he is unconvinced of the merits of AV – 
chiefly due to concerns that it can prevent the electorate from voting for 
‘representatives who share their views or who are capable of arguing on their 
behalf’. A consociationalist response to the centripetalist position will now be 
presented. 
 
On the issue of executive formation, McGarry and O’Leary (2009b, p. 379) 
disagree with Horowitz’s and O’Flynn’s critique of the d’Hondt procedure. They 
argue that if a coalition is to be constructed on the basis of a weighted majority 
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of 60 per cent, it would be possible for one of the two largest parties – currently 
the DUP and Sinn Fein – to be excluded. Participants in the executive would 
therefore be subjected to outflanking, which could impede upon their ability to 
cooperate. They also claim that weighted majority executive formation would 
not facilitate moderation amongst parties, as this procedure does not provide 
them with incentives to do so, whereas the d’Hondt method and its guarantee of 
ministerial positions to parties achieving a certain quota of seats in the 
legislature, does. Lastly, McGarry and O’Leary (2009b, pp. 360-61, 379) 
support d’Hondt over a weighted majority as it is democratically just: it combines 
proportionality with inclusiveness, whilst incentivising parties to assume 
executive responsibilities through participation in government.  
 
Proponents of consociationalism also reject Horowitz’s support for the use of 
AV in Northern Ireland. Critics suggest that there is no evidence to indicate that 
the system incentivises vote pooling and facilitates support for moderate 
parties, and this outcome is certainly not guaranteed (see, for example, 
Fraenkel and Grofman, 2007). In addition to this, McGarry and O’Leary (2009a, 
p. 62) argue that it is flawed to believe that a non-proportional system would 
have been agreed upon during the Good Friday negotiations by parties who 
stood to lose out by it, in particular those associated with paramilitary 
organisations – Sinn Fein, the PUP and the UDP – whose inclusion was vital to 
the success of the Agreement. Therefore, they claim that AV is not a realistic 
option in the case of Northern Ireland, not least because its exclusionary 
character also has the potential to reignite intergroup conflict. The merits and 
demerits of PR-STV and other electoral systems relevant to Northern Ireland 
will be explored in greater depth in subsequent chapters. 
 
Taylor (2009b, p. 312) argues that consociationalism does not sufficiently 
address the ‘sectarian dualism’ between unionists and nationalists which 
continues to form the basic structure of Northern Ireland’s society, and is 
considered by some to be problematic. This position is also supported by Dixon 
(2011, pp. 310-11), who claims that consociationalism is ‘a kind of voluntary 
apartheid’, as its instruments ‘reinforce’ the ‘antagonistic communal identities’ 
that he believes policy makers should seek to diminish. The primary factor 
behind why Taylor considers a peace agreement based upon consociational 
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power sharing that does little to address the ‘sectarian dualism’ between 
communities that is rooted in Northern Irish society to be so problematic is the 
inequality and injustice which he believes it is contributing to (Taylor, 2009b, p. 
312). This, he argues, facilitates the continuation of the inequality suffered by 
Catholics since the partition of Ireland in 1921 and which was a major 
contributor to the outbreak of the Troubles in the late 1960s, and cites a 2007 
report indicating that Catholics have ‘lower levels of employment, lower levels of 
economic activity and higher representation in workless households’ than their 
Protestant counterparts (CAJ, 2007, p. 2, quoted in Taylor, 2009b, pp. 312-13, 
316). Taylor (2009b, p. 320) claims that this is due to the Good Friday 
Agreement reinforcing and perpetuating sectarian divisions, and failing to 
challenge inequality, rather than establishing a ‘non-sectarian era’. This has the 
effect of freezing the conflict as it is, rather than providing any meaningful 
conflict transformation away from traditional sectarian divisions. 
 
Taylor (2006, pp. 218-19. See also O’Flynn, 2003, p. 144) also criticises the use 
of the community designation system for MLAs to demonstrate how Northern 
Ireland’s consociational political arrangements are perpetuating divisions, as it 
is argued that it does not permit individual thinking and leaves the votes of 
those designated as ‘others’ carrying less weight on legislation requiring cross-
community support. McGarry and O’Leary (2009a) discredit Taylor’s critique of 
consociationalism for three reasons. Firstly, they argue that he fails to recognise 
that as Northern Ireland is a deeply divided society with sectarianism and 
segregation still a feature of everyday life for many (see Nolan, 2012; 2013; 
2014), a peace agreement that fails to accommodate the two major 
communities would be highly unlikely to succeed (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009a, 
p. 83). Secondly, and more specifically, he does not mention that consociational 
power sharing has provided political representatives of nationalists in Northern 
Ireland with direct access to government that they did not have prior to 1998, 
which has undoubtedly put them in a position from which to address the 
highlighted inequalities against Catholics (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009b, p. 
387). Finally, McGarry and O’Leary (2009b, p. 385) discredit Taylor’s claim that 
consociationalism is reinforcing and perpetuating sectarian divisions by citing a 
survey indicating that support for residential integration had increased by nine 
per cent between 1998 and 2007, and stood at 80 per cent at this time. 
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A further criticism of Northern Ireland’s consociational settlement is the 
argument that it is not achieving its objective of facilitating a peaceful 
environment in the region. This position is advocated by Wilson (2009, p. 229), 
who makes a connection between the implementation of power sharing 
arrangements and an increase in violence in Northern Ireland. He justifies this 
link by arguing that violence increased during the late 1990s and early 2000s in 
the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement and decreased after the 
suspension of power sharing in 2002 (Wilson, 2009, p. 229). This position is 
also supported by Taylor (2009b, p. 325), who cites articles by Wilford and 
Wilson (2003, p. 8, quoted in Taylor, 2009b, p. 325), and Jarman (2005, p. 4, 
quoted in Taylor, 2009b, p. 325) as evidence that violence has increased since 
the implementation of the Agreement in 1998. McGarry and O’Leary (2009b, pp. 
369-70), however, counter this argument by asserting that it is flawed as 
violence has continued to decrease since power sharing was re-established in 
2007, which therefore discredits Wilson’s and Taylor’s claim that 
consociationalism is failing to facilitate peace in Northern Ireland. 
 
It is clear from the literature reviewed that there is an epistemic division in 
positions on the Good Friday Agreement. Pluri-nationalists, such as McGarry 
and O’Leary (2009a, pp. 25-28, 83), argue that accommodation is the only 
realistic means of managing conflict in divided societies and may have the 
ability bring about a shared identity. In contrast, post-structuralists, such as 
Taylor (2006. 2009b) and MacGinty (2001), argue that integration would be a 
more effective approach to establishing a genuinely inclusive Northern Ireland. 
This has important ramifications when applying an ethno-symbolic approach. 
For pluri-nationalists, there is an assumption that ethno-national symbolism may 
be malleable to changing political institutions, such as those implemented by 
the Good Friday Agreement that facilitate elite level cooperation, and this may 
come to transcend identities. For post-structuralists, however, the Agreement 
allows for unionists and nationalists to maintain their ‘exclusive world-views’ by 
legitimising them in politics, which prevents symbols of unity becoming 
meaningful (MacGinty, 2001, p. 18). This is an important epistemic distinction 
within the context of this study. 
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Since the Good Friday Agreement 
The Agreement was put to the electorate by referendum in both Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland – in the latter to ratify the constitutional 
amendment of Articles Two and Three, effectively surrendering the state’s 
territorial claim over the North (O’Donnell, 2007, pp. 141-44). Predictably, 94 
per cent voted for the amendment, whilst in Northern Ireland 71 per cent 
supported the Good Friday Agreement (Mitchell, 2001, pp. 30-31). It is worth 
noting, however, that it achieved significantly less support amongst unionists 
than nationalists. Exit polls indicated that only a slim majority within the unionist 
community voted in favour of the Agreement, with Ian Paisley’s North Antrim 
constituency voting against, the only constituency to do so (Mitchell, 2001, pp. 
30-31). The Agreement officially came into force in late 1999 (Wilford, 2001, p. 
1). 
 
It was, nevertheless, beset with difficulties resulting in five suspensions by the 
British government due to disagreement over paramilitary decommissioning and 
divisions within unionism, with the final suspension in 2002 being in place for 
almost five years (O’Duffy, 2007, pp. 180, 183). The unilaterality of the UK’s 
actions in suspending the Agreement, amid private objections by the Irish 
government (O’Duffy, 2007, p. 180), has led some to question the symmetry of 
British-Irish intergovernmental relations with regard to Northern Ireland, and to 
cast doubt on its continued effectiveness in regulating conflict (Bew, 2006, p. 
67, quoted in O’Duffy, 2007, p. 189). O’Duffy (2007, p. 189), however, argues 
that this underestimates the salience of the relationship and its ability to 
incentivise unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland to accept the 
provisions of the Good Friday Agreement. Despite political instability during the 
early years of the Agreement, the ceasefires of the major paramilitary groups 
have largely remained intact and decommissioning has been implemented. The 
Agreement has also facilitated a significant reduction in lethal violence in the 
years since 1998 (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009b, pp. 370, 385-86). 
 
The continued importance of a close British-Irish relationship was once again 
demonstrated during negotiations culminating in the St Andrews Agreement of 
73 
 
2006 to re-establish the principles of the Good Friday Agreement by creating 
the conditions necessary for the DUP and Sinn Fein, by now the largest parties 
in Northern Ireland, to share power (O’Duffy, 2007, pp. 189-93). O’Duffy (2007, 
pp. 190-91) draws attention to the way in which both governments balanced the 
incentives of agreement against the disincentives of disagreement – for 
example, a financial package to alleviate deprivation in working class unionist 
and nationalist areas was pitted against increased water charges and property 
taxes that the parties would undoubtedly have been held responsible for by the 
public in Northern Ireland.  
 
There are two particularly salient provisions of the St Andrews Agreement. 
Firstly, the selection procedure for the positions of First Minister and deputy 
First Minister was amended to no longer require cross-community support, 
which dealt with the DUP’s refusal to approve a Sinn Fein deputy First Minister 
and alleviated the incentive for either the First Minister or deputy to resign in 
order to bring about a collapse of power sharing, as the two largest parties 
could simply nominate replacements (O’Duffy, 2007, p. 192). Secondly, the 
Agreement saw Sinn Fein commit to support policing and the rule of law in 
Northern Ireland for the first time in the party’s history, which was considered by 
the DUP to be a pre-requisite to entering into power sharing, in return for the 
devolution of policing and justice powers to Belfast (O’Duffy, 2007, p. 191). This 
decision was duly approved at the party’s Ard Fheis (annual conference) and 
powers were devolved in April 2010 after negotiations culminating in the 
Hillsborough Agreement, despite initial disagreement between the DUP and 
Sinn Fein over when this should take place (O’Duffy, 2007, p. 191; Perry, 2011). 
Power sharing has continued, without suspension, since the implementation of 
the St Andrews Agreement in May 2007. 
 
A major development of the reestablishment of power sharing is the interaction 
and engagement between unionist and nationalist political elites who were 
formerly staunch opponents. This is demonstrated in the cordial relationship 
between the then First Minister, the DUP’s Ian Paisley, and deputy Martin 
McGuinness of Sinn Fein, with commentators branding them ‘the chuckle 
brothers’ (Dixon, 2012, p. 273). Elite level interaction is not confined to working 
relationships between political leaders, however, and has also manifested itself 
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in engagement with the opposite community’s culture and traditions. Examples 
include the current DUP leader and First Minister, Peter Robinson, attending a 
Gaelic football match with McGuinness, with the sport a defining example of 
Irish nationalist culture; and McGuinness meeting the Queen, who is 
traditionally considered by republicans to illustrate British imperialism in Ireland 
(Belfast Telegraph, 2012; Greenslade, 2012). This engagement is not confined 
to Stormont: in 2013, Mairtin O Muilleoir became the first Sinn Fein mayor of 
Belfast to attend an Armistice Day service, a British tradition in remembrance of 
those who fought in World War I (Kearney, 2013). Despite interaction between 
political elites of opposite communities occurring on a daily basis in Northern 
Ireland, the situation is altogether different within many areas of society. ‘Peace 
walls’, designed to separate communities in an attempt to limit inter-communal 
conflict, continue to divide some lower socio-economic urban areas, whilst 
recent reports indicate that 93 per cent of children are educated in segregated 
schools (Nolan, 2014). It is clear that although substantial violent conflict is 
largely confined to the past and elite level political cooperation has taken hold, 
Northern Ireland is yet to make significant progress in overcoming staunch 
communal divisions between unionists and nationalists. 
 
Recent political issues in Northern Ireland have focused on two major themes – 
the impact of dissident republicanism, and dealing with flags, parades and the 
legacy of the past. Firstly, small paramilitary groups which reject the Good 
Friday Agreement, such as the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA, continue the 
republican ‘armed struggle’. Whilst their support and ability remains limited, 
these organisations have launched several attacks, including the 2011 killing of 
a PSNI constable in Omagh and the shooting of a prison officer in County 
Armagh in 2012 (Tonge, 2014, pp. 14-17). This has led scholars such as Tonge 
(2014, p. 14) to describe dissident republicanism as ‘the greatest threat to 
stability in Northern Ireland’ and mitigating this is undoubtedly a key challenge. 
In 2014, dissidents achieved political success, with the election of a 32 County 
Sovereignty Movement member, thought to be the political wing of the Real 
IRA, to Derry and Strabane Council (Deeney, 2014). Although their political 
impact is limited, this is the first example of a dissident republican being elected, 
which demonstrates that there is some support for their objectives within 
communities. 
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A second current political issue of salience in Northern Ireland is how to deal 
with flags, parades and the legacy of the past. This is largely borne out of the 
aforementioned 2012-13 union flag protests and riots, and has remained an 
important issue since. As the Good Friday Agreement was more focused on 
managing violent conflict, these issues were largely ignored and it was decided 
that all-party talks, chaired by American diplomat Richard Haass, were to be 
held in late 2013, with a view to resolving them. These, however, broke up 
without agreement when unionist parties were unwilling to accept the proposals 
(McDonald, 2013b). In late 2014 the talks reconvened, now primarily chaired by 
the current Secretary of State to Northern Ireland, Teresa Villiers, and 
culminated in the Stormont House Agreement in December of that year. The 
Agreement established a Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture and Tradition 
to be in place by June 2015, amongst other provisions concerning, for example, 
fiscal policies and welfare reform (Stormont House Agreement, 2014). Although 
these issues are far from being fully resolved, the Agreement provides a 
foundation from which to achieve this. 
 
 
Summary 
This chapter has dealt with the issue of governing plural societies, with 
particular emphasis placed on conflict management in societies considered to 
be divided. By making reference to the case study of this research, Northern 
Ireland, it has demonstrated how entrenched divisions between different 
communities can result in (often violent) conflict and the need for this to be 
managed in order to bring about a more peaceful political and social society. 
Through analysing existing literature, this chapter has shown that an 
accommodative approach such as consociationalism is necessary in order to 
achieve this in deeply divided societies, as only an approach that recognises 
the existence of distinct, and often opposing, communities has the potential to 
successfully manage violent conflict. It has nevertheless noted that 
consociational settlements can require the inclusion of principles of integration 
and power dividing, such as the external dimensions of the Good Friday 
Agreement, which recognises that power sharing agreements are often not 
purely accommodative. As consociational power sharing facilitates cooperation 
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between political actors at the elite level, it is thought that this may, over time, 
trickle down and contribute to a reduction in the salience of ethno-national 
identities within wider society (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009a, p. 83). Using the 
case of Northern Ireland, later chapters of this thesis seek to determine whether 
this phenomenon is indeed taking place. 
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Chapter Three – Electoral politics in divided societies 
 
 
Having explored the continued salience of nationalism and the politics of conflict 
management in divided societies, attention will now turn to electoral politics. 
This chapter analyses existing literature on elections in divided societies and, 
more importantly, debates around which electoral system is most conducive to 
conflict management. It begins with an overview of electoral characteristics, with 
particular emphasis placed on the importance of ethnic party systems in divided 
societies, before providing a comparison of the most significant electoral 
systems that have been recommended as being conducive to managing conflict 
in these societies. Particular prominence will be placed on analysing PR-STV, 
as the system is the focus of this research. Attention then turns to the case 
study of Northern Ireland, with a history of its voting systems, before discussing 
the post-Good Friday Agreement electoral environment. The purpose of this 
chapter is to provide the necessary background in order for this research to fulfil 
the aim of determining whether the preferential PR-STV electoral system is 
facilitating any erosion in the significance of ethno-national identities at election 
time, and therefore within wider society, in Northern Ireland. 
 
 
Electoral characteristics of divided societies 
Horowitz (1985, pp. 291-92) argues that ‘the main element that ethnic conflict 
introduces into party politics is the ethnically based party’, which ‘derives its 
support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group (or cluster of ethnic 
groups) and serves the interests of that group’. He elaborates to suggest that 
parties must serve the interests of the community they intend to represent or 
their support will diminish. Ethnic parties, therefore, often utilise aforementioned 
ethno-symbolic characteristics such as particular flags and emblems as this is a 
crucial way in which they can identify with the community they seek to represent 
and maximise their electoral support from it, as will be demonstrated by the 
case of Northern Ireland. Although it is logical to suspect that this would 
damage a party’s overall electoral prospects as they are tailoring their appeal to 
one particular section of population, maximising support from one community is 
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usually essential to the success of parties in divided societies as many voters 
engage in ethnic voting (P. Mitchell, 1999, pp. 101-03). 
 
Horowitz (1985, pp. 298-302) identifies three types of political parties in divided 
societies: ethnic, multi-ethnic and non-ethnic. Ethnic parties are those which 
seek to represent one particular community within a society, such as the DUP in 
Northern Ireland. However, as Horowitz (1985, p. 299) argues, the language 
parties use to describe themselves is often more aspirational than realistic. He 
cites the case of Malaysia, where several parties catering for the Chinese 
community have described themselves as multi-ethnic on the basis that they 
occasionally enlist Malays and elect them to party office. They are, however, 
ultimately Chinese parties. When truly multi-ethnic parties do exist, such as the 
Parti Democratique de Cote d’Ivoire during the Ivory Coast’s fight for 
independence, they often attempt to adopt a non-ethnic focus, usually with little 
success (Horowitz, 1985, p. 300). Horowitz (1985, p. 301) argues that non-
ethnic parties rarely exist in plural societies, except in those where divisions are 
not deep or communities are so thinly dispersed that it is unfeasible. It is clear 
that in deeply divided societies, ethnic parties are paramount.  
 
Whilst this is the case, it is nevertheless important not to oversimplify the 
assumption that identity, which may be ethnic, national, linguistic or other, 
cannot influence the party system in societies that are not divided and, 
conversely, that left-right ideology – social liberalism or conservatism, for 
example – cannot be a point of identification for parties in divided societies. In 
support of this, in Northern Ireland the DUP and the UUP are traditionally 
considered to represent a centre-right to right wing, conservative position, 
whereas the SDLP and Sinn Fein take a more socially liberal, centre-left to left 
wing approach to everyday politics. In the Republic of Ireland, which unlike 
Northern Ireland is not affected by ethnic divisions, electoral competition has 
traditionally been based around positions during the Irish Civil War, with anti-
Anglo-Irish Treaty, republican Fianna Fail and pro-Treaty, nationalist Fine Gael. 
This demonstrates that whilst identity may be the main influence on parties in 
divided societies, party systems are not entirely binary (see, for example, 
Horowitz, 1985, ch. 8). 
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Unsurprisingly, the presence of ethnic parties in divided societies results in 
ethnic voting. P. Mitchell (1999, p. 101) states that two types of competition 
exist within an ethnic party system: between blocs and within them. He argues 
that this results in elections having a ‘census-type quality’ in which electoral 
trends are determined by demographics, rather than one community seeking to 
win votes from the other. As such, the main party competition is intra-bloc. 
Mitchell et al (2009, p. 400) claim that ethnic party mobilisation is based on a 
‘catch us’ rather ‘catch all’ appeal to voters, as few cross the inter-bloc divide. 
As Horowitz (1985, p. 291) suggests, in ethnic party systems it is therefore 
essential that parties serve the interests of the community they seek to 
represent, or face the prospect of losing their support to a rival party. It has 
been argued that this results in ‘ethnic outbidding’, whereby parties engage in 
‘extremist and emotive ethnic appeals’ that imply that the core interests of their 
community are under threat of being ‘sold out’, in order to mobilise the group 
they strive to represent (Mitchell et al, 2009, p. 400. See also Horowitz, 1985, 
pp. 349-60; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972). It is claimed that this leads to 
increased political polarisation as parties seek to present themselves as the 
stoutest defenders of their ethnic bloc and adopt ever more hard line positions 
to secure this portrayal (Mitchell et al, 2009, p. 400). 
 
Whilst one could be forgiven for thinking that this political polarisation would 
inevitably result in the collapse of democratic institutions, Mitchell and Evans 
(2009, p. 149) argue that there are two ways in which this can be avoided within 
an ethnic party system. First is the existence of a ‘multidimensional and cross-
cutting cleavage structure’ that is ethnically fluid and prevents a ‘winner takes 
all, loser gets nothing’ situation. Chandra (2005, p. 235, quoted in Mitchell and 
Evans, 2009, pp. 149-50) uses the case of India to illustrate how ethnic 
divisions can, over time, become multidimensional, resulting in centripetal party 
behaviour through, for example, a generous language policy and statehood 
recognition. This, however, is unlikely to occur in deeply divided societies due to 
the absence of any potential for cross-cutting cleavages to be established 
(Mitchell and Evans, 2009, p. 150).  
 
In these societies, Mitchell and Evans (2009, pp. 149, 151-53) argue that ‘power 
sharing institutions may lead to centripetal competition if the extremist parties 
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can develop successful ethnic tribune appeals’, and this explains the electoral 
success of formerly hard line parties in divided societies such as Northern 
Ireland. Kedar (2005, p. 185) argues that this occurs due to voter recognition 
that policies are often only implemented after multiparty bargaining during which 
positions are likely to become watered down. In divided societies voters, 
therefore, often opt for who they perceive to be the stoutest defender of their 
ethno-national bloc, despite that party’s positions being more extreme than their 
own. Mitchell and Evans (2009, pp. 151-52) term this ‘compensational voting’ 
and argue that it is crucial for ‘ethnic tribune’ parties to resist intra-bloc 
outflanking from more extreme parties in order to maintain their status. This 
goes some way to explaining why many parties in divided societies continue to 
utilise ethno-symbolism to seek to identify with the community they strive to 
represent and maximise their electoral support from it. 
 
In continuing with this theme, Horowitz (1985, p. 365) draws attention to the 
existence of multi-ethnic coalitions in divided societies, arguing that there is 
ostensibly great strength in the opinion that inter-communal coalitions have the 
potential to mitigate ethno-national divisions. These coalitions, however, can 
take several different forms, which often depends on the electoral arrangements 
in place and the exact nature of conflict in a particular divided society. The 
cases of Northern Ireland, Malaysia and Lebanon will be briefly explored in 
order to illustrate this. As aforementioned, in Northern Ireland executive 
formation is by mandatory coalition depending on the strength of parties in the 
legislature elected using proportional representation, which offers few incentives 
for parties to build pre-election inter-bloc alliances. It does, however, mean that 
unionist and nationalist parties must cooperate in government to facilitate the 
effective operation of governmental institutions.  
 
The arrangements in Malaysia and Lebanon, where elections are contested 
using first past the post, are altogether different. In Malaysia, consociationalism 
is played out within the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional, which has been in 
power since independence in 1957 and is comprised of three main parties 
representing the Malay, Chinese and Indian communities, in addition to 
numerous others (Brown, 2005). This arrangement facilitates cooperation 
between these parties not only in government but also at election time in order 
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to maximise support for the coalition. In Lebanon, a multipolar society, two 
multi-ethnic coalitions have been organised since 2005 around party positions 
on the Cedar Revolution of the same year (Haddad, 2009, p. 406). In short, the 
March 8 Alliance is pro-Syrian and friendly towards Syrian intervention in 
Lebanon, whilst the March 14 Alliance takes the opposite view, with both being 
named after events of the Revolution: the pro-Syrian demonstration and 
expulsion of Syria from Lebanon respectively (Haddad, 2009, p. 406). Most 
importantly, these coalitions transcend ethno-national divisions, with parties 
representing most communities being present within both (Haddad, 2009, p. 
406). This demonstrates that it is possible for issues of great significance to go 
beyond the salience of communal identity in some divided societies, although 
the significance of the latter is not necessarily reduced. As coalitions are often a 
feature of such societies, the way in which they should be formed is a source of 
debate amongst consociationalists and centripetalists in terms of which offers 
the greatest potential for successful conflict management, which will later be 
referred to in greater depth. 
 
 
Electoral systems and conflict management 
As aforementioned, the consociational/centripetal debate over the most 
effective method of conflict management in divided societies also manifests 
itself electorally. Whilst consociationalists favour proportional representation 
systems, there is discord within the approach over whether PR-STV or party list 
PR is most effective (Mitchell, 2014). For centripetalists, there is a preference 
for plurality systems, in particular AV (Reilly, 2012). Each will be explored and 
analysed in turn, with particular focus on PR-STV, as this is the electoral system 
under study in this research. 
 
PR-STV 
PR-STV is a proportional electoral system which is currently used for Assembly 
elections in Northern Ireland, local government elections in Scotland, and lower 
chamber elections in the Republic of Ireland and Malta (Grofman and Bowler, 
1996/97, p. 43; Mitchell and Gillespie, 1999, p. 79; Clark, 2013). Importantly, 
votes cast in elections contested using PR-STV are for candidates rather than 
political parties, therefore the system neither requires nor prevents party voting, 
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as explained by Mitchell and Gillespie (1999, pp. 74-75). As with all PR electoral 
systems, multimember constituencies in which seats are allocated based on the 
proportion of the vote each candidate receives is an essential component of 
PR-STV.  
 
Ballot papers feature candidates listed alphabetically, and can include, for 
example, several candidates representing the same party, only one candidate 
representing a party and independent candidates not affiliated to any party. 
Voters are required to rank candidates in order of preference, starting with the 
number ‘1’ for their most preferred option and continuing to however many 
candidates are included on the ballot. They are not obliged to give every 
candidate a preference and may stop at whatever point they choose; this may 
be after ranking only one candidate, they may choose to vote for five, or indeed 
every candidate on the ballot, in order of preference. Crucially, however, only 
one vote on each ballot paper is transferable. From the perspective of the voter, 
PR-STV is a relatively straightforward system provided they remember that 
votes are cast for candidates and not parties, using numbers in order of 
preference and not an ‘X’ as is common with non-preferential electoral systems 
(Sinnott, 1993, p. 69, quoted in Mitchell and Gillespie, 1999, p. 75). 
 
A more comprehensive understanding of PR-STV is, however, required by 
election strategists, analysts and those involved in the counting of votes. 
Mitchell and Gillespie (1999, pp. 75-79) offer a guide to its intricacies. The first 
stage of the count is to determine the quota, which is the number of votes 
required by a candidate in order to guarantee election, and is calculated using 
the following formula (also known as the droop quota): 
 
Quota = Total number of valid votes 
      +1 
Number of seats + 1 
 
The case study of Northern Ireland is a worthy example of how PR-STV quotas 
are determined in practice. For Assembly elections, which have a district 
magnitude, or number of seats per each of the 18 constituencies, of six, the 
quota is the total number of votes divided by seven (14.3 per cent) plus one. 
This relatively low quota increases the likelihood of independent candidates and 
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those representing small parties gaining representation, as the lower the quota 
is the more proportional the result is likely to be. However, for European 
elections, which are also contested using PR-STV, Northern Ireland elects as a 
single constituency and, with only three seats available, has a much lower 
district magnitude than elections to the Assembly and a quota of 25 per cent of 
the vote plus one, thus increasing the potential for disproportionality in the 
result. Local government elections in Northern Ireland are also contested using 
PR-STV, although quotas for these elections cannot be uniformly determined, 
as district magnitudes vary from ward to ward within each council, though 
district magnitudes are usually comparatively high (Elliott, 1998). 
 
As demonstrated by Mitchell and Gillespie (1999, pp. 75-79), once a quota has 
been calculated a first count is made and any candidate who exceeds the quota 
with first preference votes is duly elected. Any first preference votes of elected 
candidates that exceed the quota are considered to be surplus and are 
redistributed to other candidates based on order of preference to avoid wasted 
votes. For example, if a quota is 1,200 and a candidate is elected at the first 
count with 1,350 first preference votes, the 150 votes between these two figures 
are considered to be surplus and are therefore reallocated at the second count. 
Any ballot papers that do not indicate a second preference are deemed to be 
non-transferable. This process continues, with preferences further down the 
ballot often playing a role, until all of the available seats have been allocated. 
When candidates are unable to win representation they are eliminated and their 
next preferences are transferred. Once there are no more candidates left to be 
eliminated, the remaining candidates can be elected without reaching the 
required quota to guarantee this. This makes for a particularly complex electoral 
system for those who require a comprehensive understanding of its intricacies. 
 
Mitchell and Gillespie (1999, pp. 79-80) identify three main merits of the PR-
STV electoral system. First, it is largely proportional and therefore does not 
result in the hugely disproportionate outcomes often associated with the first 
past the post plurality system, whilst virtually eliminating wasted votes as there 
is no harm done in giving first preference votes to candidates with little 
likelihood of winning due to second preferences being transferred after their 
elimination (Grofman and Bowler, 1996/97, pp. 45-46). Second, PR-STV allows 
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voters to cross party lines and vote for candidates of more than one party, 
which is particularly important in Northern Ireland and a point that will later be 
returned to. Finally, under the system voters have a degree of control over how 
their votes will be used in the count, safe in the knowledge that a lower 
preference vote can never be used against a candidate to whom the voter has 
given a higher preference (Gallagher et al, 1995, p. 287, quoted in Mitchell and 
Gillespie, 1999, p. 80). These merits give PR-STV some advantages over, for 
example, first past the post and party list PR systems, and this will later be 
returned to in providing a comparison of PR-STV with other electoral systems. 
 
Despite these merits and the benefits they offer, Mitchell and Gillespie (1999, p. 
79. See also Gallagher et al, 1995, p. 288) nevertheless highlight two main 
criticisms of PR-STV. First, as voters can vote for candidates representing more 
than one party, it has been argued that this can cause each candidate to make 
appeals to the centre ground, which can result in less distinctive parties and 
representatives. Due to the particular salience of this in Northern Ireland, a fuller 
explanation and analysis will later be made. Second, it is a requirement of PR-
STV that constituencies have low district magnitudes, which may result in 
disproportionality when compared to other PR systems, such as party list. 
Evidence suggests, however, that this argument has not been realised in 
election results in the Republic of Ireland and Malta. 
 
Party list PR 
Whilst there are numerous variations of party list PR, the focus in divided 
societies is on ‘closed’ list PR, as this can ‘encourage the formation and 
maintenance of [the] strong and cohesive political parties’ that Lijphart (2008, p. 
79, quoted in Mitchell, 2014, p. 247) considers to be essential for the successful 
application of consociationalism. It is a system in which parties list their 
candidates in order of preference and these candidates are duly elected should 
the party reach the required quota for one or more of its candidates to gain 
representation. Therefore, voters vote for a party rather than a candidate, with 
one vote, denoted by an ‘X’. The system is widely used throughout mainland 
Europe (Hain, 1997, p. 122). Seats are often allocated using the d’Hondt 
formula, in which representation is determined based on the number of votes a 
party receives and aims to ensure that the number of votes for each seat is 
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equalised (Wilder, 1999, pp. 232-33). For example, should a party receive 
double the quota of votes necessary to win a seat, it will gain two 
representatives, which will be the first two names on its list. One critique that 
has been made of the d’Hondt method is that its highest averages formula 
tends to favour larger parties (Gallagher, 1996, p. 8, quoted in Mitchell and 
Gillespie, 1999, p. 81). 
 
Grofman and Bowler (1996/97, p. 43) argue that one of the major advantages of 
party list PR over PR-STV is that it is more proportional, though they recognise 
that large, multimember constituencies are necessary for this. Evidence of 
disproportionality in elections contested using party list PR can be found in the 
1996 Northern Ireland Peace Forum election when small, five seat 
constituencies resulted in, for example, Sinn Fein winning four of West Belfast’s 
five seats with just 53 per cent of the vote and the DUP taking all five seats in 
Lagan Valley with less than three-fifths of the vote (Mitchell and Gillespie, 1999, 
p. 81). As this example suggests, it is impossible to claim that PR-STV is more 
disproportionate than party list PR and vice versa, as this depends on the 
district magnitude in place. 
 
A major contrast between ‘closed’ party list PR and PR-STV is that the former is 
very much a party-centred system (Grofman and Bowler, 1996/97, p. 44). With 
party list PR, the chances of a candidate being elected is largely in the hands 
the party, as it is it that decides where candidates will be listed, in order of party 
preference. This is particularly true of large parties who are often guaranteed of 
winning at least one seat in a constituency. Therefore, candidates for elections 
contested using party list PR are much more likely to adhere to party politics 
and positions than seek to differentiate themselves to cultivate the personal 
vote, as it is probable that party elites will select those who toe the line for the 
top positions on the ballot. This is a direct contrast with PR-STV, whose 
candidate-centred attributes often make it necessary for candidates to seek the 
personal vote when faced with intra-party competition from those offering very 
similar policy positions. Likewise, a further related difference between PR-STV 
and party list PR is that the latter, like first past the post, reinforces party 
divisions as voters can only vote for one party or one candidate representing a 
party, whereas PR-STV has the potential to encourage candidates to make 
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cross-cleavage appeals, as the systems allows vote transfers (Grofman and 
Bowler, 1996/97, p. 46). One critique levelled at party list PR is that it can break 
the link between constituencies and representatives that is much supported by 
proponents of first past the post, and its often high district magnitude has the 
potential to do this to a greater extent than PR-STV (Hain, 1997, p. 122). 
Despite party list PR and PR-STV both being considered to be proportional 
electoral systems, this analysis indicates that there are significant differences 
between the two. 
 
As the founder of the consociational model for governing plural societies such 
as Northern Ireland, Lijphart (2008, p. 79; 1991, pp. 98-99, quoted in 2008, pp. 
188-89, quoted in Mitchell, 2014, p. 247) argues that ‘closed’ party list PR is a 
more suitable electoral system than PR-STV and makes four criticisms of the 
latter to support his claim. First, he argues that the comparatively small 
constituency size needed in order for PR-STV to be effective makes the system 
more conducive to gerrymandering than party list PR, which uses larger 
constituencies. Second, the preferential method of PR-STV, in which voters 
rank candidates, is claimed to be too confusing. Third, voting for candidates 
rather than parties is argued to weaken party cohesion, which could threaten 
inter-party negotiations. Fourth, the small constituency size required by PR-STV 
is claimed to increase disproportionality, and leave minorities and smaller 
parties unelected. Overall, Lijphart (1991, p. 99, quoted in Mitchell, 2014, p. 
247) argues that ‘these many disadvantages of STV clearly outweigh the 
advantage of reciprocal agreements to exchange second preferences’, and 
therefore recommends the use of party list PR in plural societies.  
 
Mitchell (2014, pp. 249, 255-56), however, claims that the disadvantages of PR-
STV identified by Lijphart are either not applicable or not as serious as 
suggested. He argues that gerrymandering can occur under any electoral 
system, regardless of the size of constituencies, and that PR-STV is not 
confusing from the point of view of the voter. Furthermore, despite being a 
candidate-based system, PR-STV offers incentives for candidates to cooperate 
with parties as they often require transfers in order to secure election. Finally, 
although it may be less proportional than party list PR, PR-STV ensures that the 
most favoured candidates are elected, disputing the argument that the system 
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disadvantages minorities and smaller parties. Therefore, Mitchell (2014, p. 247) 
argues in contrast to Lijphart that PR-STV is at least as compatible as the party 
list PR system for plural societies. 
 
Plurality systems 
There are two major plurality systems: first past the post and AV. Whilst first 
past the post is not often recommended for divided societies, it is used in some, 
such as Malaysia, and therefore merits a mention.  It is a majoritarian, plurality 
system and usually features small, single member constituencies in which the 
candidate with the most votes wins, regardless of the share of the vote they 
have received. In contrast to PR-STV, voters can only vote for one candidate, 
denoted by an ‘X’. It is for this reason that elections contested using first past 
the post are prone to high levels of disproportionality and this is the main way in 
which the system differs to PR-STV (Bogdanor, 1997, pp. 80-81). As Bogdanor 
(1997, pp. 80-81) argues, the disproportionality of first past the post often 
results in a single party forming a government at Westminster with more than 
half of all seats but with significantly less than 50 per cent of the popular vote, 
eliminating the need to form a coalition of parties, which would be inconceivable 
in elections contested using PR-STV. This disproportionality is, however, 
considered by some to be an advantage as it increases the potential for the 
election of a strong, decisive government (Norton, 1997). Unlike PR-STV, first 
past the post also fails to ensure the fair representation of minorities, as small, 
single member constituencies require candidates representing such groups to 
have a large concentration of support within a district in order to win the seat. 
Due to the particular importance of minority representation in divided societies 
such as Northern Ireland, this is a significant shortcoming of first past the post, 
as is the single party executive that elections contested using this system often 
bring about. 
 
Despite these inherent differences, there are some similarities between the two 
systems. The most notable is that voters vote for a candidate as opposed to a 
party, although candidates standing for election under either system often 
represent a party. Grofman and Bowler (1996/97, pp. 44-46) argue that the 
principal ramification of this is that it encourages candidates to seek the 
personal vote by pursuing the interests of their constituents, making them less 
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likely to stick rigorously to party positions and ultimately results in them being 
more accountable to the electorate. However, where PR-STV differs to first past 
the post in this respect is that whereas in elections contested using the latter 
only one candidate is selected to represent each party to avoid potential vote 
splitting, the preferential method of the former encourages parties to nominate 
more than one candidate, particularly those parties with a large support base. 
As Martin (2010) argues, this clearly marks out PR-STV as a candidate-centred 
system and intra-party competition makes it more likely that candidates will 
seek the personal vote and potentially deviate from party positions, whilst there 
is a reduced likelihood of this in elections contested using first past the post. 
The candidate-centred focus of both systems is not suggested to be an 
advantage or disadvantage, although the need to cultivate the personal vote, 
which is particularly important under PR-STV, is likely to increase the 
accountability of representatives and this is no doubt considered to be a merit 
by constituents. 
 
Despite being used in only a small number of states (most notably Australia), 
AV was brought to the attention of the British public in 2011 when the 
government held a referendum to replace first past the post with the system – a 
motion that was resoundingly defeated by the electorate (Lundberg and Steven, 
2013). As demonstrated by Hain (1997, pp. 124-26), the system has similarities 
with both PR-STV and first past the post. Like the former, AV employs a 
numbering method which allows voters to rank candidates in order of 
preference should they choose to do so; however, in common with first past the 
past, elections contested using AV are done so in single member constituencies 
and with parties nominating only one candidate.  
 
Under AV, votes are counted using a similar method to PR-STV but with only 
one seat available, whilst the fundamental principal of the system is that the 
candidate who wins does so with more than 50 per cent of the vote, therefore 
making the result more proportional, despite AV not being considered to be a 
proportional system. As such, if a candidate receives more than half of all first 
preference votes on the first count, they are duly elected. If not, the candidate 
with the lowest share of the vote is eliminated and their second preference 
votes are redistributed. This process can be repeated several times, with lower 
89 
 
order preference votes playing a role, until a candidate achieves the required 
quota. As is the case with PR-STV, AV can increase incentives for candidates 
to transcend party lines in order secure enough lower preference votes to win 
the seat and it minimises the likelihood of wasted votes as it allows voters to 
express their genuine preference. AV would therefore appear to be a bridge 
between PR-STV and first past the post in not being as proportional as the 
former but having a higher degree of proportionality than the latter. 
 
One of the reasons why the PR-STV electoral system is recommended by some 
for divided societies is because it allows both intra-bloc and inter-bloc vote 
transfers, which has the potential to encourage parties to moderate both their 
policy positions and election campaigns in attempt to attract transfers from 
beyond their own voters (McGarry and O’Leary, 2006b, pp. 269, 274). Horowitz 
(2003), however, argues that PR-STV does not go far enough by simply being a 
system that should induce this – rather, he recommends AV for plural societies 
such as Northern Ireland, as he claims this would require moderation, and 
would therefore be more effective. The rationale behind his position is that 
under PR-STV the quota of votes needed for election is too low to incentivise 
candidates to seek transfers from beyond their own party, and certainly from 
beyond their own bloc (Horowitz, 2003, p. 99). Horowitz (2003, p. 99) argues 
instead that AV would be more effective in inducing parties to moderate their 
policies and election campaigns in order to attract lower order preference votes, 
as under the system elections would be contested in single member 
constituencies in which a candidate would be required to reach a quota of 50 
per cent to be elected, thus increasing the salience of transfers. Under AV, 
parties would not only be incentivised to behave more moderately, especially in 
espousing the nationalism of the community they represent, in attempt to attract 
inter-bloc transfers, but would also be encouraged to enter into deals with 
parties from the opposite bloc to direct their voters to transfer to one another 
and this is argued to be easier for moderate parties, thus incentivising ‘hard 
liners’ to moderate (Horowitz, 1991a, p. 171; 1997, pp. 24, 26, 33, quoted in 
Fraenkel and Grofman, 2006, pp. 626-27). 
 
Horowitz (1989; 1991a; 1991b; 1997, quoted in Fraenkel and Grofman, 2006, p. 
627) identifies two necessary preconditions in order for AV to successfully 
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achieve this. First, constituencies must be sufficiently heterogeneous in that 
they are comprised of significant numbers of members of two or more ethno-
national blocs for it to be ‘politically rewarding’ for parties to seek to attract lower 
order preference votes from the opposite community. Second, there is a 
necessity for multiple political parties because there must be more than one 
party representing the majority community in a constituency in order to 
incentivise the attraction of transfers from minority blocs. If only one party 
represents the majority community it is highly likely that that party will achieve 
the required 50 per cent quota on first preference votes alone, and thus 
elections may as well be contested using a non-preferential majoritarian system 
such as first past the post. If these preconditions are present, Horowitz (2003, p. 
93; 2002, pp. 213-14, quoted in Coakley, 2009, p. 130) argues that AV would be 
likely to encourage more centre ground politics and incentivise inter-bloc vote 
pooling, which would in turn facilitate the formation of a cross-community 
coalition of moderate parties. 
 
To support his argument, Horowitz uses the case of Fiji to demonstrate the 
moderating impact of AV in divided societies (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009a, p. 
62-63). In short, Fiji is comparable to Northern Ireland in that most 
constituencies have a majority of members from one community and the state 
has two similarly sized communities: indigenous Fijians, who make up 52 per 
cent of the population, and Indians, with 44 per cent (McGarry and O’Leary, 
2009a, p. 63; Fraenkel and Grofman, 2006, pp. 631-32). A period of political 
instability during the late twentieth century led to the establishment of a 
constitutional review commission designed to seek academic opinion on how 
best to manage Fiji’s divisions, with Horowitz’s recommendation of using the AV 
electoral system endorsed in the 1997 constitution (Fraenkel and Grofman, 
2006, p. 632). The results of the first election in 1999 indicated a success for 
AV, with two multi-community coalitions contesting the election, both of which 
agreed to reciprocate transfers and share seats, resulting in a prime minister 
from the Indian community presiding over an executive mostly comprised of 
indigenous Fijians (Fraenkel and Grofman, 2006, pp. 633-34). Fraenkel and 
Grofman (2006, pp. 634-36) argue that the success of AV in incentivising 
moderation in Fiji was short lived with the election in 2001 of a hard line Fijian 
dominated government made up of parties that had very low levels of electoral 
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support from the Indian community, and even Horowitz himself has 
acknowledged that AV failed to achieve its intended outcome at the 2001 
election (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009a, pp. 62-63). As such, despite advocating 
AV in societies with weak communal divisions and those with extreme ones, 
Reilly (nd, quoted in McGarry and O’Leary, 2009a, p. 63) does not recommend 
AV for bipolar societies such as Fiji and Northern Ireland. The factors which 
influence opinion against the use of AV in such cases will now be considered. 
 
McGarry and O’Leary (2009a, p. 63) argue that as AV is non-proportional, it can 
have significant drawbacks for plural societies, as electoral outcomes are often 
disproportionate, and the inclusion of minorities and smaller parties in these 
cases is crucial. Their concern is that, being a majoritarian system using small 
single member constituencies, elections contested under AV would be likely to 
return representatives from the majority community, who would not necessarily 
be moderate, and in common with all plurality systems it is probable that AV 
would result in electoral outcomes that favour larger parties. McGarry and 
O’Leary (2009a, pp. 63-64) also argue that the fabled moderating effect of AV is 
unproven, and using the system in divided societies may actually result in 
parties hardening their single identity, nationalist appeals in attempt to secure 
more intra-bloc first preference votes, rather than encouraging them to 
moderate in order to attract transfers from the opposite community. They argue 
that this may lead to the continuation of ethnocentrism, xenophobia and 
extremism by political parties, all of which impact negatively on societies divided 
by conflict. 
 
 
History of electoral systems in Northern Ireland 
 
1921-72 
With the partition of the island of Ireland in 1921, the Government of Ireland Act 
implemented PR-STV for parliamentary and local government elections both 
North and South, whilst first past the post was retained for Westminster 
elections in Northern Ireland (O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, p. 121). As 
McKittrick and McVea (2001, p. 8) explain, the rationale behind this decision 
was that the system offered a safeguard for the Catholic minority in Northern 
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Ireland and the Protestant minority in what was then known as Southern 
Ireland, and indicated respect for their positions. This was comparatively trouble 
free in the Republic of Ireland, with the continued use of PR-STV for all 
elections to the present day (Mitchell and Gillespie, 1999, p. 67). However, the 
Government of Ireland Act included a subclause that allowed Northern Ireland 
to amend the electoral system for parliamentary elections after three years, 
despite unionists having already made clear their opposition to PR-STV 
(Mansergh, 1936, p. 133, quoted in O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, p. 121). It is 
important to note that this requirement was not in place for local government 
elections and, therefore, the recently established Government of Northern 
Ireland was free to amend the electoral system for these as and when it saw fit. 
This it did in 1922 when, threatened with some nationalist run councils refusing 
to recognise the partition of Ireland, the unionist government abolished PR-STV 
and implemented first past the post, as McKittrick and McVea (2001, p. 8) 
assert. They draw attention to the discriminatory character of this decision, with 
nationalists losing their majorities in thirteen of the twenty four councils they had 
previously controlled and, for example, Derry moving to the unionists despite 
the city having a clear nationalist population majority. 
 
As permitted under the terms of the Government of Ireland Act, the Northern 
Ireland Government abolished PR-STV for parliamentary elections in time for 
the 1929 contest, which O’Leary and McGarry (1996, p. 121. See also 
Mansergh, 1936, p. 133) argue would have been done sooner were it not for 
unionist fears of a British response. The Government defended its decision by 
claiming that PR-STV was ‘not British, was undemocratic, prevented strong 
government, and contributed to indecisiveness and inefficiencies by enhancing 
the prospect of ‘hung parliaments’’, in addition to being costly and confusing 
(O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, p. 121). There is, however, debate over whether 
this amendment was designed to strengthen the position of the UUP by 
weakening labour movements and independent unionist candidates, or was 
simply a measure intended to increase unionist hegemony (McKittrick and 
McVea, 2001, p. 9; O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, pp. 122-25; Whyte, 1983). The 
plurality of first past the post meant that in almost every constituency the 
contest was between a UUP candidate and a non-unionist candidate, with 
93 
 
independent unionists denounced as running the risk of splitting the vote and 
allowing a nationalist to be elected (McKittrick and McVea, 2001, p. 9).  
 
The amendment certainly succeeded in weakening non-UUP unionists and 
labour representatives, whose number of seats decreased from eight in 1925 
(contested using PR-STV) to four in 1929 (under first past the post), despite an 
increase in their share of the vote (Elliott, 1973, pp. 89-90, quoted in Whyte, 
1983). The move to first past the post did not, however, significantly 
disadvantage nationalists, with the bloc losing only one seat in 1929 of the 
twelve it won in 1925 (Whyte, 1983). Whether the abolition of PR-STV for 
parliamentary elections was intended to weaken the nationalist bloc or shore up 
support for the UUP away from independent unionist and labour movement 
candidates is inconclusive, although on the basis of this evidence there is 
perhaps greater strength to be found in the argument for the latter. By adopting 
first past the post the UUP did of course succeed in its objective of a ‘British’ 
electoral system for Northern Ireland that was likely to create a strong 
government and enhance its hegemony as the largest party in the region, which 
was to continue until the suspension of Stormont in 1972 (O’Leary and 
McGarry, 1996, p. 125). It is clear that the unionist majority at the time 
considered the use of first past the post to be a fundamental component of 
British political culture and a way in which to demonstrate the synonymy of 
Northern Ireland with the rest of the UK (Mitchell and Gillespie, 1999, p. 67). 
 
1972-present 
With the implementation of Direct Rule from London, the British government set 
about determining how Northern Ireland should be governed in the future, with 
PR-STV implemented by the Northern Ireland Assembly Act of 1973 as the 
voting system for elections to any new Assembly and to local councils 
(McKittrick and McVea, 2001, p. 91; O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, p. 194). In 
common with the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, PR-STV was chosen as it 
was considered to be ‘fairer’ than the plurality of first past the post (Mitchell and 
Gillespie, 1999, p. 68). Likewise, O’Leary and McGarry (1996, p. 194) claim that 
the system was opted for ‘as an act of fairness’ to nationalists, who had been 
discriminated against by the first past the post system, particularly in local 
government elections, with allegations of unionist gerrymandering to ensure a 
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majority abound (Whyte, 1983). They also argue that the British Government 
intended for PR-STV to reduce the UUP’s fifty year hegemonic grip on power in 
Northern Ireland, perhaps to encourage more independent unionist and cross-
community candidates to stand for office, and, more broadly, to facilitate power 
sharing between unionists and nationalists under what was to become the short 
lived Sunningdale Agreement. Despite the failure of power-sharing in 1973, PR-
STV has since been used as the electoral system for all regional and local 
elections in Northern Ireland, as well as for all European Parliament elections 
since the first in 1979 (O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, p. 185). The only exception 
to this is the Peace Forum election of 1996 to determine the participant parties 
in what were to become the Good Friday negotiations, for which party list PR 
was used. Further exploration of this decision and the outcome will now be 
provided. 
 
The rationale behind the decision of the British Government to use party list PR 
for these elections arose from differing party positions on how candidates 
should be elected, as explained by Evans and O’Leary (1997, p. 25). The UUP 
and the Alliance Party wanted the election to be contested under PR-STV, with 
seats allocated using the droop quota in the eighteen Westminster 
constituencies which would each return five members. From the perspective of 
the UUP, this would prevent the DUP leader, Ian Paisley, from heading a 
regional party list and minimise the party’s potential of benefitting electorally 
from his personal popularity and charisma that had served it so well in 
European elections (see also Mitchell and Gillespie, 1999, p. 80). Alliance 
considered its best opportunity to do well to be under a system in which the 
election was contested in the eighteen Westminster constituencies, as it feared 
being squeezed by the unionist and nationalist ethno-national blocs in a single 
Northern Ireland constituency. In contrast, both the DUP and the SDLP 
favoured party list PR in a single constituency with seats allocated using 
d’Hondt, as this would enable their leaders to head the list in attempt to reap the 
benefits of the successful formula employed for European elections. Sinn Fein 
did not express a preference for how the election should be contested. The two 
small loyalist parties, the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster 
Democratic Party (UDP), whose representation at the peace talks many 
considered to be essential in order for them to have a chance of succeeding, 
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believed that they would benefit most from the use of party list PR with a high 
district magnitude (see also Mitchell and Gillespie, 1999, p. 81). 
 
The resulting electoral system has been described by Mitchell and Gillespie 
(1999, p. 81) as a ‘fudged compromise formula’, and by Gallagher (1996, p. 8, 
quoted in Mitchell and Gillespie, 1999, p. 80) as a ‘unique method’ that ‘should 
probably remain unique’. As Evans and O’Leary (1997, pp. 25-27) assert in their 
analysis of the formula and the election, the response by the then British prime 
minister, John Major, was to ‘split the differences’ between the parties and 
adopt a complex and confusing system. To appease the UUP and Alliance, 
elections were to be contested in the eighteen Westminster constituencies with 
the droop quota used to allocate seats in the first stage. In a concession to the 
DUP, the SDLP, the PUP and the UDP, party list PR was opted for and the 
d’Hondt method was to be used to determine the remaining seats in the second 
stage. Each constituency returned five members and each voter had one ‘X’ 
vote, with independent candidates treated as ‘parties’. This was used for the 
allocation of ninety seats. To ensure the representation of the smaller parties at 
the peace talks who had been unable to win one of these seats, in particular 
those representing the loyalist community, a further twenty seats were allocated 
to the ten parties that received the most votes with each assigned two members 
from a regional list. This brought the total number of seats to 110. 
 
As previously mentioned, the election results indicated that the formula used did 
not score particularly highly in terms of proportionality. For example, despite the 
SDLP securing a total of 160,000 votes, the DUP won three seats more with 
141,000 votes (Evans and O’Leary, 1997, p. 27). The system has been 
described by Evans and O’Leary (1997, p. 25) as ‘comic’, and by others as ‘a 
dog’s breakfast’, although the then leader of the Liberal Democrats, Paddy 
Ashdown, referred to it as ‘the best dog’s breakfast available in the 
circumstances’. In echoing the position of Evans and O’Leary, Mitchell and 
Gillespie (1999, p. 82) argue that a formula for contesting elections which is 
based on making compromises to appease the opinions of political parties is no 
substitute for one designed with the will of the electorate in mind. It is difficult to 
disagree with this observation and despite the method succeeding in ensuring 
the representation of small parties at the peace talks, it is nevertheless a 
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complex and confusing electoral formula, and it is hard to envisage any 
situation in which it would be implemented again in the future. As part of the 
Good Friday Agreement, PR-STV has been used to elect members to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly since 1998 (Kerr, 2006, p. 88). As primary research 
into this decision has been undertaken with political actors present at the 
negotiations, the circumstances of its selection will be analysed in Chapter Five. 
Focus will now turn to the contemporary electoral environment. 
 
 
The present electoral environment in Northern Ireland 
Despite the significant success of the Good Friday Agreement in managing 
violent conflict and establishing power sharing between communities, 
sectarianism and segregation still exist in Northern Ireland (Nolan, 2012; 2013; 
2014), and this is reflected in the party system. Electoral support is 
concentrated on parties representing one of the two main communities, with the 
unionist DUP and UUP, and nationalist Sinn Fein and the SDLP securing a 
cumulative 84 per cent (43 per cent to the former and 41 per cent to the latter) 
of first preference votes at the 2011 Assembly election (Whyte, 2011). On the 
basis of Horowitz’s (1985, pp. 291-92) aforementioned definition, Northern 
Ireland fulfils the criteria of an ethnic party system. Critics of consociationalism, 
such as Taylor (2006, pp. 218-19. See also O’Flynn, 2003, p. 144), argue that 
the perpetuation of this is a result of the community designation system used in 
the Assembly favouring the votes of those designated as unionist or nationalist 
for legislation requiring cross-community support. However, due to Northern 
Ireland’s deep communal divisions, the designation system is considered by 
many to be a necessary provision to ensure that each bloc is represented and 
to uphold the mutual veto (Lijphart, 1977; McGarry and O’Leary, 2009). Within 
nationalism, electoral support lies almost exclusively with Sinn Fein and the 
SDLP, with republican dissident parties Eirigi and Republican Sinn Fein 
currently having no representation.  
 
In the unionist bloc, however, electoral support is more fragmented. Whilst the 
DUP and UUP dominate, smaller parties are also represented, such as the 
loyalist PUP and the more hard line Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV), 
established in 2007 by former DUP MEP Jim Allister as a rival to his former 
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party (Hainsworth and McCann, 2010, p. 304). Although these parties do not 
pose a significant threat to the electoral dominance of the DUP and UUP, the 
TUV succeeded in splitting the unionist vote at the European elections of 2009 
and 2014, impacting significantly on the DUP and contributing to Sinn Fein 
topping the poll on both occasions (Whyte, 2009; 2014). Mainland UK parties, 
the Conservatives and the UK Independence Party, also play a minor role in 
unionist politics, and independent unionist candidates, such as Lady Sylvia 
Hermon in North Down, have enjoyed some electoral success. Although the 
majority of parties are organised as either unionist or nationalist, some do strive 
to represent cross-communal interests. The most significant of these is the 
Alliance Party, which was formed in 1970 as a non-sectarian party and is 
currently the only cross-community party to be represented alongside the DUP, 
UUP, Sinn Fein and the SDLP in the Northern Ireland executive. Its electoral 
support is, however, limited in comparison to that of the four main ethno-
national parties, securing eight per cent of the popular vote at the 2011 
Assembly election (Whyte, 2011). Other cross-community parties, notably the 
Green Party in Northern Ireland, receive nominal shares of the vote. The 
comparatively low levels of support for cross-community parties demonstrates 
that electoral politics in Northern Ireland remains heavily polarised around the 
unionist and nationalist blocs in the post-Good Friday Agreement era of power 
sharing. 
 
The most significant electoral development since 1998 is undoubtedly the rise 
of the DUP and Sinn Fein, both of whom prior to the Agreement were 
considered to represent the extremes of their respective unionist/loyalist and 
nationalist/republican communities. It was initially thought that the more 
moderate UUP and SDLP would be rewarded for their role as the main political 
party protagonists of the Agreement (Mitchell et al, 2009, p. 398). Whilst these 
parties did enjoy some electoral success during the early years of the 
Agreement (Whyte, 1998), Sinn Fein superseded the SDLP as the largest 
nationalist party at the 2001 Westminster election (Whyte, 2001), whilst the 
DUP displaced the UUP as the largest representative of the unionist bloc at the 
2003 election to the Assembly (Whyte, 2003). It is evident that the electoral rise 
of these parties was ultimately at the expense of their more moderate intra-bloc 
rivals, with data from elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly indicating that 
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between 1998 and 2003 the DUP made a net gain of 18 per cent of the vote on 
the UUP, whilst Sinn Fein enjoyed a 14 per cent net vote gain on the SDLP 
(Mitchell et al, 2009, pp. 407-08). It is, however, important to note that the DUP 
candidate, then party leader Ian Paisley, topped the Northern Ireland poll in 
every European election since the first in 1979. This, however, is more likely a 
result of Paisley’s charismatic persona resonating amongst the unionist 
electorate than any genuine preference for the UUP ahead of the DUP 
(Githens-Mazer, 2005). The factors behind the electoral rise of the DUP and 
Sinn Fein at the expense of their more moderate rivals in the post-Good Friday 
Agreement era will now be considered. 
 
Critics of consociationalism, such as Taylor (2009b, pp. 320-21), argue that the 
success of these hard line parties is the result of the Good Friday Agreement 
entrenching, encouraging and rewarding ‘those who pursue strategic sectarian 
ethno-national calculations and interests’. He cites Aughey (2005, quoted in 
Taylor, 2009b, p. 321) in claiming that the rise of the DUP and Sinn Fein is a 
product of the Agreement’s maximisation of ‘ethno-national group advantage’. 
Whilst consociationalist critiques of the argument that the Agreement has 
entrenched and perpetuated communal divisions in Northern Ireland have been 
referred to in greater depth in Chapter Two, Mitchell et al (2001; 2002) present 
an alternative explanation for the success of these parties. They argue that 
whilst the institutional arrangements resulting from the Good Friday Agreement 
were not of preference to either the DUP or Sinn Fein (indeed, the former did 
not partake in the negotiations), the incentives of consociational power sharing 
sufficiently encouraged their participation (Mitchell et al, 2001, p. 726). The 
moderation of both parties has been crucial to their democratic engagement in 
both the peace process and in Northern Ireland’s governmental institutions 
(Mitchell et al, 2001, pp. 726-27). In the case of the DUP, its traditional hard line 
position of staunch opposition to any role for the Irish Republic in Northern 
Ireland had by 2001 been mitigated to a requirement that the North-South 
relationship, as provided by the Good Friday Agreement, be more accountable 
to the Northern Ireland Assembly. Sinn Fein’s moderation was clearly 
demonstrated in its support for the IRA ceasefires and later decommissioning, 
and recognition of the principle of consent that a united Ireland would require 
majority support in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. 
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There are of course other contributing factors to the electoral rise of the DUP 
and Sinn Fein in the post-Agreement era. Mitchell et al (2002, p. 24) argue that 
the UUP and SDLP may have been victims of their own success, in that they 
ultimately fulfilled their raison d’etre in their role as the main protagonists of the 
Agreement, which is particularly acute in the case of the latter. They suggest 
that younger nationalists have found greater appeal in the ‘fresher and more 
assertive’ Sinn Fein, whilst the SDLP is aged. Likewise, it has been argued that 
the pro/anti Agreement divisions that plagued the UUP during the early years of 
the Agreement turned many unionists towards the DUP (Mitchell et al, 2002, p. 
24). It is also likely that the aforementioned ‘ethnic tribune appeals’ approach 
has had an impact in Northern Ireland. In arguing that this is indeed so, Mitchell 
and Evans (2009, pp. 152-53) reject the notion that voters have become more 
extreme in the era since the Good Friday Agreement and instead opt for who 
they perceive to be the strongest defender of their community in the knowledge 
that party positions will become watered down as a result of multiparty 
bargaining associated with power sharing institutions. 
 
Tilley et al (2008) highlight that whilst intra-bloc competition within nationalism is 
distinctively ethno-national between the traditionally nationalist SDLP and 
republican Sinn Fein, within unionism there has been a shift from the socio-
economic left-right focus of the DUP and UUP respectively. This is reflected in 
intra-bloc voting patterns. They demonstrate that since the implementation of 
the Good Friday Agreement party competition within the unionist bloc has been 
much more heavily focused on the extent of unionist ideology of the UUP and 
DUP being the key determiner of voter choice. This supports the ‘ethnic tribune 
appeals’ thesis in that ideology is fundamental as voters seek to elect the 
strongest defender of their community to represent them in a power sharing 
government. The Good Friday Agreement, with the removal of the Republic of 
Ireland’s constitutional claim over Northern Ireland and the granting of national 
self-determination, has led to party competition being based on the 
management of compromise. Emphasising unionist or nationalist ideology 
therefore continues to be a fundamental way in which respective political parties 
can continue to project substantive power by symbolically highlighting their 
ethno-national credentials. Whilst the electoral rise of the DUP and Sinn Fein is 
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likely to be a combination of many of the factors explored here, there is great 
strength in the ‘ethnic tribune appeals’ argument that is supported by evidence.  
 
 
Summary 
The role of elections in divided societies has been analysed, with particular 
emphasis placed on exploring debates around which electoral systems are 
most conducive to successful conflict management. What is perhaps most 
clearly evident is the continued significance of ethnic parties in societies divided 
by ethno-national conflict, which is a phenomenon that often remains even after 
the successful management of violent conflict and the implementation of power 
sharing. The case study of Northern Ireland supports this argument. Whilst it 
was thought by many that the Good Friday Agreement would bring about a shift 
to a more non-sectarian, centre ground party system, this has not been realised 
(Mitchell et al, 2009). Instead voters have been drawn to parties traditionally 
considered to represent the extremes of their respective unionist or nationalist 
communities, with several arguments put forward to explain this. Although 
recognising that there is no guarantee that it will occur, McGarry and O’Leary 
(2006, p. 274) argue that one of the main benefits of the PR-STV electoral 
system is its facilitation of both intra-bloc and inter-bloc vote transfers, which 
has the potential to induce political parties to moderate the single identity focus 
of their election campaigns. Chapter Six will determine whether or not this 
phenomenon is taking place. 
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Chapter Four – Methodology 
 
 
Bryman (2012, p. 380) identifies three main facets of qualitative research. 
Firstly, it is ‘an inductive view of the relationship between theory and research, 
whereby the former is generated out of the latter’. Secondly, it is an interpretivist 
method, which stresses ‘the understanding of the social world through an 
examination of the interpretation of that world by its participants’. Finally, 
qualitative research is constructionist and ‘social properties are outcomes of the 
interactions between individuals’, rather than being ‘separate from those 
involved in its construction’. Bryman (2012, pp. 399-404) also identifies several 
key preoccupations of qualitative researchers. Firstly, ‘the social world must be 
interpreted from the perspective of the people being studied’ who can ‘attribute 
meaning to events and to their environment’. Secondly, qualitative researchers 
are concerned with description and context, with the contextualisation of a study 
being achieved through ‘thick descriptions of social settings, events and often 
individuals’. This is necessary as social research must be understood in 
context. Qualitative researchers also emphasise the role of processes in social 
life due to the need to demonstrate how patterns and events pan out over time, 
often years. Finally, they stress the need for flexibility in research, as this 
enhances the potential to genuinely reveal the perspectives of the people under 
study. Through an examination of the research methods applied to this research 
project, it will be shown that its research design adheres to all of these 
characteristics. 
 
This study’s research question serves as a proxy in order to test its hypothesis, 
as explained in the Introduction. The ethno-symbolic characteristics of unionists 
and nationalists in Northern Ireland, explored in Chapter One, will be used as a 
theoretical and historical framework in order to answer this question. Chapters 
Two and Three have explained the political and electoral characteristics of 
divided societies, with a particular focus on Northern Ireland. All of these 
chapters constituting the literature review play an essential role in 
contexualising this study by establishing and examining the research that has 
already been undertaken in this field, and by enabling the determination of a 
gap in the literature. This research aims to fill this gap and contribute to existing 
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work by employing an ethno-symbolic framework to analyse party election 
campaign literature in a unique way in order to test the hypothesis of this study. 
The significance of this framework lies in its ability to explain the importance of 
particular symbols and rhetoric to national identity, which is especially salient in 
divided societies such as Northern Ireland. 
 
 
Methods 
 
Content analysis 
To answer its research question, this study provides a content analysis of 
campaign literature. This method is defined as ‘an approach to the analysis of 
documents and texts (which may be printed or visual) that seeks to quantify 
content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable 
manner’ (Bryman, 2012, p. 289). This is applied to analyse trends and changes 
in symbolism and rhetoric in political party manifestos in Northern Ireland, with 
the intention of determining if the preferential method of the PR-STV electoral 
system is having any impact on this. As they are primary documents, those 
analysing manifestos are required to interpret them through ‘an understanding 
of individual concepts, appreciation of the social and cultural context through 
which the various concepts are related in a particular discourse, and a judgment 
of the meaning and significance of the text as a whole’ (Scott, 1990, p. 31, 
quoted in Burnham et al, 2004, pp. 187-88). The researcher is, therefore, 
required to ascertain as much as possible about the conditions under which the 
document was produced and the author’s intentions (Burnham et al, 2004, p. 
188).  
 
The rationale behind exploring manifestos as opposed to other forms of 
campaign literature – leaflets or posters, for example – is that they allow for 
more systematic analysis, providing greater reliability. This is due to them being 
issued by all major parties for all elections on a nationwide basis. In contrast, 
leaflets and posters are usually produced by local party branches and can be 
irregular, with regional differences and inconsistency having the potential to 
distort conclusions. It is, however, important to note that there are limitations to 
manifestos. Their appeal amongst the electorate is low, with just 27 per cent of 
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respondents to a Guardian poll in the run up to the 2010 UK general election 
stating that they read them (Guardian, 2010). It is, therefore, likely that parties 
write manifestos with the media, academics and practitioners more in mind than 
the general public. Whilst this may have some potential to impact upon the 
results of this study, manifestos are nevertheless considered to offer the 
greatest reliability, for the aforementioned reasons, of all forms of campaign 
literature and have, therefore, been utilised for this research. 
 
The manifestos included in this project were accessed from archives, either 
online or in libraries. The Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) website of the 
University of Ulster provides online access to many manifestos, particularly 
those of the post-Good Friday Agreement era, of all significant political parties 
in Northern Ireland. Manifestos were also accessed in person at The Linenhall 
Library in Belfast, the London School of Economics library and the British 
Library in London. Given this project’s hypothesis and research question, the 
analysis of manifestos is divided into two eras: before and after the signing of 
the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. As this research focuses on the impact of 
the Agreement on ethno-national identity, greater emphasis is placed on the 
analysis of post-Agreement manifestos of the current power sharing era from 
2007. Publications from three sets of elections have been selected for this 
study: the 2010 Westminster Parliament election, the 2011 Northern Ireland 
Assembly and local government elections, and the 2014 European Parliament 
and local government elections. The rationale behind these choices is that, as 
of March 2015, all are the most recent elections to their respective parliaments, 
assembly or local council. This enables this study to provide an up to date 
response to its research question, whilst also enabling a comparison of 
manifestos from elections using different electoral systems, as Westminster 
elections are contested using first past the post, whilst all others in Northern 
Ireland use PR-STV. This offers a useful indicator of the impact of PR-STV on 
party election campaign moderation. 
 
Whilst post-Good Friday Agreement campaign literature constitutes the main 
focus of this research, manifestos predating this era are also analysed as a 
comparative means of demonstrating any similarities and differences over time. 
This, however, is intended to offer a guide to the focus of pre-1998 election 
104 
 
campaigns, rather than a definitive study. In keeping with the contemporary 
character of this research, most pre-Good Friday Agreement manifestos 
analysed are for elections contested during the 1990s, such as the 1992 and 
1997 Westminster Parliament elections, and the 1994 European Parliament 
election. Whilst this project aims to be as systematic as possible in its analysis, 
there are occasions when manifestos for certain elections are not available. 
This is either because a respective party did not publish one for a particular 
election – in the case of minor parties, this is often due to them not contesting 
all elections – or because they were unavailable in all of the three archives 
utilised. There is, therefore, some flexibility in which manifestos are included in 
this analysis, particularly for pre-1998 elections. Whilst some may argue that 
this impacts upon the internal validity of the results (Bryman, 2012, p. 47), 
where manifestos for a particular election are unavailable it is necessary to 
include an alternative or be forced to exclude, often significant, political parties 
from this study.  
 
An additional factor that has the potential to impact upon the internal validity of 
conclusions is that Sinn Fein’s manifestos for elections to the European 
Parliament are published on an all-Ireland basis. This has the potential to affect 
their focus due to the need to appeal to electorates in two different sovereign 
states, one of which is deeply divided along ethno-national lines and one that is 
not. This, however, is discussed and taken into consideration in the analysis. 
Furthermore, the UUP’s manifesto for the 2010 Westminster election was 
published under the wider UCUNF banner due to the party’s electoral alliance 
with the Conservative Party at the time. It is nevertheless important to note that 
the Conservatives and UCUNF published two different manifestos for Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland respectively. Although there is a possibility of this 
electoral pact impacting upon the focus of the manifesto, this is accounted for 
during the analysis to ensure that results are not misrepresented. 
 
The decision of which parties to include has been largely influenced by the 
ability to conduct interviews with their representatives. Whilst it would be 
impossible to exclude the DUP, Sinn Fein, the UUP and the SDLP from this 
research, the inclusion of minor parties is subject to the availability of party 
members during fieldwork. This is ultimately due to interviews playing a crucial 
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role in understanding a party’s perception of PR-STV and how it uses it to 
maximise its electoral potential, which a content analysis of manifestos alone is 
unable to achieve. This explains, for example, the inclusion of the PUP, as an 
interview with a party representative was undertaken, and the exclusion of the 
TUV, with whom no such interview was obtained. There is also a need for the 
Alliance Party to be included in this study as a means of comparing the 
campaigns of ethno-nationally based and non-sectarian parties. Manifestos are 
analysed through an ethno-symbolic lens to elucidate whether there have been 
any changes in their focus over time. This study is primarily concerned with 
changes in discourse and symbolism away from ethno-nationalism towards an 
almost exclusively socio-economic appeal. If this is taking place, particularly in 
elections contested using PR-STV and not those using first past the past, it 
would suggest that this system’s preferential ranking method is influencing how 
parties focus their campaigns. The manifesto analysis constitutes Chapter Six 
of this thesis. 
 
Interviews 
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, p. 1) define the importance of interviews to 
qualitative research as being explained through the need to ‘understand the 
world from the subjects’ points of view, to unfold the meaning of their 
experiences [and] to uncover their lived world’. Given the essence of the 
research question, interviews are essential to this study, as the question is 
concerned with how political actors perceive, interpret and behave, often within 
the wider context of their respective political party. In order to obtain information 
on why PR-STV was chosen for elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, 
how parties understand and use the system, and to gauge the extent of 
communal divisions, it was decided that approximately 30 to 40 interviews 
would be conducted. The rationale behind this choice is that they allow for 
tailored questions to be asked, whilst providing access to directly involved 
actors. All interviews undertaken can be considered to be ‘elite’, as many were 
with actors with, for example, policy making power, which is essential as this 
study is ultimately political research (Burnham et al, 2004, p. 205).  
 
Elite interviews tend to be semi-structured (Burnham et al, 2004, p. 205), with 
preparation based around several main topics to be discussed and suggested 
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questions that adhere to this (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 130). The 
advantage of semi-structured interviews is that they are more likely than 
unstructured interviews to enable most, if not all, of the discussion topics to be 
addressed, whilst offering more flexibility than fully structured interviews 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 471). All interviews conducted were, therefore, semi-
structured, as whilst there was a need for certain issues to be referred to, there 
is also a necessity for fluidity when, for example, important information is raised 
that the interviewer has not previously considered or is not aware of. A potential 
disadvantage of this form of interviewing is that because the balance of the 
relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee usually lies with the 
latter, as they hold the knowledge sought by the former, the quality of data 
obtained often depends on the management skills of the interviewer in, for 
example, ensuring that all topics are covered within an often limited timeframe 
(Burnham et al, 2004, pp. 205, 219). Due to the nature of this research, it was 
decided that elite interviewing is nevertheless the only effective way of obtaining 
the data required. 
 
Interviews were primarily solicited by email, after carrying out online research 
into suitable interviewees, and on rare occasions by telephone. Several were 
also solicited through contacts, either academic or previous interviewees, as all 
who were interviewed were asked if they could suggest other suitable actors 
who may be willing to participate. Whilst it was necessary to conduct interviews 
with a wide range of actors, especially from different political parties and 
communities, there was no overriding strategy employed when soliciting 
interviews, beyond the inclusion of as diverse a range of opinions as possible. 
Ultimately, however, there was a limited strategy, to the extent that the project 
was influenced by the actors with whom interviews were successfully solicited. 
In total, 32 interviews were carried out between June 2013 and December 
2014. All but one of the interviews were conducted face to face, with the 
exception by telephone, and lasted between fifteen minutes and one hour, 
which was largely dependent on the quality of responses received. Their 
relatively short length was dictated by most elite actors having only a finite 
amount of time to devote to participating in interviews.  
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For all but three interviews there was one interviewee, with there being two for 
one case, three for the other and four for the final. With three or four 
interviewees the interview assumed an almost focus group atmosphere, with 
participants sharing their opinions, and influencing, and being influenced by, 
each other (Krueger and Casey, 2000, quoted in Burnham et al, 2004, p. 106). 
Due to it being questionable whether the limited number of participants in these 
interviews qualifies them as focus groups and as they were not explicitly 
intended to be used as a research method for this study, these cases are 
considered to be interviews with multiple interviewees. The majority of 
interviews were undertaken during four research visits to Northern Ireland, with 
all but one carried out during these visits taking place in Belfast. The exception 
was a single interview in Derry. Whilst this geographical scope could be 
criticised for being too narrow, this was a result of not only limited time and 
resources, but also the political nature of this research dictating that much of the 
focus was on Belfast, as the seat of the Northern Ireland Assembly and other 
political institutions. Other interviews were conducted in London, Salisbury and 
Dublin. They were, with the interviewees consent, recorded on a Dictaphone. All 
but one gave consent to this. Recorded interviews were later transcribed. 
 
This project utilises three broad, overlapping categories of interviews, 
conducted in no particular order. The first is designed to establish why the PR-
STV voting system was chosen as part of the Good Friday negotiations for 
elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly and is, therefore, intended to obtain 
the information necessary in order to answer this project’s research question. In 
total, three interviews were carried out with the specific aim of determining this – 
two with British government officials and one with an Irish civil servant, all of 
whom were present at the Good Friday negotiations. In three further interviews 
with politicians present at the talks, however, interviewees were asked for their 
opinions on the selection of PR-STV, within the context of a wider overall scope. 
The questions asked were based around why the system was chosen for 
elections to the Assembly, what it was intended to achieve, whether there was 
any disagreement over the choice and, if so, how this was resolved. The 
purpose of these interviews was to determine whether the potential for PR-STV 
to induce moderation was a factor which influenced its selection. This 
constitutes the first part of Chapter Five. 
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The second category of interviews forms the main basis of this project and is 
designed specifically to answer the research question by obtaining data on the 
perception of PR-STV amongst representatives of political parties. In total, 
twenty two interviews with political actors (politicians and activists) were 
conducted with this purpose. Interviews were carried out with actors engaged in 
‘high’ politics – MLAs, MPs and senior party officials, for example – and ‘low’ 
politics, such as local councillors and student activists. This was done in order 
to elucidate any difference in responses between these two political realms. 
Interviewees were asked which voters the party that they represent seeks to 
appeal to at election time and, more specifically, whether this includes everyone 
in Northern Ireland, regardless of whether they are unionist or nationalist. They 
were then asked whether they perceived the main issue to voters to be the 
constitutional future of Northern Ireland or socio-economic policy.  
 
Interviewees were also asked if they campaign differently for elections 
contested using first past the post and those contested using PR-STV, with a 
particular focus on how they advise voters to use their preferences. 
Respondents were then asked if the preferential method of PR-STV induces 
moderation of the single identity symbolism of their election campaigns, if 
applicable, with the intention of attracting inter-party and inter-bloc transfers. 
Finally, the focus shifted to the areas of Northern Ireland in which parties 
campaign, with the aim of establishing whether unionist parties canvass 
majority nationalist areas and vice versa. The rationale behind this choice of 
questions was to obtain detailed knowledge of how parties understand PR-STV 
and use it, and how they focus their campaigns in an ethno-nationally divided 
society. The information obtained from these interviews forms the second part 
of Chapter Five and complements the manifesto analysis of Chapter Six. 
 
Rather than being a means of answering this project’s research question, the 
third category of interviews refers to its hypothesis. Whilst the research question 
is the primary means of testing the hypothesis, it is necessary to ‘bridge the 
gap’ between the two in order to ensure accuracy in conclusions. As interviews 
with political actors progressed, it became clear that PR-STV is not, on the 
whole, inducing parties to moderate their election campaigns. It was, therefore, 
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necessary to determine why this is the case. To do so, six interviews were 
conducted with community activists, religious representatives and journalists, 
whilst some questions on this issue were also put to political actors active in 
local communities. The aim was to ascertain the extent of communal divisions 
between unionists and nationalists within wider society. Interviewees were 
asked what the main issues are within the community in which they operate, 
primarily if they are based around the constitutional future of Northern Ireland or 
are socio-economic. They were also asked about the community’s opinion of 
the police and paramilitary organisations, and how willing the public are to 
engage in inter-communal cooperation. Information from these interviews forms 
the basis of Chapter Seven. 
 
The intention of these interviews was to use the responses as a means of 
explaining why PR-STV is not inducing parties to moderate their election 
campaigns to appeal for inter-bloc transfers. Whilst focus groups with members 
of local communities may have offered a greater insight into the opinions and 
perceptions of the public, their use was unfeasible. This was principally due to 
an absence of the means needed to organise them, such as contacts, and time 
constraints associated with fieldwork. Instead, elite interviews with community 
activists and other such actors were considered to be a sufficient way of 
obtaining the data sought. It should be noted that almost all interviewees were 
asked about their opinion of future prospects for Northern Ireland, in terms of 
the continued significance of the two ethno-national communities. This served 
the purpose of providing an insight into how different actors envisage this, and if 
there is any difference in the opinions of unionists and nationalists. 
 
Participant observation 
Bryman (2012, p. 432) defines participant observation as a research method in 
which the researcher ‘immerses him- or herself in a group for an extended 
period of time, observing behaviour, listening to what is said in conversations 
both between others and with the fieldworker, and asking questions’. The 
attractiveness of participant observation in social (and political) research lies in 
the ability of the researcher ‘to collect a great deal of information in an informal 
and relaxed way, then use these observations to analyse and explain the 
situation under investigation’ (Burnham et al, 2004, p. 234). The main limitation 
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of this method, however, is that it is difficult to record proceedings and relying 
solely on memory can be problematic (Burnham et al, 2004, p. 233). The 
inclusion of participant observation in this study is, nevertheless, unintentional.  
 
The opportunity arose when conducting an interview with two SDLP student 
activists in December 2013, who asked afterwards if I would like to canvass with 
them and other party representatives for the then upcoming European and local 
elections in May 2014. Whilst actual canvassing never materialised, I spent 
around four hours with several members of the SDLP Queen’s University 
Belfast branch stuffing envelopes with campaign literature to send to voters. 
This provided a useful insight into how the party prioritises which parts of 
Northern Ireland and which voters to send literature to in order to maximise its 
potential for electoral success, in terms of both the ethno-national and socio-
economic composition of these areas and the ethno-nationality of voters. It is 
important to emphasise that participant observation was not intended to be a 
research method used for this study. Rather, the opportunity arose with the 
SDLP but was not solicited with other parties due primarily to difficulty of access 
and time constraints. It is, therefore, impossible to wholeheartedly generalise 
the findings beyond the SDLP to other parties in Northern Ireland. 
 
Comparative analysis 
Whilst not intended to be the focus of this study, Chapter Seven includes a 
content analysis of recent election campaign literature of political parties in 
Malaysia and Brussels. The purpose of this is to draw a comparison between 
Northern Ireland and these two cases, as all three are divided societies with 
some form of consociational power sharing government. The rationale behind 
the selection of Brussels and Malaysia is that both have a longer experience of 
consociationalism than Northern Ireland, which is intended to offer an insight 
into the longer term prospects of the potential for Northern Ireland’s 
consociational institutions to work to overcome the importance of ethno-national 
identity, as dictated by this project’s hypothesis. The significance of including a 
comparative analysis in this research is, therefore, that it enables predictions to 
be made about the future of ethno-national identity in Northern Ireland 
(Burnham et al, 2004, p. 70). It also enables a degree of external validity to be 
granted to this study, as it verifies its conclusions using cases beyond Northern 
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Ireland (Bryman, 2012, pp. 47-48). It is, however, not without significant 
limitations. The ability of ‘a concept to stay constant across time and space’ is 
questionable (Burnham et al, 2004, p. 72), especially as Northern Ireland, 
Brussels and Malaysia all employ institutionally different forms of 
consociationalism.  
 
It is important to note that no elections in Brussels and Malaysia are contested 
using PR-STV, which prevents the exact research question of this study being 
applied to these cases. Instead, the comparative analysis tests this study’s 
hypothesis by arguing that if divisions were being overcome, most parties would 
seek to maximise their electoral support by making almost exclusively socio-
economic appeals to the electorate, which would be reflected in their campaign 
literature. Thus, the PR-STV dimension of the potential for the acquisition of 
transfer votes which is applied to Northern Ireland has been removed. An 
ethno-symbolist framework is applied to the analysis of Parti Socialiste and 
Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Open VLD) manifestos for the 2014 
election to the Parliament of the Brussels-Capital region, and campaign 
literature published by the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) for the 2013 
Malaysian general election. This provides for a recent examination of the impact 
of consociationalism over a significant length of time. The rationale for analysing 
these particular parties is that their campaign literature is readily available 
online from respective party websites. Given time and financial constraints, it 
has not been possible to conduct empirical fieldwork into these cases. It is 
important to emphasise that this comparative analysis is intended only as an 
indication of the potential generalisability of conclusions from Northern Ireland 
and future prospects for ethno-national identity in the region. 
 
 
Ethics 
A fundamental ethical concern of social research is the requirement of the 
informed consent of participants (Bryman, 2012, pp. 318-40). Interviewees 
participating in this research were, therefore, presented with an information 
form, which provided a brief synopsis of the project, and asked to read and sign 
a consent form prior to the interview commencing. Whilst there are concerns 
that the form instigates rather than mitigates concerns of participants, the 
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advantages are that it fully informs interviewees of the nature of the research 
and provides the researcher with a signed record of consent should any 
subsequent concerns be raised (Bryman, 2012, p. 140). The consent form 
informed participants that data collected – either recordings, transcripts or notes 
– is to be held confidentially under the Data Protection Act, will not be shared 
with any third party, and that interviewees reserve the right to request interview 
transcripts to comment on and edit as they see fit. The majority of participants 
requested that data acquired from interviewees be approved by them before 
being publicised. Avoiding harm to participants, whether physical, a loss of self-
esteem, stress or harm to their development, is paramount to social research 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 135). Given the nature of this project and the actors 
interviewed, avoiding harm primarily takes the form of the need for 
confidentiality (Bryman, 2012, p. 136), and it was therefore crucial that these 
measures were enforced. When information obtained from interviews is referred 
to in this thesis, the names of the interviewees are not included in order to 
ensure anonymity. 
 
The requirement of informed consent is also important in social research 
(Bryman, 2012, pp. 138-40). Participation in this project was voluntary and 
participants reserved the right to anonymity, as stated on the consent form. 
They were also able to withdraw consent during or after the interview for any 
reason, by contacting the researcher at the email address provided on the form. 
Finally, all interviewees were asked to consent to having the interview recorded 
by Dictaphone and reserved the right to decline. One former paramilitary 
member did decline, citing the PSNI’s acquisition of recordings as part of 
Boston College’s ‘Belfast Project’ on the Northern Ireland conflict as his 
rationale for doing so (BBC, 2014). For the participant observation exercise, I 
was introduced to other participants by the person who invited me to take part, 
and they were provided with a brief description of my background and this 
project. It was agreed that I should seek consent from the person who invited 
me to participate prior to any information obtained from the exercise being 
publicised. All of these ethical considerations have been adhered to in order to 
ensure that no harm comes to participants and their right to informed consent is 
respected. 
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Chapter Five – PR-STV in Northern Ireland 
 
 
Utilising a combination of information obtained during interviews with political 
actors and activists, electoral results data and secondary sources, this chapter 
fulfils three main objectives. Firstly, it determines why the PR-STV electoral 
system was chosen during the Good Friday negotiations for elections to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly, and the disagreements and debates around this 
choice. Whilst PR-STV has a history in Northern Ireland dating back to partition, 
which has been explored in Chapter Three, the factors behind its selection for 
Assembly elections is important as this effectively established PR-STV as 
Northern Ireland’s principal electoral system, used for all elections except those 
to the Westminster Parliament. Secondly, the chapter analyses information 
obtained from interviews with political party actors and activists on how parties 
perceive and understand the preferential ranking method of PR-STV, and how 
this influences their election campaigns and strategies. Finally, transfer data 
from elections in Northern Ireland is explored and analysed in order to 
determine any correlation between party perception of the role of lower order 
preferences and electoral outcomes. The purpose of this chapter is to extend 
knowledge of the influence of PR-STV on how political parties campaign for 
elections in Northern Ireland and to serve as a precursor to the following 
chapter, an interpretive analysis of election literature with the aim of determining 
whether the system is inducing parties to moderate their campaigns in attempt 
to attract inter-bloc transfers. 
 
 
PR-STV for Northern Ireland Assembly elections 
 
Selecting an electoral system 
Deciding on a voting system for elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly fell 
within the remit of ‘Strand One: Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland’ of 
the negotiations and became enshrined in the Good Friday Agreement. 
Provided the system chosen was proportional, the British government was 
willing to allow the Northern Irish political parties participating in the negotiations 
to decide upon it themselves and, furthermore, this willingness was shared by 
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the Irish government (personal interviews, 27th August 2013; 7th April 2014). 
There are a number of factors behind the decision to use PR-STV. Firstly, in 
any divided society a proportional electoral result and the need for adequate 
minority representation is essential, as exclusion is a cause of conflict (McGarry 
and O’Leary, 2004, p. 32, quoted in Coakley, 2009, p. 144). Lijphart (1977, pp. 
38-39. See also Steiner, 1971) also stresses the importance of proportionality to 
consociational democracies, arguing that it ensures that the influence an ethno-
national bloc has is determined by its size, which aids decision making by 
reducing the number of potentially divisive issues. As previously mentioned, 
PR-STV has the potential to achieve this necessary proportionality, whilst 
plurality systems such as first past the post would be likely to result in 
disproportional outcomes and greater minority exclusion.  
 
In support of this claim, the rationale behind opting for PR-STV at the Good 
Friday negotiations was that it would facilitate an Assembly with ‘a broad 
representation of political views in Northern Ireland’, as many parties and 
individuals with different positions could be elected (personal interview, 11th 
June 2013). Furthermore, the system was chosen due to the need for ‘pluralism 
and the plurality of ideas’ in the Assembly, and for the engagement and 
representation of smaller parties (personal interview, 10th July 2013). The latter 
argument is particularly important as it would have been impossible to achieve 
the support of the smaller parties at the Good Friday negotiations for an 
electoral system under which they had little or no likelihood of winning a seat, 
such as first past the post, thus jeopardising the entire peace agreement 
(McGarry and O’Leary, 2009a, p. 62). The smaller parties included the cross-
community Alliance Party, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, and the 
Labour Party (unrelated to the British party of the same name); the UK Unionist 
Party; and the loyalist PUP and UDP (Mowlam, 2002, pp. 145-52). All of these 
were successful in winning seats in the first Assembly, with the exception of 
Labour and the UDP (Wilder, 1998, p. 101). It is clear from this evidence that a 
fundamental factor behind this choice of electoral system was the need for 
proportional and representative electoral outcomes, in which minorities and 
smaller parties are adequately represented in the Assembly. 
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Although it has been argued that the raison d’etre of opting for PR-STV was not 
to encourage the electorate to vote for moderate parties, which indeed it was 
not, the potential for the preferential method system to facilitate and reward 
centre ground politics and electioneering was nevertheless at the back of the 
minds of the negotiators (personal interview, 10th July 2013. See also McGarry 
and O’Leary, 2006b; Dixon, 2005, p. 365). PR-STV has the ability to encourage 
parties to moderate in attempt to maximise their share of the vote on two levels. 
Firstly, it is in the interests of parties to attract intra-bloc transfers in order to 
increase the likelihood of their candidates being elected. Sinn Fein was acutely 
aware of this during the 1980s when its candidates often secured large 
numbers of first preference votes but very few transfers, as moderate 
nationalists who voted for the SDLP would not transfer to what they perceived 
to be ‘hard line’ Sinn Fein, and they then remained unelected (McGarry and 
O’Leary, 2006b, p. 269). Secondly, as it could be expected that any rational 
political party would seek to maximise the potential for its candidates to win 
election regardless of the origin of votes, PR-STV also has the potential to 
induce parties to moderate the single identity nationalist symbolism and rhetoric 
of their campaigns in attempt to attract inter-bloc transfers. This is therefore a 
second factor behind the decision to use PR-STV for Assembly elections, as a 
system which facilitates more moderate politics and electioneering by allowing 
voters to rank each candidate and cross party and communal lines undoubtedly 
has the potential to bring about a normalised political system common in most 
Western democracies, and ultimately a transformation of elections and politics 
as a whole in Northern Ireland. This differentiates the system from other forms 
of PR, such as party list, which allows voters to vote for only one party and, 
therefore, prevents them from giving lower order preference votes to candidates 
from outside of their own ethno-national bloc.  
 
A final major factor behind the decision to choose PR-STV for Assembly 
elections is its aforementioned usage on the island of Ireland, and particularly in 
Northern Ireland for European Parliament and local government elections. The 
system was chosen because Northern Ireland was ‘used to it’ and, from a 
nationalist perspective, it was used in the Republic of Ireland, and this was a 
way in which nationalists could express their Irishness and their links to that 
state (personal interviews, 14th June 2013; 10th July 2013). Unionists, however, 
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have not traditionally been as supportive of PR-STV. They are, on the whole, 
‘more inclined to the Westminster first past the post system’, largely as it is 
considered to be British and, therefore, a way in which unionists can 
demonstrate both their own Britishness and the Britishness of Northern Ireland 
(personal interview, 10th July 2013). Despite this, the unionist parties 
participating in the Good Friday negotiations nevertheless accepted the need 
for a PR system in order to ensure a proportional Assembly with adequate 
representation of smaller parties, not least because the loyalist PUP and UDP 
fell into this category (personal interview, 10th July 2013). On this basis, it is 
evident that the parties to the Good Friday negotiations concluded that the 
voting system for elections to the Assembly should be one of the two – PR-STV 
and first past the post – already in use in Northern Ireland, as the electorate 
would be familiar with it. As first past the post would be unable to provide the 
proportionality and minority representation required to adequately elect a 
chamber in a divided society, only PR-STV fulfilled the necessary criteria. 
 
Disagreements 
There were two main disputes concerning the choice of electoral system for 
elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly. The first was a relatively subtle, 
underlying disagreement between the two major political parties at the talks, 
with the UUP having a preference for first past the post and the SDLP favouring 
PR-STV. In addition to the UUP’s aforementioned perception of first past the 
post as being more British than PR, there are two further factors behind the 
party’s opposition to PR-STV (personal interview, 27th August 2013). Firstly, it 
was concerned that the system would result in too many seats being won by 
minorities and smaller parties, and, secondly, due to the UUP’s position at the 
time as the largest party in Northern Ireland, it had a preference for systems 
such as first past the post that increase the probability of a majoritarian 
government (see, for example, Norton, 1997). It is likely that historical context 
had a role to play in the rationale behind this position, with the party at the time 
having always been the largest in Northern Ireland and having governed the 
entity single-handedly for the first fifty years of its existence (O’Leary and 
McGarry, 1996; McKittrick and McVea, 2001). The UUP was, nevertheless, 
more inclined towards PR-STV than party list PR due to the diminishment of its 
share of first preference votes in the Peace Forum election of 1996, which was 
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contested using the latter system (O’Leary and Evans, 1997, quoted in McGarry 
and O’Leary, 2006a, p. 60). Indeed, it is little wonder that the party opposed 
party list PR for Assembly elections: had it been used for the 1998 election it 
would have won fewer seats than the SDLP, which would have threatened the 
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement as the largest party of the largest 
ethno-national bloc would not have been the largest party overall (P. Mitchell, 
1999, quoted in McGarry and O’Leary, 2006a, p. 60). 
 
Despite the UUP’s preference for first past the post, it is arguable that this 
position was never likely to threaten the peace negotiations, as it and the other 
unionist parties present accepted that an agreement could only be achieved if a 
PR system was to be used for elections to the Assembly, due to the need for 
the adequate representation of minorities and smaller parties that is essential in 
divided societies such as Northern Ireland (personal interview, 10th July 2013). 
It is also probable that PR-STV having a history in the region and already being 
used for European and local government elections, as well as a general need 
for compromise in negotiations for conflict resolution, impacted upon the UUP’s 
acceptance of the system for Assembly elections. The overall context of a 
peace process allowed the party to present the package as a whole to the 
unionist community and whilst the choice of system may have been perceived 
by some as a concession to nationalists, this could be offset by ways in which 
the Agreement benefitted unionism, such as by nullifying the Republic of 
Ireland’s territorial claim over Northern Ireland (see, for example, G. Mitchell, 
1999, ch. 15; Godson, 2004, ch. 24). This is evidence of a ‘trade-off’ between 
unionists and nationalists, which may also have been driven by factors such as 
the decision to use d’Hondt in executive formation as the system favours large 
parties like the UUP.  
 
The second, and potentially more problematic, disagreement focused on the 
concern of the smaller parties at the Good Friday negotiations that it would be 
difficult for them to secure representation in the Assembly under the proposed 
electoral arrangement and they were therefore reluctant to support it (Hansard, 
9th July 2013 cols 316-18; personal interview, 10th July 2013). The importance 
of this concern is highlighted by Gary McMichael (1999, p. 222), the UDP leader 
at the time of the peace talks, who argues that his party, and the other small 
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parties, were going to have difficulty competing in elections to the Assembly and 
that this would be particularly acute in unionist areas where there were 
numerous unionist parties fielding candidates. The specific concern of the 
smaller parties was that the initial plan for each of Northern Ireland’s eighteen 
Westminster constituencies to return five members using PR-STV, with a total 
of ninety seats in the Assembly, did not provide a high enough district 
magnitude to sufficiently guarantee their representation, despite this proposal 
being the preferred choice of most of the parties at the talks (personal interview, 
10th July 2013). To compensate for this, it was suggested that a regional top up 
of ten seats be added, the allocation of which was to be determined using party 
list PR, in addition to PR-STV in five-seat constituencies, bringing the total 
number of elected representatives in the Assembly to 100 (Hansard, 9th July 
2013 cols 317-18; personal interviews, 10th July 2013; 11th September 2013).  
 
The ten seat top up suggestion was the preferred option of the smaller parties, 
who stood to be most advantaged by it, but it was rejected for two reasons. 
Firstly, it faced resistance from the larger parties, particularly the UUP, who 
considered this method to disadvantage them by ensuring that the smaller 
parties gained representation, possibly at its expense (personal interview, 10th 
July 2013). This is especially important, as the Good Friday Agreement would 
have been unachievable without the support of the large parties. Secondly, the 
top up of ten suggestion faced opposition from the British government and was 
rejected as it was claimed ‘it would be too complicated to work out all the 
different permutations of top-ups’ (Hansard, 9th July 2013 col 318). It is possible 
to draw parallels with this and the aforementioned difficulties associated with 
the method of party list PR used for the Peace Forum elections, which 
employed a complicated formula described by Mitchell and Gillespie (1999, p. 
81) as ‘not well thought out or even properly understood by its architects’. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the use of a voting system for Assembly elections 
which included top up seats found little support beyond the smaller parties at 
the Good Friday negotiations that stood to gain the most from it. 
 
Although the Northern Ireland political parties participating in the peace talks 
were largely responsible for deciding on a voting system for elections to the 
Assembly, this particular dispute, which was ongoing until 3am the day before 
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the Good Friday Agreement was reached (personal interview, 10th July 2013), 
was eventually settled by the British government (Hansard, 9th July 2013 col 
317). This is significant as it is an example of the fundamental role played by 
external actors in the negotiations. With the top up seats suggestion rejected 
and PR-STV established as the only system likely to be accepted by the larger 
parties at the talks, there was a dilemma of how to keep the smaller parties 
onboard and have members elected using only PR-STV (personal interview, 
10th July 2013). Appeasing the small parties was important for two reasons. 
Firstly, with the absence of the DUP and UKUP at the negotiations, who despite 
winning seats in the 1996 Peace Forum election to determine participants 
chose to leave the talks in protest against Sinn Fein’s inclusion, support for an 
agreement from the loyalist PUP and UDP was necessary in order to 
demonstrate that a majority of the unionist political bloc backed the deal 
(McGarry and O’Leary, 2006b, pp. 260, 269). This is significant as without this 
support pro-Agreement unionist politicians would have undoubtedly struggled to 
convince the unionist community of its merits when faced with the subsequent 
referendum.  
 
Secondly, there was a need to appease the wishes of the smaller parties as 
they deserved every reasonable opportunity to be represented in the Assembly 
due to the role that they had played in the Good Friday negotiations (personal 
interview, 10th July 2013). It was these considerations combined with the need 
for elections to be contested using PR-STV that informed the response to the 
dilemma. It was proposed that the number of seats per constituency be 
increased from five to six, resulting in an additional eighteen members in the 
Assembly and a higher district magnitude, which increased the potential for the 
smaller parties to gain representation (personal interview, 10th July 2013). 
Although they did not consider this option to advantage them as much as the 
ten top up seats suggestion, the small parties agreed, possibly through 
recognition of the need for compromise in peace processes and out of fear of 
allowing the issue to jeopardise the achievement of a peace deal, and this 
dispute was duly settled (personal interview, 10th July 2013). 
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The case for and against PR-STV in Northern Ireland 
The major contemporary alternative voting system that has been suggested for 
Northern Ireland is AV, which Horowitz (1985; 2003) recommends for divided 
societies in general. To recap, his argument is that under PR-STV the quota of 
votes needed for election is too low to induce parties and candidates to seek 
inter-party lower order preference votes, and certainly inter-bloc transfers 
(Horowitz, 2003, p. 99). AV would, therefore, be more suited to Northern Ireland 
as it would induce moderation due to candidates needing to reach a quota of 50 
per cent in order to be elected, which would entrench the need for them to make 
inter-party, if not inter-bloc, appeals (Horowitz, 2003, p. 99). Critiques of 
Horowitz’s argument will now be considered. 
 
There is no guarantee that AV offers greater potential to induce moderation 
than PR-STV (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009a, pp. 62-63). As elections contested 
under AV use small single member constituencies, this increases the incentives 
for parties to engage in intra-bloc electoral pacts whereby they agree to not field 
candidates against each other in order to shore up support from one 
community. Under AV it is also probable that voters are even less likely to make 
inter-party, and especially inter-bloc, transfers out of fear of their preferred 
candidate not being elected. Despite the quota candidates need in order to be 
elected being lower in elections contested using PR-STV, due to the use of 
larger multimember constituencies this factor is significantly reduced. It is, 
therefore, multimember constituencies with a low district magnitude, such as 
European elections in Northern Ireland, that offer the greatest potential for party 
election campaign moderation. McGarry and O’Leary (2009a, pp. 62-64) make 
two arguments against the use of AV with specific reference to Northern Ireland. 
First, they argue that the conditions required for AV to successfully achieve its 
objectives do not exist because most voters transfer first to candidates within 
their own bloc, regardless of how moderate (or not) the parties they represent 
may be. In support of this, they cite the claim of Fraenkel and Grofman (2006, 
pp. 627-31) that a majority of the electorate must favour moderation and voters 
must be willing to transfer to candidates outside of their own bloc before 
transferring to those within it in order for AV to produce results that favour 
moderate parties.  
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Second, McGarry and O’Leary (2009a, p. 62) argue that AV would never have 
been endorsed by the hard line and smaller parties at the Good Friday 
negotiations because as previously mentioned, they would not approve a 
majoritarian system that would be likely to have a negative impact on their 
potential electoral success. They assert that the use of AV was also unlikely to 
have been agreed upon as the participants at the negotiations owed their 
positions to a proportional system, as party list PR was used for the 1996 
Forum election to allocate places at the talks, and it could therefore only have 
been imposed by an external actor, as was the case in 2000 when AV was 
implemented in the Republika Srpska. The position of McGarry and O’Leary is 
supported by aforementioned evidence obtained from interviews with actors 
present at the Good Friday negotiations. 
 
McGarry and O’Leary (2006b; 2009a) are, therefore, wholeheartedly supportive 
of the use of PR-STV in Northern Ireland due primarily to its status as a 
proportional voting system – which unlike first past the post and AV, guarantees 
the fair inclusion of minorities and smaller parties – and because PR-STV 
employs the preferential method of ranking candidates. They argue that 
proponents of PR-STV in Northern Ireland and other divided societies have 
been proven correct in that the system has incentivised ‘hard line’ parties to 
moderate their positions (McGarry and O’Leary, 2006b, p. 269). Using Sinn 
Fein as an example, they claim that the party responded to its aforementioned 
struggle to attract transfers during the 1980s by moderating its policies, 
facilitating the PIRA ceasefires and participating in the Good Friday 
negotiations, and are now reaping the rewards of receiving lower order 
preference votes from SDLP voters. McGarry and O’Leary (2006b, p. 269) 
argue that this example demonstrates that PR-STV assists accommodative 
moves by parties and candidates in situations where there is more than one 
party within an ethno-national bloc. Whilst other aforementioned factors have 
undoubtedly been instrumental in facilitating party moderation, it is possible that 
the desire of parties to obtain inter-bloc lower order preferences has also played 
a role in this. 
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Political party perception of PR-STV 
Having explored the factors which influenced the choice of PR-STV for elections 
in Northern Ireland, focus will now turn to how political parties perceive the 
system and how they campaign in attempt to maximise their potential for 
electoral success. Although this research is centred on attempts by parties to 
attract transfers to them, the information included on lower order preference 
votes focuses on how parties understand and perceive transfers both to and 
from them, as this furthers understanding of how parties perceive PR-STV and 
strengthens conclusions. It is based primarily on information obtained from 
interviews with politicians, party activists and community leaders. Whilst PR-
STV is also used for elections to the European Parliament in Northern Ireland, 
much of the data referred to has greater relevance to Assembly and local 
government elections, as for European elections Northern Ireland is a single 
constituency with only three seats, which inevitably results in campaigns being 
fought differently than in geographically smaller constituencies with a greater 
number of seats. Some reference will, nevertheless, later be made to the impact 
of PR-STV on how parties campaign at European elections. Party perception of 
the electoral system will be addressed within four key areas – intra-party 
transfers, inter-party transfers, inter-bloc transfers and transfers at European 
elections – which will each be addressed in turn. 
 
Intra-party transfers 
Perhaps the most significant way in which the electoral system influences 
campaigning is the need for parties to ensure that they receive intra-party 
transfers. As ‘major’ parties, such as the DUP, Sinn Fein, the UUP, the SDLP 
and the Alliance Party, often field more than one candidate in a particular 
constituency, parties are acutely aware of the important necessity of balancing 
constituencies in order to maximise the potential for all, or as many as possible, 
of their candidates standing to win election. This is significant as it is usually 
perceived that a candidate will need to secure in first preference votes around 
half of the quota required for election to avoid early elimination (personal 
interview, 25th November 2013). It is, therefore, not in the interest of a party 
hoping to win more than one seat in a particular constituency to have one of its 
candidates obtaining a large first preference vote with few first preferences for 
its other candidates, unless it can be absolutely sure that transfers from its 
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candidate with the large first preference vote will be received by its other 
candidates during subsequent counts.  
 
The main way in which parties achieve this is by dividing constituencies into 
areas with comparable population sizes and advising potential voters in different 
areas to utilise the preferential ranking system of PR-STV by voting for their 
own candidates in a different order (personal interviews, 13th June 2013; 11th 
September 2013; 4th November 2013). For example, in one area of a 
constituency a particular party may advise potential voters to vote ‘1 Brown, 2 
Dawson, 3 O’Neill’, yet in another area this order may be reversed. Usually a 
constituency is divided between candidates in a way which is roughly 
proportional with a comparable electorate size in each area, however well 
known candidates will often campaign for first preferences within a considerably 
smaller area, as it is likely that their prominence will result in them receiving a 
greater number of first preference votes across the constituency (personal 
interview, 11th September 2013). 
 
There are a number of ways in which parties campaign once they have divided 
a constituency between their candidates. Campaign literature in the form of 
leaflets delivered through doors is a very significant method utilised by all major 
parties, as is displaying placards on lampposts, traffic lights and other such 
prominent locations within communities. It is, therefore, very common when 
travelling through a constituency to see placards of a particular party advising 
the electorate to vote for its candidates in a different order in different areas. A 
further means is through the use of mock ballot papers issued by parties at 
polling stations to advise potential voters of the order in which they would like 
them to vote for their candidates, which will differ depending on the area of a 
constituency in which the polling station is located (personal interviews, 14th 
June 2013; 27th November 2013). These methods are designed to maximise the 
likelihood that first preferences and transfer votes for a particular party’s 
candidates are evenly distributed, increasing the potential for all of the 
candidates it has fielded to be elected. Parties may also devise a general 
slogan, such as ‘DUP 1,2,3’, that is designed to be memorable and increase the 
probability that voters will make intra-party transfers, although this is unrelated 
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to the need to balance votes within a constituency and the DUP, for example, 
will in some constituencies put forward more than three candidates. 
 
It is clear that for the largest parties – the DUP and Sinn Fein – ensuring voter 
discipline by campaigning for intra-party transfers is more important than 
attracting lower preferences from voters of other parties. This is especially acute 
in constituencies with a large majority of members belonging to one community 
in which one party traditionally outperforms the others by a significant margin. In 
the Lower Falls ward of Belfast City Council, for example, Sinn Fein will field as 
many candidates as there are seats in local government elections. In these 
circumstances, the party knows that if its voter discipline is strict in terms of 
intra-party transfers, it will win all five seats, as was the case in 2005 (personal 
interview, 26th November 2013). In situations where Sinn Fein fields as many 
candidates as there are seats within a constituency, the party does not feel it 
necessary to advise its voters to transfer to any other party’s candidates, as its 
own candidates need the transfers in order to ensure their election (personal 
interview, 26th November 2013). This is further supported by Sinn Fein sources 
stating that as it is a major political party in Northern Ireland, its primary focus is 
on the acquisition of first preference votes in order to maximise its electoral 
success (personal interview, 17th June 2014). Given the importance of intra-
party transfers, particularly to the DUP and Sinn Fein, election campaigns in 
Northern Ireland can be considerably party exclusive, despite PR-STV allowing 
parties to encourage transfers from voters of other parties and advise their own 
voters on which other party’s candidates to transfer to. 
 
Inter-party transfers 
Whilst it has been demonstrated that for the two largest parties in Northern 
Ireland the most salient aspect of the preferential ranking method of PR-STV 
lies in the management of intra-party transfers, the DUP and Sinn Fein are by 
no means ignorant to the potential benefits of attracting transfers from other 
party’s voters, particularly within their own respective communal bloc. As has 
been previously suggested, it is likely that the need for Sinn Fein to acquire 
transfers, especially from SDLP voters, contributed in some way to the 
moderation of the party, as at local elections during the 1980s its candidates 
often remained unelected despite winning a large first preference vote (McGarry 
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and O’Leary, 2009a, p. 64). However, as research by Tilley et al (2008) 
indicates, the ideological distinction between traditionally republican Sinn Fein 
and the traditionally nationalist SDLP has influenced party support. This 
distinction has also impacted upon how both of these parties perceive the 
significance of intra-bloc inter-party transfers to and from their candidates. 
Indeed, in interviews neither party suggested that they actively appeal to the 
other party’s voters for transfers, nor advised their own voters to transfer to the 
other party’s candidates.  
 
Whilst if Sinn Fein or SDLP voters do choose to engage in making inter-party 
transfers they are most likely to remain in-bloc and therefore be between the 
two as they are the only significant nationalist parties (Barry and Love, 2011), 
that the parties themselves do not even claim to actively encourage intra-bloc 
transfers to their own candidates from the other party or from their voters to the 
other party’s candidates indicates little electoral unity within the nationalist bloc. 
This is attributed to the historical ideological distinction between Sinn Fein and 
the SDLP having an acute ethno-national dimension, which has in turn 
impacted upon the way in which these parties perceive the preferential ranking 
method of PR-STV (Tilley et al, 2008). As research has demonstrated that there 
is considerable voter fluidity within the nationalist bloc (see Mitchell et al, 2009, 
pp. 407-08), this is an interesting finding as it is thought that there is a potential 
electoral benefit for Sinn Fein and the SDLP to attempt to attract transfers from 
each other. 
 
There is greater electoral unity within the unionist bloc in terms of how parties 
perceive lower order preference votes. Although it is of paramount importance 
to the DUP that its voters make intra-party transfers, the party actively 
encourages its voters to transfer to other unionist candidates, particularly those 
that share the DUP’s ideals (personal interview, 27th November 2013). The 
UUP’s approach is much the same, with the party policy being to advise its 
voters to make intra-party transfers first before transferring to other unionist 
candidates in order of preference (personal interview, 13th June 2013). Whilst 
the DUP and the UUP ultimately campaign against each other for the same 
unionist votes, they are in many ways united around ensuring that the unionist 
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bloc remains the largest political community in Northern Ireland, with this intra-
bloc unity largely absent within nationalism, as previously demonstrated.  
 
Although unrelated to the workings of PR-STV, the existence of greater unity 
within unionism is corroborated by unionist parties, particularly the DUP and the 
UUP, agreeing at times to field a single candidate under a unionist unity banner 
in Westminster seats in which they believe they can win (see, for example, 
BBC, 2015). Whilst it has been known for the SDLP or Sinn Fein to not field a 
candidate in certain marginal constituencies to enhance the potential of the 
other winning election (BBC, 2010b), a united nationalist or republican 
candidate agreed on by both of these parties is yet to happen. This is supported 
by aforementioned research by Tilley et al (2008) claiming that unionist politics 
has not been subjected to the traditional ideological division that exists within 
nationalism. Although the influence of ethno-nationalism as a determiner of 
voter choice in unionism has become more important in the post-Good Friday 
Agreement era, it has not been as divisive as it does not have the historical 
roots of the nationalist SDLP/republican Sinn Fein distinction. 
 
In terms of attracting transfers, within the DUP there is a perception that voters 
of other parties are united in their detestation of it, to the effect that the DUP will 
fail to receive many transfers and it is thus not in the party’s interest to actively 
court them (personal interview, 12th June 2013). As is the case with Sinn Fein, 
the primary electoral strategy of the DUP for elections contested using PR-STV 
is often to ensure its voters transfer to all other DUP candidates. For the DUP 
and Sinn Fein, elections are therefore largely party exclusive, with the 
preferential ranking method of PR-STV having little impact on campaigns 
beyond the need to balance constituencies between candidates in order to 
maximise their potential to be elected. An exception to this rule is the DUP 
advising its voters to transfer to other unionists once they have given 
preferences to DUP candidates, which is evidence of the party considering the 
wider ramifications of elections and demonstrates that electoral competition in 
Northern Ireland exists between blocs as well as within them (P. Mitchell, 1999, 
p. 101). 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, transfers are clearly of greater significance to smaller 
parties, both in terms of receiving them and advising their voters of where to 
transfer to. It is nevertheless important to note that parties do not, on the whole, 
campaign with the specific intention of attracting transfers – intra or inter bloc. 
Rather, it is largely the case that transfers are considered to be a ‘better than 
nothing’ alternative for voters unwilling to give the party their first preferences, 
as will later be demonstrated. Perception of PR-STV differs from party to party. 
For the SDLP, transfers clearly play an important role in its electoral strategy. 
When canvassing constituencies such as Belfast South, party activists note that 
whilst many nationalists vote for Sinn Fein as they perceive it to be the only 
nationalist party with the potential to supersede the DUP as the largest party in 
Northern Ireland, the SDLP are eager to receive transfers from these voters, as 
the party recognises that they can make a considerable difference to its 
electoral fortunes (personal interview, 25th November 2013). The SDLP will, 
therefore, canvass districts in which it has little potential of obtaining a 
significant number of first preference votes, such as the Sinn Fein dominated 
Creggan and Bogside areas of Derry (participant observation, 13th May 2014). 
Whilst the primary aim of the party is undoubtedly to attract first preferences, it 
recognises that transfers can make a significant difference in areas such as 
these. Despite being a nationalist party, the SDLP also believes that it has the 
potential to attract transfers from unionist voters (personal interviews, 14th June 
2013; 25th November 2013), and its campaigns, as will be shown in Chapter 
Six, are arguably the least sectarian of the four largest parties.  
 
Whilst the SDLP does issue mock ballot papers at polling stations advising 
potential voters of the order in which they should vote for the party’s candidates, 
the party is happy for its voters to then transfer to candidates representing other 
parties, which is different to Sinn Fein’s position on lower order preferences in 
west Belfast, for example (personal interview, 11th September 2013). However, 
unlike unionist parties such as the DUP and the UUP, the SDLP does not 
advise its voters on which party’s candidates they should transfer to, ultimately 
because it believes that they should be free to decide themselves but also to 
avoid a ‘sectarian headcount’ in which elections are strictly intra-bloc (personal 
interviews, 11th September 2013; 25th November 2013). This fits with the 
SDLP’s view that it is not simply a party for the nationalist community. It is 
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evident that the SDLP perceives the preferential ranking method of PR-STV to 
be something to engage with and utilise to maximise its potential for electoral 
success, both in giving and receiving transfers. 
 
Like the SDLP, the UUP can be considered to be a transfer friendly party. As 
aforementioned, it advises its voters to make intra-party transfers first before 
transferring to other pro-union parties. The rationale behind this is that it will be 
reciprocated by other parties and the UUP will benefit from transfers from their 
voters (personal interview, 13th June 2013). The party is not only transfer 
friendly in terms of advising its voters of who to give their lower preferences to. 
When canvassing, it is keen to ask voters unwilling to give the UUP a first 
preference vote to transfer to the party further down the ballot (personal 
interview, 13th June 2013). As is the case with most other parties, the need to 
balance constituencies between candidates and ensure that voters make intra-
party transfers is the major factor in the UUP’s interpretation of PR-STV, 
however intra-bloc lower preferences do also nevertheless play a role (personal 
interview, 13th June 2013). 
 
Lastly, it is clear that intra-bloc transfers are important in explaining how minor 
parties perceive PR-STV. The PUP, who are not currently represented in the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and have only a handful of local government seats, 
is keen to encourage voters to rank all of the candidates on the ballot, 
regardless of their constitutional position, and wants other parties to advise their 
voters likewise (personal interview, 11th June 2013). That way, a comparatively 
minor party such as the PUP can be sure of receiving a transfer, which is likely 
to be electorally beneficial. Although it is not possible to wholly generalise this 
argument, on the basis of this evidence it is apparent that the smaller a party is, 
the more important it will consider lower order preference votes to be. 
 
Inter-bloc transfers 
As the focus of this research is to determine whether the preferential ranking 
method of PR-STV is inducing parties to moderate their campaigns in attempt to 
attract lower order preference votes from outside of the ethno-national bloc they 
represent, it is necessary to analyse how parties in Northern Ireland perceive 
and interpret inter-bloc transfers. Starting with the larger parties, the DUP 
129 
 
argues that it is not on its agenda to campaign with the intention of attracting 
many transfers from Sinn Fein or SDLP voters, as the effort would be too great 
and may undermine its unionist appeal (personal interview, 12th June 2013). 
The impression is often given in interviews that the DUP do not consider inter-
party transfers to play any significant role in the planning of its campaigns. For 
example, the party has recently made clear its wish to attract more votes from 
conservative Catholics who it believes would support its positions on certain 
social issues, such as its opposition to gay marriage (personal interview, 11th 
September 2013). Although it is important not to wholeheartedly conflate 
Catholicism and nationalism, despite clear parallels between the two, it could be 
thought that the obvious starting point would be to attempt to attract transfers 
from these voters, although the distinction between first and lower preferences 
is not made. This indicates that the DUP views elections as largely party 
exclusive, with transfers playing a very limited role beyond the intra-party level. 
 
There are similarities with the way in which Sinn Fein perceives inter-bloc 
transfers. The party recognises that it does not have a tradition of receiving 
votes from the unionist community but claims that non-nationalist voters may 
find common ground with its positions on everyday issues, such as its 
promotion of LGBT rights, which may result in some unionists voting for the 
party (personal interview, 13th June 2013). This, nevertheless, does not 
influence how Sinn Fein presents its campaigns and, as is the case with the 
DUP, little distinction is made between first and lower preference votes. It is 
clear that making explicit intra and/or inter bloc appeals for transfer votes is not 
on the agenda for the party. The ‘ethnic tribune appeals’ thesis, which claims 
that parties strive to portray themselves as the stoutest defender of their 
respective community in order to maximise their electoral support as voters are 
drawn to these parties in power sharing arrangements, goes some way to 
explaining why the DUP and Sinn Fein are reluctant to significantly tone down 
their campaigns, as they fear outflanking from intra-bloc rivals. From the 
perspectives of both of these parties, the preferential ranking method of PR-
STV is having little effect on how they plan their campaigns. 
 
Evidence from interviews suggests that smaller parties show greater interest in 
attracting, and advising their voters to give, inter-bloc transfers. As 
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aforementioned, whilst the SDLP is a nationalist party, it is keen to emphasise 
what it considers to be its non-sectarian credentials, and this manifests itself in 
the party’s understanding of PR-STV. In support of this, the SDLP does 
canvass some majority unionist areas, although it is not clear whether the aim 
of this is to attract first preferences, transfers, or both (personal interview, 25th 
November 2013). Perhaps most significantly to this research, at the 2003 
Assembly election, the party claims to have actively campaigned for SDLP 
voters to transfer to other pro-Good Friday Agreement candidates, notably 
those of the UUP, which had the potential to create a new political cleavage in 
Northern Ireland not based on ethno-nationalism (personal interview, 11th 
September 2013). This, however, was not realised as the UUP did not 
reciprocate this lower preference advice and instead urged its voters to transfer 
to other pro-union candidates (personal interview, 11th September 2013). Whilst 
the SDLP does not claim to explicitly moderate its message in the hope of 
attracting inter-bloc lower preference votes, that it was willing to advise its 
voters to transfer across the ethno-national divide indicates a preparedness to 
use the preferential ranking method of PR-STV in a way which is unique 
amongst the four largest parties in Northern Ireland. 
 
It is clear that whilst it is undoubtedly a pro-union party, the UUP believes that it 
has the potential to appeal to voters outside of the unionist community and 
considers everyone in Northern Ireland ‘to be a potential unionist’ (personal 
interview, 13th June 2013). At the 2014 local government election, a party 
candidate in East Belfast canvassed the predominantly nationalist/republican 
Short Strand area and expected to attract around 40 votes, most of which the 
party believed would be first preferences (personal interview, 14th May 2014). 
Whilst this may or may not be related to the workings of the preferential nature 
of PR-STV, evidence from both the SDLP and the UUP suggests that the 
system can induce parties to canvass areas in which they have little potential to 
obtain first preference votes in the hope of attracting transfers, although it is 
difficult to gauge the true extent of the occurrence of this. Although the UUP 
may believe that it has the ability to attract support from pro-union voters 
outside of the unionist community, that it advises its voters to transfer only to 
other pro-union candidates indicates that the party still considers elections to 
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have a particular ‘unionism v nationalism’ dimension, which remains the most 
important cleavage. 
 
As the Alliance Party is the only significant cross-community party in Northern 
Ireland, its perception of the preferential ranking method of PR-STV is largely 
inter-bloc, if those designated as ‘others’ are to be treated as a distinct 
community. The issue of transfers can, therefore, present difficulties in 
upholding Alliance’s non-sectarian position. For this reason, whilst Alliance is 
happy for its voters to transfer to other parties’ candidates, it does not advise 
them on where to transfer to, as the party does not wish to endorse politics 
based on sectarianism (personal interview, 25th November 2013). The party is, 
however, willing to admit that it hopes its voters will transfer to parties that share 
its agenda and outlook, which includes, to some degree, the nationalist SDLP 
due to its centre-left progressive ideology (personal interview, 2nd December 
2014). In terms of receiving transfers, Alliance claims that it is transfer friendly 
(personal interview, 25th November 2013). Although, like most other parties, the 
primary way in which Alliance perceives the preferential method of PR-STV is 
the need to divide and manage constituencies between candidates, and 
ultimately ensure that its voters make intra-party transfers, if it cannot obtain a 
first preference vote from a voter the party will ask for a transfer (personal 
interview, 25th November 2013). Alliance, nevertheless, is not immune to first 
preferences carrying greater weight than transfers and ultimately considers 
lower order preferences to be the first step towards obtaining a first preference 
vote (personal interview, 4th November 2013). The party thus does not 
campaign specifically for transfers when targeting voters of other parties, as it 
claims that it is often in competition with these parties and first preferences are, 
therefore, ‘what matter’ (personal interview, 4th November 2013).  
 
As a significantly smaller party than the four largest in Northern Ireland, Alliance 
is aware of the type of voter who is likely to support the party: well educated, 
middle to upper class, but not always high income, residents of suburban 
Belfast, and also minorities residing in areas with a large majority community 
(personal interview, 4th November 2013). The party ultimately tailors its 
campaigns to appeal to this support base and is largely unique in Northern Irish 
politics in that its canvass strategy is, on the whole, not constricted by ethno-
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national divisions, enabling it to potentially canvass every street in Northern 
Ireland (personal interview, 25th November 2013). It is apparent from this 
analysis that whilst Alliance is indeed transfer friendly in both giving and 
receiving lower order preference votes, the party has an acute perception of 
who is likely to vote for it and targets first preference votes from this cohort. As 
such, aside from the need to divide and balance constituencies between 
candidates, PR-STV does not have a hugely significant impact on how Alliance 
campaigns. This is attributed to the difficulties posed by PR-STV for cross-
community parties, in that they do not wish to inadvertently endorse sectarian 
politics by attracting transfers from other parties and in advising its voters on 
where to transfer to. This is a particular problem for Alliance, as save for the 
minor Green Party, some independents and perhaps NI21, there are no other 
cross-community parties in Northern Ireland. 
 
Lastly, it is clear that the PUP is a party that has given consideration to 
attracting transfers from outside of the unionist bloc. Whilst arguing that this is 
impossible to achieve amongst voters towards the lower end of the socio-
economic scale, the PUP believes that it has the potential to attract transfers 
from non-unionist middle class voters (personal interview, 11th June 2013). It is 
evident, however, that moderating its unionist/loyalist stance has little role to 
play in achieving this. Rather, like many other parties, it is the party’s positions 
on socio-economic issues that it believes have the potential to attract transfers 
from beyond its traditional electorate (personal interview, 11th June 2013). 
Nevertheless, as the PUP is ultimately a minor party, it is undoubtedly seeking 
to maximise its support from whichever possible source. As such, whilst it may 
surprise some that a traditionally staunch loyalist party refers to a desire to 
attract non-unionist transfers, it is firmly rooted in maximising the PUP’s 
currently very limited electoral success. As evidence from the DUP and Sinn 
Fein shows, it is likely that references to attracting lower preferences from 
across the divide would diminish the larger the party became. 
 
Lower order preference votes and European elections 
European elections in Northern Ireland are unique among those contested 
using PR-STV in that, with the exception of Sinn Fein in 1994 (Whyte, 1994), 
parties only field one candidate. Unlike at Assembly and local government 
133 
 
elections, all transfers are therefore inter-party. This is due to Northern Ireland 
electing as a single constituency for European elections, returning only three 
seats. This comparatively low district magnitude results in a high quota that 
candidates need to reach in order to be elected. This, coupled with the 
European Parliament being neither British nor Irish and thus free of ethno-
national baggage, means that European elections offer the greatest potential for 
parties to moderate their single identity symbolism and rhetoric in the hope of 
maximising their electoral support by appealing for transfers from the widest 
possible audience. In the interests of being elected, it is thought that parties 
would indicate a greater willingness to do this at European elections than at 
Assembly and local government elections, given the significantly higher quota of 
the former. 
 
The reality is that this, on the whole, is not happening, at least in terms of inter-
bloc transfers. Within unionism there has been some attempt to facilitate intra-
bloc lower order preference votes between parties. At the 2014 European 
election, for example, the DUP advised its voters to give their second and third 
preferences to the UUP and UKIP in their order of choice (Clarke, 2014). This 
has its roots firmly in the desire of the DUP to ensure that the unionist bloc does 
not become fragmented, which may allow nationalism to gain the upper hand, 
demonstrated by the party arguing that unionists should not vote for Alliance 
(presumably by way of first preferences and transfers), as it is no longer ‘a small 
‘u’ unionist party’ (Clarke, 2014). In the nationalist bloc, whilst Sinn Fein’s 
European campaigns do appear to express its republican ideals a little more 
moderately than they do for other elections (Githens-Mazer and Jarrett, 2014), 
the party indicates that there is a need to balance issues of salience in the Irish 
Republic with those of importance in the North, which in some cases are 
different (personal interview, 8th April 2014). It is clear that this has little to do 
with any attempt to attract inter-bloc transfers from unionists. As in common 
with other elections contested using PR-STV, unlike within unionism, neither 
Sinn Fein nor the SDLP advise their voters on which parties to transfer to. 
When asked in interviews, no representative of any party suggested that the 
higher quota needed to win a seat at European elections made any difference 
to the way in which parties attempted to sell their positions and policies to the 
electorate. This suggests that the preferential ranking method of PR-STV is 
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having little impact on how parties present their campaigns, particularly in 
reference to inter-bloc transfers. 
 
Summary 
From the evidence presented, it is clear that the primary way in which most, if 
not all, parties in Northern Ireland understand PR-STV for Assembly and local 
elections is in the need to divide and balance constituencies by ensuring that 
their voters make intra-party transfers. In terms of inter-party lower order 
preferences, there is demonstrable strength in the argument that the smaller a 
party is, the more transfer friendly it will be. This is ultimately a result of smaller 
parties perceiving the need to appeal to a wider audience to win election. As 
has been demonstrated, the DUP and Sinn Fein place a limited emphasis on 
attracting transfers from voters of other parties, which is especially true of the 
latter. For the UUP and the SDLP, inter-party transfers play a greater role, with 
both asking voters not willing to give their first preference votes to their 
candidates to instead give them a transfer when canvassing. Whilst unionist 
parties often advise their voters to make intra-bloc transfers to other parties, this 
is absent within nationalism, largely due to historical ideological distinctions, as 
aforementioned.  
 
Although it claims to be transfer friendly, the cross-community Alliance Party 
struggles with inter-party transfers as it does not want to be seen as endorsing 
sectarian politics, particularly in terms of advising its voters on who to give their 
lower order preferences to. On the whole, parties have given little thought to 
inter-bloc transfers and any potential role for them, which is ultimately the result 
of operating within a deeply divided society. An exception to this rule is the 
previously referred to example of the SDLP appealing for its voters to transfer to 
other pro-Good Friday Agreement candidates at the 2003 Assembly election, 
which was aimed in particular at the UUP. However, as this call was not 
reciprocated by the UUP, this sole example of a party making explicit reference 
to inter-bloc lower order preference votes has since petered out. Finally, despite 
having a lower district magnitude, with candidates therefore requiring a higher 
quota in order to be elected, European elections are having no greater success 
than other elections contested using PR-STV in influencing the way in which 
parties understand transfers. 
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Transfer vote data 
Whilst this study is not intended to be a quantitative analysis of the origins and 
destinations of lower order preference votes, it is beneficial to briefly explore 
recent transfer data in order to draw parallels or differences with party 
understanding and perception of the preferential ranking method of PR-STV. 
Although this research recognises the potential for different outcomes at 
different elections contested using the system, it refers primarily to data 
presented in the studies undertaken into transfers at the 2007 and 2011 
Northern Ireland Assembly elections (NIA, 2007; Barry and Love, 2011), as they 
are comprehensive, whilst other research into this is mostly skeletal. On the 
basis of evidence from interviews, it is expected that transfer friendly smaller 
parties, especially the UUP and SDLP, will receive the most inter-party 
transfers. In contrast, it is expected that the DUP and Sinn Fein will receive 
fewer lower preference votes, as they are less transfer friendly by their own 
admission, which is particularly true for Sinn Fein, as it presents an image of 
being uncomfortable with its voters transferring to other parties and indicates a 
limited interest in attracting inter-party transfers itself. In terms of inter-bloc 
transfers, although these are likely to be negligible, it is thought that the more 
moderate UUP and SDLP would perform best, which is especially true for the 
latter, as it has expressed an interest in using transfers in a way which goes 
beyond the traditional ethno-national cleavage in Northern Ireland. 
 
On the whole, this analysis is accurate when applied to the most recent 
Northern Ireland Assembly election of 2011. Unsurprisingly given that they are 
the two largest parties, the DUP and Sinn Fein received the highest number of 
intra-party lower order preferences, with 16,835 and 19,738 respectively (Barry 
and Love, 2011, pp. 8-9). When intra-party transfers are excluded, the UUP 
received the highest number of transfers from other party’s voters, with 21,110, 
and the SDLP a close second, with 19,409 (Barry and Love, 2011, pp. 8-10). 
This supports the claims of these parties to be transfer friendly. The DUP 
performed moderately well in attracting inter-party lower preferences, obtaining 
16,416, but nevertheless was behind the UUP and the SDLP (Barry and Love, 
2011, pp. 8, 10). Perhaps unsurprisingly given that previous analysis has 
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demonstrated that it is the least transfer friendly of all the major parties in 
Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein attracted the fewest number of inter-party transfers 
of the four largest parties, with just 7,149, and substantially less than the DUP 
(Barry and Love, 2011, pp. 8, 10). As Sinn Fein obtained the highest number of 
intra-party transfers but the lowest number of inter-party transfers of the four 
largest parties, it indicates that its voters have a high level of voter discipline 
and Sinn Fein relies on this, rather than making inter-party appeals, for its 
electoral success. This reflects data obtained from interviews, during which 
party sources were keen to stress its achievement of winning all five seats in 
the Lower Falls electoral ward at the 2005 election to Belfast City Council 
(personal interview, 26th November 2013). 
 
More important to this study is the issue of inter-bloc transfers. Research by 
Mitchell (2014) indicates that whilst the majority of lower order preference votes 
remain in-bloc, there has been an increase in inter-bloc transfers as the peace 
process has progressed into the post-Good Friday Agreement era. It is useful to 
compare the 1982 election to the shortlived Northern Ireland Assembly with the 
2011 Assembly election. In 1982, one per cent of DUP voters’ transfers were to 
the SDLP, with no transfers to Sinn Fein (Mitchell, 2014, p. 254). Similarly, 0.7 
per cent of Sinn Fein voters’ lower preference votes were to the DUP, with 0.4 
per cent to the UUP, which was perhaps a result of the latter being the most 
significant unionist party at the time, despite adopting a more moderate position 
than the DUP (Mitchell, 2014, p. 254). No transfers from UUP voters were to 
Sinn Fein and only 0.5 per cent went to the SDLP (Mitchell, 2014, p. 254). 
Finally, the data indicates that at the 1982 election there was no incidence of 
SDLP candidates standing against DUP candidates, however SDLP transfers to 
the UUP were negligible at 0.9 per cent (Mitchell, 2014, p. 254). It is important 
to note that this data references lower order preference vote destination levels 
only when voters were able to transfer to a particular party, as not all parties 
fielded candidates in all constituencies for the 1982 election. 
 
When inter-bloc transfer destination levels at the 1982 Assembly election are 
compared with those at the 2011 Assembly election, it is clear that there have 
been some changes. Transfers received by the DUP from nationalist party 
voters and by Sinn Fein from unionist party voters, however, remain negligible, 
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at 2 per cent and 2.2 per cent respectively, with intra-party transfers excluded 
(Barry and Love, 2011, p. 8). Similarly, only 2 per cent of inter-party transfers to 
the UUP were from nationalist party voters (Barry and Love, 2011, p. 9). Of the 
four largest parties, it was the SDLP who received the highest percentage of 
inter-bloc transfers, with 16 per cent of its inter-party transfers coming from 
unionist voters (Barry and Love, 2011, p. 9). As has been illustrated, this is 
perhaps unsurprising given the party’s keenness to emphasise its non-sectarian 
credentials, although it is important not to overstate the significance of this 
relatively low figure. It is worth briefly mentioning transfers to the Alliance Party 
at the 2011 Assembly election. With intra-party transfers excluded, 50 per cent 
of lower order preferences to Alliance came from voters of parties designated 
as ‘others’, with an almost equal percentage from unionist and nationalist party 
voters – 24 per cent and 26 per cent respectively (Barry and Love, 2011, p. 9). 
The vast majority of transfers to Alliance were inter-party (Barry and Love, 
2011, p. 9). This indicates that whilst the party’s appeal is ultimately non-
sectarian, it does have some, albeit limited, success in obtaining transfers from 
unionist and nationalist party voters, despite not making active appeals to them 
for fear of endorsing sectarian politics. 
 
 
Summary 
This chapter has explored the decision to use the PR-STV electoral system for 
elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, and the disagreements and debates 
around this choice. It has drawn on information obtained from interviews with 
political actors and activists to analyse how parties perceive, understand and 
utilise PR-STV’s preferential ranking method with regard to their election 
campaign strategy. Finally, a brief analysis of transfer data has been included in 
order to demonstrate a correlation between how parties claim to understand 
lower order preference votes and actual electoral outcomes. Whilst the focus of 
this research is on attempts by parties to attract transfers from voters of other 
parties, reference has also been made to whether they advise their voters, or 
potential voters, on which parties to transfer to, and it has been shown that 
there is a correlation between the two. Although the most significant way in 
which most parties perceive PR-STV is in the need to ensure their own voters 
make intra-party transfers, it has been demonstrated that smaller parties are 
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more transfer friendly than larger parties, in both receiving and in advising 
voters where to transfer to, in terms of inter-party lower order preference votes. 
Attracting inter-bloc transfers has been shown to be absent from most parties’ 
campaign strategies, despite the potential for this having been a factor behind 
the choice of PR-STV, although there is no guarantee of this occurring. This has 
served as a precursor for the following chapter to analyse election campaign 
literature through an ethno-symbolist lens to elucidate whether PR-STV has 
induced moderation in an attempt by parties to attract inter-bloc lower order 
preference votes. 
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Chapter Six – Manifesto analysis 
 
 
Through the application of content analysis, this chapter examines the election 
campaigns of political parties in Northern Ireland using an ethno-symbolic lens 
in order to elucidate the extent of any moderation in the post-Good Friday 
Agreement era. Its foundations lay in the claim of McGarry and O’Leary (2006b, 
p. 274) that ‘PR-STV provides an opportunity, though no guarantee, of both 
inter-communal and trans-communal transfer of lower-preference votes’. If there 
is any potential for this to take place, it is expected that this prospect would 
induce political parties to tone down the single identity symbolism and rhetoric 
of their election campaigns and focus almost exclusively on socio-economic 
issues affecting everyone in Northern Ireland, with the intention of maximising 
their potential electoral appeal and, therefore, success.  
 
With each party analysed in turn, first a general overview of pre-Good Friday 
Agreement manifestos will be included to provide an indication of the focus of 
these campaigns. Then manifestos from the 2010 Westminster Parliament 
election, the 2011 Northern Ireland Assembly and local elections, and the 2014 
European Parliament and local elections will be analysed. This will firstly allow 
for the examination of manifestos from more than a decade after the signing of 
the Good Friday Agreement, with its provisions having had a significant amount 
of time to have become entrenched. Secondly, analysing manifestos for these 
elections will enable the exploration of campaign literature for elections to all 
levels of government in Northern Ireland, including those contested using PR-
STV and those that are not. The purpose of this chapter is to gauge the extent 
to which many of the ethno-symbolic characteristics identified in Chapter One 
are utilised by parties in their election campaigns. 
 
 
Democratic Unionist Party 
 
Pre-Good Friday Agreement 
The focus of the DUP’s pre-1998 election campaigns is especially strident and 
largely populist in its unionist appeal. Often the party’s manifestos were 
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published as short leaflets or booklets, rather than more traditional longer, 
policy driven documents. The election and electoral system used appear to 
make little difference to the way in which the DUP presents its positions, save 
for when explicit references are made to the parliament for which the respective 
election is being contested. The language and symbolism of the party’s 
manifesto for the 1992 Westminster election is particularly strident, with the 
need to ‘tackle terrorism’ (in this case Irish republican paramilitarism) 
foregrounded (DUP, 1992). It states that ‘nothing short of the elimination of the 
IRA shall suffice… they must be militarily defeated’. This theme is continued 
throughout, with calls for Sinn Fein to be proscribed and for the Ulster Defence 
Regiment (UDR) to be ‘given a meaningful role in the defence of Ulster’. It is 
also keen to highlight the link between Sinn Fein and IRA, and to present the 
two as synonymous.  
 
The manifesto emphasises the DUP’s opposition to a role for the Republic of 
Ireland in Northern Ireland’s affairs and claims to speak for the unionist 
community in doing so. There is, nevertheless, some discussion of policies, 
though these are usually pro-union and focused explicitly to the unionist bloc, 
such as opposing ‘the ban on the display of the union flag and portraits of the 
Royal Family in the workplace’. The party clearly draws a distinction between 
pro-union and pro-British government, however, with some criticisms made of 
the latter. For example, it accuses the government of ‘turning Sunday into a 
working day’ as part of its ‘Sunday is Special’ campaign against what was to 
become the Sunday Trading Act of 1994. This is evidence of the DUP’s 
religious foundations continuing to have a key impact on its policy formation 
during the early 1990s. The visual symbolism of the manifesto is profoundly 
unionist, with a red and blue colour scheme throughout and the inclusion of the 
red hand of Ulster on the party emblem. 
 
Whilst this particularly strident presentation of its unionist credentials is perhaps 
to be expected for campaigns for elections to the Westminster Parliament, it is 
thought that this may be toned down for European and local elections contested 
using PR-STV, as the DUP was a comparatively small party at the time and it 
would have been in its interest to attract transfers from the more moderate 
UUP. This incentive, however, was evidently not realised, with campaigns for 
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these elections demonstrating little deviation from those for Westminster 
elections in terms of their single identity focus. The DUP’s 1994 European 
election manifesto is intensely unionist in focus and foregrounds preventing 
‘Dublin interference’ in Northern Ireland, an issue largely outside of the remit of 
the EU (DUP, 1994). It presents what the party perceives as the ‘emboldened’ 
and ‘more united than ever before’ Irish Republic as a threat to the 
constitutional position of Northern Ireland, which is further emphasised in 
statements such as ‘the SDLP leader (John Hume) and the leader of IRA/Sinn 
Fein (Gerry Adams) have joined forces with Dublin to pursue their common goal 
of a united Ireland’. This demonstrates a determination to emphasise what the 
party perceives to be the Republic of Ireland’s congruence with the nationalist 
community in the North and to package this as a combined threat to unionism.  
 
Opposition to the Irish Republic is also demonstrated in its discussion of EU 
issues, with a section dedicated to ‘Our money given to Dublin’, which argues 
that taxpayers’ money from Northern Ireland is transferred ‘into Dublin’s coffers’. 
Whilst some reference is made to specific European policies, much of the focus 
of the manifesto is on issues outside the remit of the EU, with calls for voters to 
‘deliver their verdict on the Downing Street Declaration and the process to bring 
IRA/Sinn Fein to the negotiating table’ by voting for the DUP. Whilst the 
manifesto’s visual symbolism is perhaps less strident than that of the party’s 
1992 Westminster election campaign, with a blue colour scheme throughout, its 
language and focus remain particularly hard line unionist, indicating that the use 
of PR-STV had little impact on DUP campaign moderation at this time. 
 
Neither can it be suggested that PR-STV had any significant impact on how the 
DUP campaigned for local elections in the pre-Good Friday Agreement era. The 
party’s 1997 local government election manifesto makes little reference to 
specific socio-economic policies affecting local areas and is instead largely 
focused on issues rooted in the Northern Ireland conflict (DUP, 1997). It 
includes a section dedicated to opposing ‘IRA/Sinn Fein’ that makes statements 
emphasising the DUP’s opposition to Sinn Fein’s presence in council chambers 
and reiterates calls for its proscription. The manifesto also asserts the party’s 
support for Articles 2 and 3, which set out the Republic of Ireland’s territorial 
claim to Northern Ireland, to be removed from the state’s Constitution, claiming 
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that they are ‘immoral, irredentist and illegal’. When socio-economic policy is 
discussed, it is focused on what the party can do for the unionist community, 
rather than the entire Northern Ireland population, regardless of their ethno-
national background or beliefs. For example, it states that the DUP will support 
‘Fair funding for unionist areas’, arguing that statutory agencies are neglecting 
unionists in need in favour of nationalists. This is an example of a political party 
utilising a psychocultural narrative, as identified by Ross (2009, pp. 8-10), to 
portray the ethno-national group it seeks to represent as vulnerable against the 
opposing community. 
 
The manifesto also emphasises the DUP’s unionist credentials in stating that 
the party ‘puts the interests of Ulster and the unionist people above any sectoral 
or party advantage’, whilst also reiterating its opposition to involvement from the 
Irish government in Northern Ireland’s affairs. Although the largely neutral blue 
colour scheme is again utilised, the language of the manifesto does not indicate 
that PR-STV is having any meaningful success in inducing the DUP to tone 
down its single identity symbolism in the hope of attracting inter-party transfers, 
even from more moderate voters within the unionist bloc. This analysis has 
demonstrated that the intention of the party in the pre-Good Friday Agreement 
era was to mobilise hard line unionist voters by focusing its electoral appeal 
specifically to this section of the community. It is evident that use of the PR-STV 
electoral system made little difference to the way in which the DUP focused its 
campaigns, as the party’s European and local election manifestos from this time 
do not indicate any significant moderation in its unionist symbolism, suggesting 
that attracting inter-party transfers was not a priority for the party. 
 
Post-GFA 
Two significant ways in which the DUP’s 2010 Westminster Parliament election 
manifesto differs from the party’s pre-Good Friday Agreement publications is its 
increased length and greater discussion of socio-economic issues (DUP, 2010). 
It includes several sections dedicated to bread and butter issues such as the 
economy, business, health, education and agri-food, with specific policies 
outlined for each. The language of the manifesto is more focused on what the 
party can do for Northern Ireland overall, rather than just the narrower unionist 
community. It is not, however, completely devoid of specific appeals to this 
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cohort. The introduction by the current party leader, Peter Robinson, makes 
reference to obtaining ‘key strategic gains for unionism’ and states reasons why 
the electorate should vote for the DUP, two of which are because it provides 
‘unionist unity’ and ‘strong positive unionist leadership’. This indicates that whilst 
the party is keen to stress its credentials on everyday issues affecting all of 
Northern Ireland’s population, whether unionist, nationalist or other, it considers 
it necessary to situate its appeal within the unionist community.  
 
The manifesto also demonstrates this appeal in its discussion of certain socio-
economic issues. For example, a section entitled ‘Tackling Disadvantage’ refers 
to the DUP being ‘particularly concerned about the often overlooked deprivation 
within Ulster’s Protestant Unionist and Loyalist communities’. Similarly, within 
‘Crime and Policing’ the manifesto states that the devolution of these powers 
has ‘always been considered essential by Unionists’. Furthermore, a section 
dedicated to ‘Culture’ refers only to that of unionism, arguing that the DUP ‘has 
worked to promote and develop the roles of the Loyal Orders, marching bands 
and Ulster-Scots heritage’, and claims, for example, that the party has obtained 
‘greater funding for the Twelfth and other Orange activities’. This is evidence of 
the DUP utilising the collective memories that ethno-symbolists, and Ross 
(2009), consider to be so important to national identity in order to attract support 
from unionists. Some of the DUP’s pledges are focused not just on what the 
party can achieve for the unionist community but what it can implement in 
opposition to nationalists: ‘there will be no Irish Language Act’, for example. The 
visual symbolism of the manifesto supports the party’s unionist appeal, with 
images of the union flag, the British Army and the Orange Order included. 
Whilst this literature demonstrates some moderation of the DUP from the pre-
Good Friday Agreement era, with greater discussion of socio-economic issues, 
its appeal is still very much aimed towards the unionist community. 
 
If PR-STV, with its preferential ranking system allowing candidates to receive 
inter-party transfers, is having a significant impact on the DUP’s election 
campaigns the post-1998 era of inter-communal power sharing, it is expected 
that the party’s 2011 Northern Ireland Assembly and local government 
manifesto would demonstrate moderation of the staunchly unionist appeal of its 
Westminster election publication of the previous year. There is, indeed, some 
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evidence of this. The 2011 manifesto follows a similar theme to that of 2010, 
with party positions set out on a range of issues, including the economy, health 
and education, and some specific policies pledged (DUP, 2011). Where they 
differ, however, is in the language used to make their appeals. Whilst the DUP’s 
2010 manifesto is explicit in its appeal to the unionist community, its 2011 
publication does demonstrate some movement towards appeals to the broader 
population of Northern Ireland. For example, when addressing cultural issues, 
the manifesto uses language such as ‘delivering for unionism and the broader 
community’. In comparison to 2010, this section is more focused on discussing 
culture that applies to both communities in Northern Ireland, such as supporting 
libraries, the arts and museums, as well as common sporting events such as 
the Olympics and Paralympics. Significantly, the 2011 manifesto pledges that 
the DUP will invest in regional stadium development for the GAA, a key sporting 
organisation for nationalists and a defining example of their cultural heritage.  
 
Unionist discourse and symbolism is not, however, entirely absent. The party, 
for example, proposes working alongside Loyal Orders to bring about the 
abolition of the Parades Commission and pledges its commitment to ‘strengthen 
the Union’. In a similar vein, the manifesto’s visual symbolism includes images 
of the union flag, the British Army and the Queen. Despite the party making a 
specific pledge to nationalists in GAA investment, the inclusion of explicitly 
unionist symbolism and discourse makes it impossible to argue that the 
manifesto has been designed with attracting votes, either first preferences or 
transfers, from nationalists in mind. It is more probable that this moderation in 
comparison to its 2010 manifesto is an attempt to attract support from more 
moderate unionists who may traditionally vote for the UUP, for example. As 
Assembly and local government elections are contested using PR-STV, the 
DUP has an added incentive to present its appeal in this way as if moderate 
voters are not prepared give their first preferences to party candidates, they 
may be inclined to transfer to them further down the ballot. Whilst this does not 
demonstrate that PR-STV is facilitating DUP election campaign moderation in 
the hope of attracting inter-bloc transfers, it may indicate moderation in attempt 
to attract intra-bloc lower order preferences. 
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If this appeal is a lasting strategy for the DUP, it is expected that the party’s 
2014 European Parliament and local government election manifesto would 
demonstrate a continuation of this moderation, as the high threshold of 
European elections offer the greatest incentive for this. On the whole, however, 
this is not so. Whilst the 2014 manifesto addresses specific EU and local issues 
such as agriculture, fishing, the environment and the economy, much of its 
focus is rooted in appealing to the narrow unionist community (DUP, 2014). 
There are many examples of this. Within a section entitled ‘Northern Ireland 
Moving Forward’, the party states that ‘Unionism united at every level of 
government is Unionism that is confident and strong. In this election it is 
important that the Unionist vote is not shredded and a strong Unionist voice is 
heard. Only the Democratic Unionist Party offer a united Unionist voice’. This 
suggests that the DUP is placing the interests of the unionist community at least 
on par with those of the party, and indicates that it perceives the 2014 elections 
as ‘unionism vs nationalism’ contests. Further examples of the party presenting 
its appeal in an exclusively unionist way are to be found in pledges such as 
supporting the year round flying of the union flag, and ‘defending the symbols 
and emblems of our nation’ in the face of nationalists and republicans waging a 
war against them. The manifesto’s visual symbolism includes British and 
unionist images, such as those of the union flag and the British Army.  
 
There are two main factors behind the DUP’s decision to run a highly charged 
unionist campaign for the 2014 European and local government elections. 
Firstly, as five unionist candidates (six if NI21 is considered to be unionist) 
contested the European election, the party was keen to avoid unionist vote 
splitting which had the potential to result in nationalist candidates winning two of 
the three seats. In the event, this outcome was not realised but Sinn Fein, 
nevertheless, topped the poll on first preference votes, ahead of the DUP 
(Whyte, 2014). Secondly, the party was keen to avoid intra-bloc outflanking by 
the more hard line Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV), which is led by the former 
DUP MEP, Jim Allister, and won 14 per cent of first preferences in the 2009 
European election (Whyte, 2009). The DUP, therefore, considered it necessary 
to run a campaign aimed almost exclusively towards the unionist community in 
2014 in order to maintain its ‘ethnic tribune’ status within unionism and to 
ensure that support was not lost to the TUV. This suggests that when it 
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perceives the electoral strength of unionism or its ‘ethnic tribune’ status to be 
threatened, the preferential method of PR-STV makes little difference to the 
way in which the DUP presents its campaigns, as it resorts to the widespread 
use of exclusively unionist symbolism and discourse in attempt to prevent this. 
 
Summary 
This analysis has demonstrated that there has been a moderation of the DUP’s 
election campaigns in the post-Good Friday Agreement era towards a greater 
focus on socio-economic issues. Party representatives identify three main 
factors to explain this (personal interviews, 11th September 2013; 14th May 
2014). Firstly, the advent of a more peaceful environment in Northern Ireland 
since the 1990s, in which people have almost entirely turned their backs on 
paramilitarism and have endorsed the peace process, means that parties must 
place greater emphasis on real world politics, as opposed to conflict related 
issues such as anti-terrorism policies. Secondly, as parties traditionally 
considered to be ‘hard line’ expand, as has been the case with Sinn Fein and 
the DUP, they attract a wider range of people and ideas, which can often result 
in moderation. Finally, being in government has the potential to incentivise 
parties to moderate as there is a necessity to deliver on their pledges and be 
held to account, whereas prior to the establishment of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly parties were effectively in a permanent state of opposition and were 
not responsible for policy implementation. These factors explain the DUP’s 
rationale for moving away from its populist elections campaigns of the 1990s, 
towards ones which place greater emphasis on key socio-economic issues in 
the 2010s. 
 
The DUP argues that one of its recent campaign strategies is to attract support 
from Catholic voters who may agree with the party’s conservative positions on 
social issues such as gay marriage and abortion (personal interview, 11th 
September 2013). Whilst it is unclear whether the party seeks first or lower 
order preferences from this electorate, as the DUP does not have a tradition of 
support from the Catholic community, it is thought that a transfer would be the 
most obvious starting point, with the potential for this to later translate into a first 
preference vote. On the basis of the manifestos analysed, there is little 
evidence of the party making any significant appeals to Catholics. Although the 
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DUP’s 2011 Assembly and local government manifesto demonstrates some 
degree of moderation, its British and unionist visual symbolism, combined with 
the staunchly and largely exclusively unionist appeal of its 2014 European and 
local government elections manifesto, indicates that the DUP is not interested in 
appealing for inter-bloc transfers.  
 
The party, however, suggests that Catholics who are interested in voting for the 
DUP will accept the utilisation of British and unionist symbolism in its 
campaigns, provided that it is not presented in an aggressive way (personal 
interview, 25th November 2013). Whilst it is important not to wholeheartedly 
conflate Catholicism and nationalism, it is the case that most Catholics in 
Northern Ireland are nationalist, and although they may not favour a united 
Ireland at present, it is likely to be at least a long term aspiration (McKittrick and 
McVea, 2001, p. 2). In its campaign literature, the DUP appears to conflate 
being presently pro-union with being a member of the unionist community. It is 
improbable that the party will receive any significant support from Catholics as 
they are likely to be discouraged by the DUP’s staunch and largely exclusive 
appeal to the unionist community. Indeed, it has been suggested that the party’s 
claim that it hopes to attract votes from Catholics is an attempt to convince 
moderate unionists that it has shed its traditional hard line position (Devenport, 
2011). The DUP, nevertheless, is willing to admit that sections of its manifesto, 
such as those on the constitutional position of Northern Ireland and cultural 
affairs, are unlikely to resonate beyond the unionist community, although it does 
claim that its policies on socio-economic issues are formulated with all of 
Northern Ireland’s population in mind (personal interview, 12th June 2013). 
 
It has been demonstrated that the DUP has shown little interest in moderating 
its unionist discourse and symbolism in the hope of attracting inter-bloc 
transfers. As its 2014 European and local government elections manifesto 
indicates little deviation in terms of this from its 2010 Westminster election 
publication, it is clear that use of the PR-STV electoral system has little or no 
meaningful impact on the way in which the party focuses its appeal to the non-
unionist electorate. Whilst the DUP’s 2011 Assembly and local government 
elections manifesto does demonstrate some moderation of its traditional 
staunchly unionist discourse and symbolism, which may be an attempt to attract 
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intra-bloc transfers from moderate unionists, this moderation is not implemented 
when the party perceives its ‘ethnic tribune’ status to be threatened. In these 
circumstances, as its 2014 manifesto suggests, the DUP resorts to a largely 
exclusive unionist appeal in order to prevent outflanking by intra-bloc rivals and 
to present itself as the stoutest defender of the unionist community. Based on 
Porter’s (1996, quoted in Dixon, pp. 206-07) aforementioned definition, it has 
been demonstrated that the DUP’s outlook is cultural unionist, with particular 
emphasis placed on Protestantism, Britishness and Ulsterness in shaping 
political life in Northern Ireland, which heavily influences its election campaigns.  
 
It is also important not to overlook the wider ramifications of the ‘ethnic tribune’ 
appeals thesis in explaining why the DUP continues to make ethno-symbolic 
electoral appeals. In assuming this position, the party has transformed itself 
from one which rejected the Good Friday Agreement, including power sharing 
with Sinn Fein and a role for the Irish government in Northern Ireland, to one 
which accepts these principles. The DUP, therefore, considers it necessary to 
project its substantive power in ethno-symbolic terms in its campaign literature 
by, for example, emphasising how it is using its position in government to 
support unionism and uphold unionist principles. This supports the argument 
that whilst consociationalism and its ‘complex’ principles, such as British-Irish 
interdependence, is having some impact on political parties in Northern Ireland, 
this, on the whole, is not being replicated in their election campaigns. Overall, 
the analysis suggests that PR-STV is having little meaningful impact on the way 
in which the DUP presents its election campaigns in terms of moderating its 
unionist appeal in attempt to attract inter-bloc transfers. This reflects 
aforementioned data indicating that the party places only a limited emphasis on 
attracting inter-party lower order preference votes. 
 
 
Ulster Unionist Party 
 
Pre-GFA 
An immediately noticeable way in which the UUP’s pre-Good Friday Agreement 
election campaigns differ from the DUP’s is in their staunchly liberal unionist 
focus, which is based on citizenship and a ‘British political way of life’, as 
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previously defined by Porter (1996, pp. 127-28). The party’s 1992 Westminster 
Parliament election manifesto is, therefore, heavily focused on demonstrating 
what it considers to be Northern Ireland’s integral position as a constituent part 
of the UK (UUP, 1992). As such, many of the policies and proposals it 
discusses are designed to uphold this and to ensure that the constitutional link 
is maintained. Indeed, a section is dedicated to this and includes statements 
such as ‘we cannot accept as stable any system of governance which could not 
be equally applied to any other regional entity within the UK’ and ‘citizens of 
Northern Ireland are… citizens of the UK with all the rights and obligations 
which go with that status’. The use of language such as this suggests that at the 
time the UUP considered the future of Northern Ireland’s constitutional position 
to be threatened, which is further demonstrated by the manifesto asserting that 
‘we desire the active support of the government in removing the constitutional 
claim [of the Republic of Ireland] to this part of the Kingdom’. It also indicates a 
commitment to uphold Northern Ireland’s institutions, demonstrated by 
statements such as ‘the welfare of the RUC… and UDR are of paramount 
importance’.  
 
The choice of visual symbolism is also intended to emphasise Northern 
Ireland’s position within the UK, with an image of the union flag on the 
manifesto’s cover, and the use of the colours red and blue throughout. It is not 
devoid of imagery unique to Northern Ireland, however, as the red hand of 
Ulster features on its cover. Unlike the DUP’s campaigns, which are often 
tailored to the narrow unionist community, the UUP’s electoral focus is aimed 
towards pro-union voters in Northern Ireland, regardless of their ethno-national 
community background (personal interview, 13th June 2013). This distinction is 
significant as this cohort may include Catholics who do not consider themselves 
to be part of the unionist community but favour the maintenance of the current 
constitutional arrangement. When discussing socio-economic policy issues, the 
UUP undoubtedly has all of Northern Ireland’s population in mind, which is also 
demonstrated in its 1997 Westminster Parliament election manifesto (UUP, 
1997). The party, nevertheless, does not shy away from emphasising its 
support for institutions that were traditionally considered by many to be almost 
exclusively unionist, such as the RUC and the UDR, and this is likely to impact 
upon the party’s ability to win support from outside the unionist community. 
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In order to maximise its electoral support by attracting lower order preference 
votes from the widest possible audience, it is thought that the UUP’s 1994 
European Parliament election manifesto would demonstrate moderation when 
compared to its 1992 Westminster publication due to the high vote quota of 
European elections under PR-STV offering the greatest incentive to court inter-
bloc transfers. This, however, was not realised and the UUP’s 1994 European 
manifesto is focused in much the same way as its Westminster manifesto of two 
years previous (UUP, 1994). Whilst socio-economic EU issues are discussed, it 
is again designed to demonstrate Northern Ireland’s constitutional position and 
includes statements such as the UUP ‘continue to defend the integrity of the 
UK’, albeit with a more European focus. Furthermore, some of the language of 
the manifesto is unlikely to sit well with Catholic/nationalist voters, for example a 
‘negative attitude plays into the hands of the IRA and the Republic’s 
government’.  
 
Whilst not suggesting that any IRA sympathiser would have considered giving 
the UUP a preference vote, it is thought that some moderate nationalists in 
agreeance with the party’s socio-economic positions may have been inclined to. 
It is, however, likely that they would be dissuaded from doing so by the UUP’s 
detrimental reference to the government of their traditional state of preference. 
This is significant as it is probable that many pro-union Catholics would still 
consider the reunification of the island of Ireland to be a long term aspiration. 
On the basis of this analysis, it is evident that the use of the PR-STV electoral 
system did not induce the UUP to tone down its pro-union appeal in the hope of 
attracting inter-communal transfers, as its European election manifesto 
demonstrates little divergence from its publication for the 1992 Westminster 
election. Although both are ultimately liberal unionist in focus, much of the 
language used is unlikely to find significant appeal beyond the unionist 
community. 
 
Post-GFA 
The UUP’s post-Good Friday Agreement election campaigns are presented in 
much the same vein as those for the 1992 and 1997 elections. In analysing the 
party’s 2010 manifesto, it is clear that the UUP remains keen to emphasise 
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Northern Ireland’s integral position within the UK, and its attempts to uphold and 
maintain this (UCUNF, 2010). It should be noted, however, that the UUP 
contested this election in alliance with the Conservative Party under the UCUNF 
banner. This presented the party with another avenue to sell itself as ‘truly 
British’, as it had joined forces with the only major British political party active in 
Northern Ireland, with the publication of a single manifesto. This alliance 
facilitated the inclusion of statements such as ‘a country is at its best when the 
bonds between people are strong and when the sense of national purpose is 
clear’, which is designed to suggest that the UCUNF pact will bring Northern 
Ireland closer to the centre of the political life of the UK. As such, the focus of 
the manifesto is rooted in socio-economic issues, with specific policies 
proposed in areas such as the economy, job creation, the environment, health 
and education.  
 
Whilst some proposals, such as education, are aimed specifically at Northern 
Ireland, most are presented in a UK-wide context. Much of the manifesto, 
therefore, is focused on opposing not Irish nationalism or the Republic of 
Ireland, but the then incumbent Labour Party at Westminster and what UCUNF 
perceived to be the DUP-Sinn Fein coalition at Stormont. The manifesto’s visual 
symbolism is thus largely neutral, with images of the then UUP leader, Reg 
Empey, and the Conservative leader, David Cameron, and the Palace of 
Westminster, for example. Although some may argue that this approach 
indicates moderation when compared to the UUP’s 1992 and 1997 Westminster 
election campaigns, this is likely to be a more out of necessity due to the party’s 
electoral alliance with the Conservatives in 2010 than any genuine attempt to 
appeal to the nationalist community in Northern Ireland. 
 
At the 2011 Assembly election, the UUP was no longer engaged in an electoral 
alliance with the Conservatives, which may have resulted in a return to the 
party’s pre-Good Friday Agreement campaign approach of demonstrating 
Northern Ireland’s integral position within the UK due to the absence of the 
moderating influence of the Tories. It is, however, clear that the UUP considers 
the constitutional position of Northern Ireland to have been settled by the 
Agreement and, therefore, the need to demonstrate this, which was central to 
its pre-1998 campaigns, has been significantly reduced (UUP, 2011). As such, 
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the party’s 2011 manifesto is heavily focused on socio-economic issues 
affecting all of Northern Ireland’s population, whether unionist, nationalist or 
other. These include the environment, health, tourism, the economy and 
education, with detailed party policies provided for each.  
 
Discussion of these issues is not, however, entirely devoid of all reference to 
unionism. Within a section dedicated to culture, arts and leisure, the UUP 
claims that it will not impose its party political ideology on any of these issues 
but later presents its opposition towards an Irish Language Act. Although the 
party states that this is due to it considering the Act to be ‘unwarranted, costly 
and overtly divisive’, it is difficult to believe that its opposition is not influenced 
by its unionist heritage. The manifesto also states the UUP’s desire ‘to advance 
international understanding and appreciation of the contribution of those of 
Ulster Scots (or Scotch-Irish) origin’, which further demonstrates its appeal to 
the unionist community. Its visual symbolism features a red and blue colour 
scheme throughout, and an image of the union flag in watermark-style on each 
page. Similar to the approach of the DUP, this is evidence of the party utilising 
the symbolic landscape in order to make appeals to voters (Ross, 2009, p. 6). 
Whilst the UUP continues to present its election campaigns using a liberal 
unionist approach, with socio-economic policies aimed at all citizens of Northern 
Ireland, it is clear that the party is not focusing its appeal in the hope of 
attracting significant support from beyond the unionist community, as several 
aforementioned inclusions are highly unlikely to resonate with nationalist voters. 
This suggests that, on the whole, PR-STV is not inducing the UUP to moderate 
the unionist rhetoric and symbolism of its election campaigns with the intention 
of attracting inter-bloc transfers. 
 
If PR-STV is having this effect on the way in which the UUP campaigns, it is 
thought that it would be most evident in its manifesto for elections to the 
European Parliament due to factors already specified. Whilst other parties, such 
as the DUP, choose to devote sections of their European manifestos to issues 
beyond the remit of the EU, the UUP’s 2014 manifesto is almost entirely 
dedicated to European affairs (UUP, 2014). As is the case with the party’s 
publications for other elections, most are presented with all of Northern Ireland’s 
voters in mind, with issues such as the economy, crime and the environment 
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discussed, and specific policies on, for example, the need for a referendum on 
the UK’s continued EU membership and for it to retain the pound sterling as its 
currency. As European elections are to a legislature outside of Northern Ireland, 
however, the UUP takes a UK-wide approach to the presentation of many of its 
policies, as it does for elections to Westminster. For example, in addition to 
stating that the UK should remain out of the Eurozone and hold a referendum 
on EU membership, the manifesto makes observations such as ‘the Rural 
Development allocation secured by the UK Government is but a fraction of the 
available budget’ and refers to ‘the UK’s current differentiated status’ within the 
EU.  
 
Whilst some referral to this is to be expected due to Northern Ireland’s 
constitutional position within the UK, it appears that the UUP sometimes 
overestimates the importance of this link when the opportunity to do so presents 
itself. This can give this impression that the UUP at times overlooks its position 
as a Northern Irish party and instead considers itself to be representing and 
appealing to a UK-wide electorate, despite contesting elections only in Northern 
Ireland. Although the manifesto’s visual symbolism is largely neutral, it does 
make some reference to issues which are clearly designed to garner support 
within the narrow unionist community. The party argues, for example, that ‘the 
allocation of PEACE III funds to the Peace Building and Conflict Resolution 
Centre at the Maze, caused not only unnecessary distress to innocent victims, 
but it also deprived many more worthy projects of funding’. As this issue is 
particularly important to many within the nationalist/republican community, the 
inclusion of this statement suggests that the UUP is not planning its election 
campaigns with the intention of winning support from this section of the 
electorate. This, along with the party’s frequent emphasis of Northern Ireland’s 
constitutional position within the UK, indicates that the preferential ranking 
method of PR-STV is not inducing the UUP to tone down the single identity 
focus of its election campaigns in the hope of attracting inter-bloc transfers. 
 
Summary 
It is clear from this analysis that the UUP’s election campaigns have undergone 
fewer changes in the post-Good Friday Agreement era than the DUP’s. It 
should of course be noted that much of this is due to the latter’s traditionally 
154 
 
hard line unionist position being more malleable to moderation as Northern 
Ireland moved away from violent conflict. The electoral rise of the DUP in the 
early 2000s presented the UUP with a choice in how to focus its appeal: ‘out-
unionist’ the DUP in attempt to reclaim its position as the community’s ‘ethnic 
tribune’ party or stick to its more moderate principles. The party opted for the 
latter. Whilst it is evident that it no longer uses the maintenance of Northern 
Ireland’s constitutional position as a major focus of its campaigns, recent 
manifestos have demonstrated that the UUP remains keen to emphasise what it 
considers to be the integral position of the region within the UK. The party’s 
justification for this is that everyone in Northern Ireland, regardless of their 
background, is a potential unionist and it, therefore, has the ability to appeal to 
all sections of the community, as it is pro-union, rather than only a party for the 
unionist bloc (personal interview, 13th June 2013).  
 
Although this may explain the UK-wide focus of its campaigns and even its 
utilisation of British visual symbolism, it does not explain the party’s use of 
rhetoric that is unlikely to resonate beyond the narrow unionist community, such 
as its opposition to the Irish Language Act. It is therefore questionable whether 
the UUP does strive to attract support from beyond its traditional unionist 
constituency in the post-1998 era. On the basis of this analysis, it would seem 
that this appeal is largely absent, which is supported by the party’s Assembly 
and European election campaigns indicating little divergence from those for the 
Westminster Parliament in terms of their espousal of unionist symbolism and 
rhetoric. This suggests that PR-STV is having little moderating effect on the way 
in which the UUP campaigns by way of attracting non-unionist lower order 
preference votes. 
 
 
Sinn Fein 
 
Pre-GFA 
Prior to the Good Friday Agreement, in a similar vein to those of the DUP, Sinn 
Fein’s election campaigns were particularly strident in their explicit appeal to the 
nationalist/republican community it seeks to represent. The party’s manifesto for 
the 1997 Westminster Parliament election demonstrates this with inclusions 
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such as ‘nationalist voters can send a clear message to the new British 
government that genuine peace talks must be all-inclusive and without 
preconditions’, and ‘Sinn Fein has highlighted the importance of maximising the 
nationalist vote’ (Sinn Fein, 1997). This specific referral to the nationalist 
community demonstrates that Sinn Fein has little intention of appealing beyond 
this electorate. This theme is continued throughout, with references to the ‘Irish’ 
peace process and calls for the Irish language to be given equal status with 
English in Northern Ireland. The party argues that the language ‘is marginalised 
in the school curriculum’ and emphasises its role in the Gaelicisation of street 
names in Northern Irish cities. This is evidence of Sinn Fein utilising a primary 
ethno-symbolic characteristic in attempt to maximise its electoral appeal (Smith, 
2009, p. 25). The manifesto presents a stoutly republican image of the party, 
much of which is profoundly anti-British, demonstrated by statements such as 
‘our objective is to end British rule in Ireland’ and to end ‘British government 
support for Orange domination’. It is also peppered with references to how 
decisions taken by the Westminster government are having a negative impact in 
Northern Ireland, for example ‘farmers in the six counties are being penalised 
because of British government incompetence’ and accuses it of lacking ‘the 
political will’ to tackle discrimination. The manifesto also emphasises what Sinn 
Fein considers to be the unsatisfactory treatment of Irish republican prisoners.  
 
Where it differs from pre-Good Friday Agreement DUP campaigns, however, is 
in its comparatively extensive referral to socio-economic policy issues in areas 
such as the environment, education, the economy and social justice. The 
manifesto also sets out Sinn Fein’s willingness to engage with the unionist 
community in order to bring about an agreement for conflict management and ‘a 
process of national reconciliation’, whilst stressing that the party ‘is not the IRA’. 
It is nevertheless likely that this has more to do with demonstrating the party’s 
commitment to the peace process than any attempt to win electoral support 
from the unionist bloc. The manifesto features little visual symbolism, save for 
an image of Sinn Fein’s logo – an orange ‘SF’ projected onto a green map of a 
united Ireland – on the first page. It is clear from this analysis that the purpose 
of the party’s 1997 Westminster election campaign was to maximise its support 
from within the nationalist community, rather than attempt to attract inter-bloc 
votes. In emphasising its distance from violent republican paramilitarism and 
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stressing its engagement with the peace process, however, it is likely that Sinn 
Fein was thinking beyond its traditional republican electorate with the intention 
of attracting support from nationalists who may previously have voted for the 
SDLP. 
 
Although the election took place prior to the 1997 Westminster election, at a 
time when the peace process was less embedded, it is thought that Sinn Fein’s 
1994 European election campaign would demonstrate some moderation of its 
staunchly republican message due to the incentives offered by PR-STV. This, 
on the whole, is not so (Sinn Fein, 1994). As it does for all European elections, 
the party published a single manifesto for the island of Ireland in 1994. It is 
focused on placing the need for Irish unity within a European context, which is 
demonstrated by statements such as the constitutional position of Northern 
Ireland is a European issue ‘due to the existence of a border’ and ‘the concept 
of the EU and open borders is at odds with a divided Ireland’. As it is an island-
wide publication, this manifesto places greater emphasis on all-Ireland issues 
than does that for the 1997 Westminster election – for example, ‘Sinn Fein 
seeks the establishment in Ireland of national democracy’. It also suggests 
ways in which the government of the Republic of Ireland can bring about the 
party’s republican ideals, such as stressing the need for ‘an agreement between 
London and Dublin to end partition’, and calling on the Irish government ‘to ratify 
its signing of the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Prisoners… to 
ensure the return of Irish prisoners’. Whilst the manifesto includes Sinn Fein’s 
position on several European policy issues, many of these are presented in a 
way in which emphasises the party’s republican ideal of a united Ireland. As this 
manifesto does not demonstrate any substantial deviation from the explicit 
appeal to the nationalist community in Northern Ireland of Sinn Fein’s 1997 
publication, it cannot be suggested that PR-STV induced the party to appeal for 
transfers from beyond this electorate, as its focus is firmly intra-bloc in nature. 
 
Post-GFA 
Despite having become the largest party of the nationalist bloc in Northern 
Ireland in the years following the Good Friday Agreement, Sinn Fein’s 2010 
Westminster election manifesto demonstrates little divergence from the party’s 
1997 publication (Sinn Fein, 2010). There remains a heavy focus on the peace 
157 
 
process, although much now refers to what the party has achieved, as opposed 
to what it hopes to. These achievements are often presented using republican 
language, for example ‘by the end of the year there will also be the transfer of 
powers from London to Belfast to deal with the issue of parades. More powers 
moving from England to Ireland’. It is clear from statements such as this that 
Sinn Fein is keen to stress that the Good Friday Agreement has not settled the 
constitutional future of Northern Ireland, as unionist parties claim, and instead 
portray it as ongoing, albeit neglecting that the Assembly, like the Westminster 
Parliament, falls under the jurisdiction of the UK. As did its 1997 publication, the 
party’s 2010 manifesto takes the approach of discussing socio-economic issues 
but often places them within an all-Ireland context. For example, a section 
entitled ‘Getting Ireland back to work’ claims that ‘Ireland cannot afford partition. 
All-Ireland development and harmonisation should advance in a planned way’, 
and calls for Northern Ireland to adopt the Euro in order ‘to create a single 
island currency’. This approach of intertwining the party’s perceived need for 
greater all-Ireland cooperation with bread and butter issues is also 
demonstrated in statements such as ‘our vision is of a seamless all-Ireland 
health service’, and ‘Sinn Fein has been at the forefront of demanding an all-
Ireland suicide prevention strategy’.  
 
The 2010 manifesto, as did Sinn Fein’s 1997 publication, also pushes for the 
furtherance of Irish culture in Northern Ireland and includes a sub-section on the 
Irish language, in which the party pledges to continue the development of 
teaching through this medium and support the introduction of an Irish Language 
Act. This is an example of the existence of what Ross (2009, p. 12) refers to as 
a psychocultural drama, with Sinn Fein supporting the introduction of an Act as 
a cultural necessity, whilst many unionist parties are opposed on the grounds 
that it is ‘pointless’ and is being advocated as part of a nationalist political 
agenda to ‘erode the Britishness of Northern Ireland (News Letter, 2015). The 
issue of Irish unity is a key focus and the manifesto is peppered with references 
to this, in addition to a section dedicated to it. For example, the opening 
message from party president, Gerry Adams, states that ‘this election is about 
leadership. It is about peace. It is about equality. It is about jobs and it is about 
unity’.  
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More specifically, the manifesto states that for a united Ireland to be achieved, 
the British government needs to push for an end to partition, the Irish 
government need to increase its planning for this and unionists need to be 
engaged in the type of Ireland they want to reside in. References to the party 
engaging with unionism are made throughout, for example ‘we want to work 
with unionists’ and ‘unionists will form 20 per cent of the new [united] Ireland 
with all of the additional rights and safeguards of the Good Friday Agreement, 
rather than remaining two per cent of a population ruled by Westminster’. In 
similarity with the party’s 1997 manifesto, however, it is likely that inclusion of 
statements such as this is more a result of the need for Sinn Fein to 
demonstrate its continued commitment to the peace process than an appeal for 
votes from beyond the nationalist electorate.  
 
One major way in which the manifesto differs from Sinn Fein’s pre-Good Friday 
Agreement publications is that a significant amount of it has been translated into 
the Irish language. As there are relatively few fluent Irish speakers in Northern 
Ireland and the vast majority of these are also fluent in English, it is clear that 
Sinn Fein use the language as ‘a badge of difference’ rather than out of 
practical necessity (McGarry and O’Leary, 1995, p. 222). It is, nevertheless, a 
fundamental way in which the party can demonstrate its cultural links and 
heritage with the community that it seeks to appeal to and represent. Although 
visual symbolism remains limited, the manifesto includes an image of a rally for 
Irish unity in addition to the party logo of the letters ‘SF’ projected on to an 
image of a map of a united Ireland. It is evident from this analysis that Sinn 
Fein’s participation in the Good Friday Agreement and the power sharing 
government established as a result of this has had little impact on the way in 
which it presents its Westminster election campaigns, which remain heavily 
focused on attracting support from, and resonating within, the nationalist 
community. It is, nevertheless, important to note that it does demonstrate a 
continuation of attempts to appeal to the broader nationalist bloc, as opposed to 
simply republicans, which is likely done in the hope of attracting more support 
from those who previously voted for the SDLP. 
 
Due to the aforementioned potential of PR-STV to facilitate a moderation of 
election campaigns, it is thought that Sinn Fein’s 2011 Assembly election 
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manifesto may demonstrate if not a toning down to attract inter-bloc lower 
preference votes, at least an increased appeal for transfers from the wider 
nationalist community. Instead, however, the party’s 2011 manifesto bears a 
significant resemblance to its 2010 publication (Sinn Fein, 2011). A key focus is 
again the need to emphasise how Sinn Fein is using the peace process to aid 
the interests of the nationalist community, by, for example, overcoming direct 
rule from London and supporting the devolution of powers to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly. As it did in 2010, the party’s 2011 manifesto takes the 
approach of claiming that socio-economic issues and Irish unity, or at least 
greater all-Ireland cooperation, are inextricably linked. For example, it pledges 
to ‘develop an all-Ireland economic recovery plan’ and ‘harmonise all-Ireland 
taxation and regulation policies’. The manifesto features a section dedicated to 
achieving Irish unity, entitled ‘There is a better way’, which pledges support for 
representation for MPs from Northern Ireland in the Irish Republic’s Dail and for 
a referendum on Irish unity. A section on the Irish language, culture, arts and 
leisure is also included, in which Sinn Fein promises to uphold the rights of Irish 
speakers and create new Gaeltacht (Irish speaking) areas in Northern Ireland, 
in addition to policies in this field affecting all communities.  
 
One way in which this manifesto differs to the party’s 2010 publication is that it 
is not translated into the Irish language. Given its overall staunchly nationalist 
and republican focus, however, this is unlikely to be an attempt to attract 
support from beyond this electorate. A further way in which it diverges from Sinn 
Fein’s Westminster manifesto is that reference to engagement with the unionist 
community is largely absent. This comes across as somewhat idiosyncratic 
given that the party makes this outreach during a campaign for a non-
preferential Westminster election but not for an Assembly election that allows 
the party to obtain transfers from voters who may give their first and other 
higher preferences to unionist party candidates. This suggests that Sinn Fein 
did not have the intention of attracting unionist transfers in mind when planning 
this campaign. The manifesto’s visual symbolism is, once again, heavily 
nationalist and republican in focus, with images of Irish language and pro-unity 
events abound. This suggests that the use of the PR-STV electoral system is 
not inducing Sinn Fein to moderate its campaigns in attempt to attract inter-bloc 
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transfers, as its manifesto for the 2011 Assembly election demonstrates no 
significant divergence from its Westminster manifesto of the previous year. 
 
It is expected that if PR-STV is having any moderating effect on Sinn Fein’s 
election campaigns in the post-Good Friday Agreement era, this would be most 
evident in the party’s manifestos for elections to the European Parliament. In a 
similar vein to its 2010 and 2011 publications, Sinn Fein’s 2014 manifesto 
continues the approach of intertwining socio-economic issues with calls for Irish 
unity and greater all-Ireland cooperation, demonstrated by, for example, 
supporting ‘maximum all-Ireland cooperation on planning in the spending of 
funds’ and ‘the adoption of an all-Ireland Charter of rights to harmonise 
guarantees’ (Sinn Fein, 2014). It is, nevertheless, very heavily focused on EU 
policy issues, to a greater extent than the party’s manifestos for the Northern 
Ireland Assembly and Westminster Parliament are focused on issues within the 
remits of these respective legislatures. Whilst a section of the 2014 manifesto is 
dedicated to promoting Irish unity, it is focused on how the European Parliament 
can be used as a vehicle through which to raise awareness of, and ultimately 
achieve, this.  
 
The approach of discussing ethno-national issues within the context of the EU is 
also applied to a section entitled ‘Promoting Irish at home and in the EU’ and, 
for example, calls for the temporary derogation of the Irish language in 
European institutions to be lifted to create jobs for Irish speakers. It is again 
surprising that there is no reference to engagement with unionists, as European 
elections, with their low district magnitude, should present the greatest incentive 
of all elections in Northern Ireland for parties to attract support from beyond 
their traditional community. The only reference that this manifesto makes to 
unionism is to allege that unionist parties are pro-economic cuts, asserted in 
statements such as ‘the only disagreement which the unionist parties in the 
North and the Conservative-led government in London have is about who 
should impose the austerity measures – Brussels or London’. This is further 
evidence of Sinn Fein seeking to link bread and butter and ethno-national 
issues.  
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The manifesto’s visual symbolism is often associated with a united Ireland, such 
as a front cover image of party delegates with a placard declaring ‘Your all-
Ireland team. Vote Sinn Fein’, in addition to images emphasising socio-
economic issues, for example a protest against cuts. The document is entirely 
translated into the Irish language. However, as the party publishes a single 
European manifesto for the island, this is likely to be more so due to the need 
for it to be accessible to Gaeltacht communities, particularly on the west coast, 
than any active attempt to identify with a particular target audience in the North. 
Although the manifesto certainly does not make any intended appeal to the 
unionist community in Northern Ireland, calls for Irish unity are less 
foregrounded than in Sinn Fein’s campaigns for other elections. This, however, 
is attributed to the need for the party’s European campaigns to balance issues 
affecting the South of Ireland with those affecting the North, with those 
concerning a united Ireland likely to be less important in the former. It is 
therefore apparent that use of the PR-STV electoral system is not inducing Sinn 
Fein to tone done the nationalist and republic symbolism and rhetoric of its 
campaigns in the hope of attracting inter-bloc transfers, even for elections with a 
low district magnitude where it is thus necessary to achieve a higher vote 
threshold in order to win a seat. 
 
Summary 
It is evident from this analysis that Sinn Fein’s election campaigns have 
undergone few changes in the post-Good Friday Agreement era. There has 
been no significant moderation of the party’s republican image and little change 
in the overall focus of Sinn Fein’s manifestos. This, however, is likely to be a 
result of the party presenting campaigns prior to 1998 that were already heavily 
focused on socio-economic policy issues, albeit often intertwined with ethno-
national concerns over the constitutional position of Northern Ireland. Therefore, 
when compared to the DUP, for example, it has been less of a necessity for 
Sinn Fein to moderate in order to adapt to the post-Good Friday Agreement era. 
Whilst retaining its republican focus, the party has, however, demonstrated a 
willingness to expand its appeal to reach out to members of the broader 
nationalist community during recent campaigns by, for example, referring to 
outreach to unionism to further the peace process. This is evidence of Sinn Fein 
attempting to entrench its status as the largest party representing the nationalist 
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bloc by winning over voters who would previously have been likely to vote for 
the SDLP. This also suggests that Sinn Fein may have become more receptive 
to the need to attract intra-bloc transfers in order to maximise its potential for 
electoral success, despite not making an explicit acknowledgement of this. As 
such, whilst the party is keen to maintain its ‘ethnic tribune’ appeal by 
presenting itself as the stoutest defender of nationalism, it attempts to balance 
this with an appeal to the wider nationalist community, many of whom would 
never have considered voting for Sinn Fein pre-1998 due to its links with the 
IRA, that stresses its full commitment to democratic politics and the peace 
process. 
 
By and large, the focus of Sinn Fein’s campaigns is congruent with the way in 
which the party claims it seeks to present its appeal. A key focus of this is to 
demonstrate the inextricable link between socio-economic issues and the need 
for Irish unity, or at least greater all-Ireland cooperation (personal interview, 13th 
June 2013). The aim of this is to attempt to convince voters that their everyday 
interests would be better served within a united Ireland and, ultimately, that 
partition is detrimental to them. In this respect, Sinn Fein’s campaigns adhere to 
a civic form of nationalism that although unlikely to find significant appeal 
beyond the nationalist community, is geared towards what the party considers 
to be in the interests of all in Northern Ireland. In other areas, however, Sinn 
Fein resorts to symbolism and rhetoric usually associated with ethnic 
nationalism, such as the Irish language, to make its appeals. As it is for the 
DUP, the ‘ethnic tribune’ appeals thesis is useful in explaining why Sinn Fein 
focuses its election campaigns in this way. Whilst the DUP’s transformation may 
be more profound, in assuming this position Sinn Fein has had to accept 
compromise on the continued UK sovereignty of Northern Ireland, meaning that 
one way in which it can persist in projecting power substantively is through 
emphasising its republican credentials in its election campaign literature. 
 
It has been made clear in interviews that the party does not expect to receive a 
significant amount of support from unionists and does not actively campaign for 
this, despite making some non-electoral attempts to reach out to the unionist 
community (personal interviews, 11th June 2013; 13th June 2013). Sinn Fein 
nevertheless believes that it has the potential to win a few votes from unionists 
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due to its representatives’ constituency work and its socio-economic policies 
(personal interviews, 11th June 2013; 13th June 2013). For example, whilst the 
DUP assumes that its conservative stance on issues such as gay marriage may 
have the ability to attract support from Catholics, Sinn Fein believes that its 
liberal position on the same issue may win the party votes from unionists. It is 
therefore clear that parties in Northern Ireland consider their ability to make 
electoral inroads into the opposite bloc to lie in their policies on socio-economic 
issues, rather than any moderation of their nationalist or unionist appeal. 
 
This analysis demonstrates that the Sinn Fein position of inter-party lower order 
preference votes being more significant in the South than the North, as it is an 
established party in the latter and a relatively new political force in the former, is 
reflected in its election campaigns (personal interview, 17th June 2014). Whilst 
its 2011 Assembly manifesto, to an election contested using PR-STV, indicates 
little divergence from its Westminster election campaign of the previous year, 
the party’s 2014 European manifesto, published as a single document for the 
island of Ireland, does demonstrate some moderation. Although it is likely that 
this is at least partly due to Irish unity being a more significant issue north of the 
border, the need to attract inter-party transfers in the South may also be a 
factor. PR-STV, therefore, may be having an impact on how Sinn Fein presents 
its campaigns to the Southern electorate. The party has identified that different 
issues have different levels of salience in Northern Ireland and the Irish 
Republic, which has impacted on the focus of its European election campaigns. 
In the North, the party interprets the most important issue for the electorate to 
be the stability of the peace process and the ability of the Assembly to deliver. 
In the South, however, it is the Eurozone crisis and the EU-IMF bailout that is 
most significant, which reflects the absence of ethno-national divisions in that 
state (personal interview, 8th April 2014). Hence, its European manifesto is a 
balancing act between what the North needs and what the South needs 
(personal interview, 11th June 2013), and its moderation when compared to 
Assembly and Westminster manifestos is attributed to this, rather than any 
active appeal for unionist transfers in Northern Ireland.  
 
As Sinn Fein places such limited emphasis on attracting inter-party transfers in 
the North, which is corroborated by the focus of its Northern election 
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campaigns, it is clear that PR-STV is not inducing the party to moderate with the 
intention of attracting lower preferences from unionists. Although its campaigns 
demonstrate some attempt to broaden its appeal to the wider nationalist 
community, it is clear that this is done primarily with the intention of acquiring 
first preference votes. This is reflected in transfer data from the 2011 Assembly 
election, which indicates that Sinn Fein received the fewest inter-party transfers 
of all the four largest parties in Northern Ireland by a significant margin (Barry 
and Love, 2011). 
 
 
Social Democratic and Labour Party 
 
Pre-GFA 
As aforementioned, whilst the SDLP identifies as a nationalist party and draws 
the majority of its support from this community, it is perhaps the least strident of 
all the four largest parties in Northern Ireland in terms of its single identity 
symbolism and rhetoric. SDLP campaigns, therefore, are traditionally heavily 
policy focused, with limited use of nationalist imagery. Its 1992 manifesto for the 
Westminster Parliament election addresses several key policy areas, such as 
tourism, education and EU policy (SDLP, 1992). Unlike the campaigns of its 
nationalist bloc rivals, Sinn Fein, the SDLP is willing to engage in UK-wide 
issues, such as the National Health Service, whilst the manifesto’s visual 
symbolism is entirely devoid of any Irish nationalist or republican characteristics. 
It is not, however, completely free of indicators that the SDLP seeks to appeal 
primarily to the nationalist community. For example, it calls for ‘support for Irish 
medium education… where parental demand exists’ and asserts that ‘one of 
Ireland’s greatest assets is scenery’. This suggests that whilst the SDLP does 
not wish to portray itself as a party of and for only the nationalist community, it 
recognises that some references to nationalist ethno-symbolic characteristics 
and all-Ireland rhetoric is necessary in order to attract support from this bloc.  
 
This theme is continued in the party’s 1994 manifesto for the European 
Parliament election (SDLP, 1994). Whilst it is heavily focused on EU issues with 
little reference to the constitutional position of Northern Ireland, some inclusions 
clearly identify the SDLP as a nationalist party. For example, it refers to cross-
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border initiatives such as improving the Belfast to Dublin rail line and argues 
that the British government cannot be trusted to defend the interests of Northern 
Ireland in the EU. As was the case with the party’s 1992 manifesto for the 
election to the Westminster Parliament, its European publication is neutral in its 
visual symbolism. The significant similarities of the two manifestos suggest that 
the preferential ranking method used for European elections had a limited 
impact on the way in which the SDLP focused its campaigns in the pre-Good 
Friday Agreement era. 
 
Post-GFA 
If anything, the post-Good Friday Agreement era has heralded SDLP 
campaigns that are more geared towards making explicit appeals to the 
nationalist community than the party’s pre-1998 efforts. This is at least partly a 
result of the SDLP seeking to win back support from voters who have switched 
to Sinn Fein and amongst whom the latter’s comparatively hard line approach 
clearly finds appeal. The SDLP’s 2010 Westminster election manifesto is, 
nevertheless, heavily focused on socio-economic policy issues affecting all in 
Northern Ireland, regardless of their ethno-national identity (SDLP, 2010). 
These include, for example, issues concerning the environment, the economy, 
the elderly and international affairs. A community-wide appeal is also 
demonstrated in the statement that the SDLP ‘will continue to take our seats in 
Westminster and work hard to defend and promote your interests’. Several 
references in the manifesto are made to opposing the actions of the ‘DUP/Sinn 
Fein led Executive’ by, for example, arguing that the two parties ‘actively 
rejected [SDLP] proposals to create jobs and cut the cost of government’. 
 
Elsewhere, however, certain proposals are clearly tailored to appeal to the 
narrower nationalist community, such as ‘restarting the forum for unity and 
establishing a northern panel in the Seanad Eireann’, and several pages are 
dedicated to bringing about a united Ireland. This section proposes policies 
such providing party leaders in Northern Ireland with ‘attendance and speaking 
rights in Dail Eireann on Northern Ireland and cross border issues’. In other 
areas the SDLP’s 2010 manifesto takes the approach of intertwining socio-
economic issues with calls for Irish unity, in much the same vein as Sinn Fein’s 
campaigns. For example, it proposes all-Ireland sustainable jobs and 
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corporation tax. Its visual symbolism, in common with pre-Good Friday 
Agreement publications, is largely neutral and not designed to make a specific 
appeal to a certain community. Whilst English is the predominant language of 
the manifesto, some statements are made in Irish. This evidence demonstrates 
that on the basis of the party’s Westminster election campaigns, the SDLP has 
increased its call to the nationalist community in Northern Ireland, which is 
largely due to it having lost considerable support to its intra-bloc rival, Sinn Fein, 
in the post-1998 era. 
 
It is thought that the SDLP’s 2011 Assembly and local government elections 
manifesto, for elections contested using PR-STV, would demonstrate 
moderation of the single identity symbolism and rhetoric included in the party’s 
2010 publication. Instead, however, it bears significant resemblance to its 
predecessor, albeit with policies more focused at the levels of the Assembly and 
local councils (SDLP, 2011). The manifesto makes significant reference to 
socio-economic issues, with specific policies proposed in areas such as crime, 
healthcare, agriculture and the environment. It also demonstrates a willingness 
to engage in UK-wide issues, with a focus of the manifesto being to encourage 
the electorate to vote in favour of the introduction of AV for elections to the 
Westminster Parliament. A section on achieving a shared future is also 
included, which makes proposals such as addressing ‘the corrosive relations in 
our community’ and ‘the deep segregation in housing’. In a similar vein, it calls 
for cross-community representation in top council positions and ‘safeguards 
against partisan or sectarian decision-making’. This suggests that whilst the 
SDLP designates as a nationalist party, it does have all of Northern Ireland’s 
population in mind when presenting policies on issues such as the ongoing 
peace process. 
 
In other areas, however, the manifesto makes considerable reference to 
nationalist symbolism and rhetoric. As was the case with the SDLP’s 2010 
publication, much of this is intertwined with socio-economic issues. For 
example, it calls for an all-Ireland economic review and healthcare service, in 
addition to an island-wide rate of corporation tax, an all-Ireland sustainable 
transport strategy and the promotion of teaching through the Irish medium in 
Northern Irish schools. Elsewhere, however, nationalist positions are included 
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on largely isolated issues, such as a section dedicated to bringing about Irish 
unity and the promotion of the GAA in Northern Ireland. Statements made in the 
Irish language are also included throughout. As is common with all SDLP 
manifestos, its visual symbolism is largely neutral and does not indicate 
identification with any particular community. This evidence suggests that the 
preferential ranking method of PR-STV is having little impact inducing the SDLP 
to tone down its utilisation of ethno-symbolism in the hope of broadening its 
electoral appeal and attracting transfers from beyond the nationalist bloc. 
 
The European election of 2014 offered the SDLP significant incentive to reach 
out for transfers from across the ethno-national divide in Northern Ireland and 
win a seat in the European Parliament for the first time since losing one in 2004. 
Its manifesto, published as a joint document with local government elections 
held on the same day, continues the party’s usual theme of being heavily 
focused on socio-economic issues facing Northern Ireland (SDLP, 2014). Many 
of these are within the remit of the EU, such as how the institution can assist 
with job creation and placing unemployment within a European context. In other 
areas, however, references are made to national issues affecting Northern 
Ireland, within the context of the UK, for example the party’s opposition to the 
so-called bedroom tax. Furthermore, the manifesto calls for ‘a deep 
accommodation between unionism and nationalism’, and for a shared future 
and identity, although it is clear that this has less to do with a shared Northern 
Irish identity, such as that advocated by the Alliance Party, and is more about 
recognition and understanding of the two ethno-national blocs. Once again, it is 
discussion of policies such as these that demonstrates that the SDLP has all of 
Northern Ireland’s population in mind on certain issues. 
 
Elsewhere, however, the party employs its familiar technique of intertwining 
calls for greater all-Ireland cooperation with socio-economic policies. For 
example, the manifesto pledges to support greater EU investment in the Belfast 
to Dublin rail line ‘between our island’s two major cities’. It also calls for ‘the 
maximisation of North-South cooperation in the whole field of agriculture and 
food processing’ and for cross-border cooperation in health. Nationalist 
symbolism and rhetoric is also to be found in the party’s promotion of the Irish 
language, both in pushing for an Irish Language Act in the Northern Ireland 
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Assembly, and promoting its use in the European Parliament and other EU 
institutions. The manifesto also includes a page translating its main policies into 
Irish, whilst its visual symbolism is largely neutral and does not make an explicit 
appeal to any particular community in Northern Ireland. On the basis of this 
analysis, it is clear that despite PR-STV providing incentives for the SDLP to 
moderate its single identity symbolism in attempt to attract transfers from 
beyond the nationalist bloc, the party has not acted upon this. Instead, its 
Assembly, European and local elections manifestos bear a stark resemblance 
to its Westminster publications, with the latter election contested using first past 
the post and therefore without transfers. 
 
Summary 
Whilst the SDLP’s desire to not define itself as simply a nationalist party has 
continued to influence its election campaigns into the post-Good Friday 
Agreement era (personal interview, 14th June 2013), the loss of its hegemonic 
position within the bloc has impacted upon the way in which the SDLP 
campaigns. This is largely due to the party’s need to win back support from 
nationalist voters who have switched allegiance to Sinn Fein since the signing 
of the Agreement. Whilst the SDLP’s campaigns remain heavily focused on 
socio-economic issues, the party has placed an increased necessity on 
emphasising its nationalist credentials, often by intertwining bread and butter 
policies with ethno-symbolic characteristics, such as calls for greater North-
South cooperation. Furthermore, the SDLP has demonstrated a tendency to 
‘out green’ Sinn Fein on certain issues in recent years, such as campaigning for 
the release from custody of Marian Price, who was later convicted of offences 
relating to paramilitary activity (personal interview, 25th November 2013). This 
also suggests that the SDLP recognises that transfers from Sinn Fein first 
preference voters may be important to its electoral fortunes. It is nevertheless 
evident from this analysis that the SDLP is significantly less strident in its 
espousal of single identity symbolism and rhetoric than Sinn Fein. The way in 
which the SDLP presents its election campaigns is largely congruent with the 
type of voter that the party seeks to appeal to: someone primarily concerned 
with socio-economic issues rather than the constitutional position of Northern 
Ireland, whilst recognising that this voter is most likely to be a member of the 
Catholic/nationalist community (personal interview, 10th September 2013).  
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It is clear that the party is not moderating the nationalism of its campaigns with 
the intention of attracting lower order preference votes in the post-Good Friday 
Agreement era. This is demonstrated not only by the continued inclusion of 
single identity ethno-national characteristics but also by whether the election is 
contested using first past the post or PR-STV making little difference to the 
focus of the party’s campaign. As aforementioned, the SDLP does, however, 
attract the largest percentage of transfers from voters giving their first 
preference votes to a party from the opposite community of all of the four 
largest parties in Northern Ireland, at 16 per cent (Barry and Love, 2011, p. 9). 
Whilst it is important not to overstate the significance of this relatively low figure, 
it does nevertheless demonstrate that the SDLP has the ability to attract inter-
bloc transfers, despite not moderating the nationalism of its campaigns to 
appeal for them. 
 
 
Progressive Unionist Party 
As the only significant loyalist party in Northern Ireland, it is worth briefly 
analysing the way in which the PUP presents its election campaigns. Given the 
party’s links to the UVF, it may come as some surprise that even prior to the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement its campaigns were focused to a 
considerable extent on socio-economic issues. The PUP’s 1997 Westminster 
election manifesto makes significant reference to bread and butter policies in 
areas such as the economy, health, housing and education, and presents these 
in a way that pays scant regard to the constitutional position of Northern Ireland 
(PUP, 1997). That is not to say that the manifesto is entirely devoid of ethno-
symbolic references. Its front cover displays the union flag, whilst the first 
section, entitled ‘The Union’, pledges to ensure that the party is opposed to any 
changes in Northern Ireland’s status as a constituent part of the UK, either 
through the unification of the island of Ireland or by way of any dilution of the 
union. These references, however, do not form the bedrock of the manifesto 
and, rather, it is its positions on socio-economic issues that the PUP 
emphasises. 
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With Northern Ireland’s constitutional future effectively settled by the Good 
Friday Agreement, it is thought that post-Agreement PUP campaigns would be 
almost entirely focused on bread and butter policies. This, however, is not so. 
The party’s 2007 Assembly election manifesto follows the PUP’s pre-Agreement 
theme of foregrounding its perceived need for the maintenance and 
strengthening of Northern Ireland’s position within the UK (PUP, 2007). 
Elsewhere it is very heavily focused on presenting the party’s policies on socio-
economic issues, from human rights to housing. The manifesto does 
demonstrate a degree of outreach to the nationalist community by stating that 
‘We recognise the importance of North/South cooperation to develop our 
economy’. The importance of this should not, however, be overstated, as issues 
such as ‘conflict transformation’ are discussed with the loyalist community firmly 
in mind. 
 
The PUP’s manifesto for the 2011 Assembly and local government elections 
indicates an increased focus on meeting ‘the needs of working class unionism’ 
(PUP, 2011). This manifesto is longer than those for previous elections, which 
allows for greater discussion of socio-economic issues such as the economy, 
business, health and the elderly, with many policy specific proposals included. It 
also, nevertheless, features several sections clearly designed to appeal largely 
exclusively to the unionist community, addressing, for example, the union and 
the armed forces. The visual symbolism of the manifesto is also more unionist 
in focus, with images of the British Army, the Northern Ireland association 
football team and the Ulster Banner. Whilst it includes statements emphasising 
the need for tolerance and respect of all cultures in Northern Ireland, this 
increased unionist outlook indicates that the PUP is certainly not moving 
towards planning its campaigns with the intention of attracting transfer votes 
from the non-unionist electorate. That this claim is more effectively supported 
on the basis of a manifesto for an election contested using PR-STV after 
several years of power sharing is a significant finding which rails against the 
hypothesis of this research. Although the PUP argues that it is a transfer 
friendly party (personal interview, 11th June 2013), it is evident that attracting 
lower order preference votes from beyond the unionist bloc is not one of its 
main aims in the 2010s. This finding is corroborated by figures indicating that 
just two per cent of inter-party transfers received by the PUP at the 2011 
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Assembly election were from voters who gave their first preferences to a 
nationalist party, with 73 per cent of the party’s lower preferences coming from 
unionist party first preference voters (Barry and Love, 2011, p. 9). 
 
 
Alliance Party 
Whilst Alliance is a cross-communal party and is, therefore, unconcerned with 
the single identity symbolism associated with the other five parties explored in 
this chapter, its conclusion is merited for means of comparison. As such, 
Alliance provides an opportunity to demonstrate how non-sectarian parties 
campaign in Northern Ireland, although it is important to recognise the 
limitations it faces working within an ethno-nationally dominated political 
system. Prior to the Good Friday Agreement, Alliance’s campaigns were heavily 
focused on how the party offered an alternative to sectarian politics. In its 1997 
Westminster election manifesto, this is demonstrated by statements such as ‘If 
you vote for ‘not an inch’ politicians you will get ‘not an inch’ politics. If you want 
to change things for the better, then you will have to vote Alliance’ (APNI, 1997). 
Unsurprisingly, given the prominence of the peace process at the time, its 1997 
manifesto foregrounds the need for an agreement to end sectarian violence in 
Northern Ireland, and avoids favouring or blaming one community over the 
other in the ongoing conflict. This is indicated by assertions such as ‘We have 
seen the IRA cynically abandon their cease-fire’ and ‘have seen the loyalist 
cease-fire slip away’. Alliance’s campaigns at this time were, therefore, 
ultimately focused on the equal apportion of blame on each community, with the 
party presenting an image of offering an alternative. Whilst issues surrounding 
the then forthcoming Good Friday Agreement are foregrounded in its 1997 
manifesto, it is not devoid of references to socio-economic issues, with the 
inclusion of detailed sections on areas such as health, the economy and 
energy. 
 
An immediate way in which Alliance’s 2010 Westminster election manifesto 
differs from its pre-1998 publications is in the diminished focus on ending violent 
conflict (APNI, 2010). Instead, this focus has switched to overcoming divisions 
between unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland. It foregrounds that 
Alliance works ‘on behalf of all the citizens in our community, irrespective of 
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religion, class, physical or mental ability, race, gender or sexual orientation’, and 
focuses on the creation of a ‘shared future’. Elsewhere the manifesto is very 
heavily focused on bread and butter issues, with specific policies included in 
areas such as defence, justice and immigration, amongst many others. 
Alliance’s strategy of combining the need for a shared future for all in Northern 
Ireland with policies on socio-economic issues is continued in the party’s 2011 
Assembly and local elections and 2014 European and local elections 
manifestos (APNI, 2011; 2014a; 2014b). Specific pledges of this nature, for 
example achieving ‘20 per cent of children in integrated schools and 40 per cent 
in mixed schools by 2020’ (APNI, 2011) and removing divisive sectarian murals 
(APNI, 2014a; 2014b), are commonplace throughout.  
 
Alliance’s post-1998 campaigns also demonstrate the party’s perceived need to 
refer to issues relating to Northern Ireland’s current constitutional position within 
the UK but also recognise nationalist aspirations of a united Ireland, or at least 
greater North-South cooperation. For example, the party’s 2011 Assembly and 
local elections manifesto stresses the need for a greater UK-wide regional 
policy whilst also calling for corporation tax in Northern Ireland to be set at a 
level comparable to that in the Irish Republic (APNI, 2011). Aside from each 
manifesto addressing issues specific to the legislature for which the respective 
election is to, there is little difference in the way in which Alliance campaigns for 
Assembly, Westminster, European and local elections in the post-Good Friday 
Agreement era. Whilst this study’s research question cannot be applied to a 
cross-communal party and it is included purely for comparative reasons, this 
demonstrates that the use of different voting systems has little or no impact on 
the party’s campaign strategy. 
 
It has been demonstrated in this analysis that Alliance’s campaigns have moved 
from foregrounding the need to end conflict to focus on bringing together all 
communities in Northern Ireland. The party recognises that its greatest potential 
lies in appealing to middle class voters who may be more accommodating to 
greater cross-communal interaction and cooperation (personal interview, 4th 
November 2013). It is, therefore, unlikely that Alliance would receive any 
significant electoral support from voters strongly identifying as unionist or 
nationalist. As ethno-nationally based parties attracted more than 85 per cent of 
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first preference votes cast at the 2011 Assembly election (Whyte, 2011), this 
creates a difficulty for Alliance in terms of receiving transfers, as most voters do 
not transcend blocs, as previously shown. Whilst the party is keen to present a 
transfer friendly image, its ability to attract them is limited, with only half of its 
intra-party transfers at this election being from those who gave their first 
preference votes to unionist or nationalist candidates (Barry and Love, 2011, p. 
9). Although on the surface Alliance’s manifestos are arguably the most ‘catch 
all’ of the six parties analysed, they are more accurately described as ‘catch 
few’ as most voters stay within either the unionist or nationalist bloc. This 
demonstrates the significant difficulty faced in running a cross-communal 
election campaign in Northern Ireland. Whilst electoral literature is devoid of any 
ethno-symbolism, therefore offering the greatest potential to attract transfers, it 
has only a narrow appeal as many voters find few sources of identification. 
 
 
Summary 
Through the analysis of political party manifestos, this chapter has 
demonstrated that election campaigns in Northern Ireland are today, on the 
whole, less strident than they were prior to the signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement in 1998. This is particularly true for the DUP, whose campaigns 
indicate some moderation, but also Sinn Fein, as although its pre-1998 
manifestos were arguably not as strident as the DUP’s, the party has 
recognised the electoral gains to be made by widening its appeal from the 
narrow republican to the broader nationalist community. This moderation can be 
attributed largely to the cessation of violent conflict in Northern Ireland 
facilitating a more peaceful political arena, which unionists and nationalists are 
willing to share power and cooperate within. Participation in government has 
encouraged parties to place greater emphasis on socio-economic issues 
affecting everyday life and has induced some limited moderation of symbolism 
and rhetoric concerning the constitutional position of Northern Ireland in their 
election campaign literature. This is an example of the malleability of collective 
identities over time and their responsiveness to changing circumstances 
(Smithey, 2011, ch. 2). This moderation also suggests that whilst parties such 
as the DUP and Sinn Fein are primarily concerned with the acquisition of first 
preference votes, they may have nevertheless become more receptive to the 
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need to attract intra-bloc transfers in the post-Good Friday Agreement era, 
despite manifestos for elections contested using PR-STV demonstrating little 
deviation from those to the Westminster Parliament. 
 
It is, however, important not to overstate the extent of this moderation. As this 
manifesto analysis has demonstrated, the election time utilisation of the ethno-
symbolic characteristics of the communal bloc they claim to represent is, to 
varying degrees, a strategy employed by all ethno-nationally based parties in 
Northern Ireland. For the DUP and Sinn Fein, and perhaps to a lesser extent 
the UUP and the PUP, this is a very important aspect of their campaigns and is 
clearly designed to mobilise voters from their own communities. Whilst the 
SDLP claims to have the ability to appeal across the two blocs and its 
manifestos are arguably the least strident in terms of single identity symbolism 
of all of the parties included in this study (with the obvious exception of the 
Alliance Party), its campaigns have, if anything, made greater use of nationalist 
symbolism and rhetoric in recent years in attempt to win back voters who have 
defected to Sinn Fein. The inclusion of Alliance in this study has served two 
important roles. Firstly, it has provided an indication of how election campaigns 
could be fought if parties were to focus almost exclusively on socio-economic 
issues whilst continuing to recognise the existence of two ethno-national 
communities in Northern Ireland. Secondly, it has highlighted the difficulties 
faced by cross-communal parties operating in a largely ethnically-based party 
political system. 
 
The important role that single identity symbolism continues to play in election 
campaigns in Northern Ireland suggests that parties perceive there to be very 
little practical significance to the claim of McGarry and O’Leary (2006b, p. 274) 
that ‘PR-STV provides an opportunity, though no guarantee, of both inter-
communal and trans-communal transfer of lower-preference votes’. The 
conclusion that parties are not planning their election campaigns with the 
intention of attracting inter-bloc lower order preference votes is supported firstly 
by aforementioned information obtained from interviews and transfer data 
included in both this chapter and in Chapter Five. It is secondly corroborated by 
the levels of unionist and nationalist symbolism employed by parties being 
comparable regardless of whether an election is contested using PR-STV or 
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first past the post. This is particularly significant in the context of European 
elections, as even campaigns for these, with the lowest district magnitude of all 
elections contested using PR-STV in Northern Ireland, do not demonstrate the 
foregrounding of socio-economic issues by many parties. This chapter has 
considered the role of the ‘ethnic tribune’ appeals thesis in the continued 
utilisation of ethno-symbolism in election campaigns by the DUP and Sinn Fein, 
through compromise facilitated by consociationalism and ‘complex’ aspects of 
the Good Friday Agreement, such as British-Irish interdependence, resulting in 
the persistence of this means of projecting substantive power. 
 
The following chapter will explore factors influencing the continued utilisation of 
ethno-symbolic characteristics by political parties, and how this can be 
explained by the extent of ethno-national divisions between the two 
communities in Northern Ireland. 
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Chapter Seven – Towards conflict transformation? 
 
 
This research has demonstrated, through an analysis of political party 
manifestos and interview data, that despite PR-STV offering incentives for 
parties to make almost exclusively socio-economic appeals, election campaigns 
remain largely focused on attracting support from the ethno-national community 
the respective party is affiliated with. This chapter explains why this is the case. 
It argues that there is little or no benefit in parties making more inclusive 
electoral appeals, as most voters are drawn to those who they consider to most 
effectively represent the interests of their own bloc and do not, on the whole, 
base their vote on socio-economic issues. This is ultimately the result of 
Northern Ireland remaining deeply divided into the post-Good Friday Agreement 
era due to the continued salience of the ethno-symbolic principles of unionism 
and nationalism. Despite the effectiveness of consociational power sharing as a 
means of managing violent conflict, it has been less successful in facilitating 
conflict transformation away from the significance of the two distinct ethno-
national communities, although proponents of the theory make no guarantee 
that any mitigation towards a shared identity can be achieved (McGarry and 
O’Leary, 2009a, p. 83). The chapter concludes with a comparative analysis of 
two other cases of where consociationalism has been employed in a divided 
society – Brussels and Malaysia. Evidence from these corroborate conclusions 
from Northern Ireland and allow for their cautious application to divided 
societies in general. 
 
 
Political party electoral strategy 
It has been claimed that the need for political parties in ethnically divided 
societies to target their election campaigns specifically to their own community 
is the result of ‘ethnic outbidding’, in which parties adopt increasingly hard line 
positions to avoid outflanking by intra-bloc rivals, which serves to escalate 
polarisation (Mitchell et al, 2009, p. 400. See also Horowitz, 1985, pp. 349-60; 
Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972). This argument, however, is flawed as this 
research has demonstrated that party positions and campaigns have, on the 
whole, become less strident in the post-Good Friday Agreement era, whilst still 
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maintaining their ethno-national focus. This phenomenon is more convincingly 
explained by the ‘ethnic tribune appeals’ thesis, which argues that voters opt for 
the party they perceive to be the strongest defender of their community as they 
recognise that positions will become watered down during the process of 
multiparty inter-ethnic bargaining (Kedar, 2005, p. 185). This, nevertheless, 
suggests that whilst voters may not hold the hard line views of the parties they 
are voting for, they still want ethno-nationally based parties to represent them 
and therefore engage in ethnic voting.  
 
Whilst this thesis disagrees with the ‘ethnic outbidding’ argument that parties in 
divided societies adopt increasingly extreme positions, it nevertheless 
recognises that this can occur when parties feel the threat of outflanking by a 
more hard line intra-bloc rival. Due to the fractured nature of unionism, this 
phenomenon is particularly acute within this bloc, an example of which can be 
found in the DUP’s aforementioned decision to run an especially hard line 
campaign when it feared being outflanked by the TUV at the 2009 and 2014 
European elections. It is clear that this is a realistic concern of parties, as 
community activists concede that it is very likely that they will lose support from 
more uncompromising members of their respective community if they tone 
down their campaigns (personal interview, 14th May 2014). It is thus in the 
interests of parties to run highly charged, exclusive and largely sectarian 
campaigns in order to maximise their electoral potential.  
 
This approach is reflected in the geographical areas that parties canvass. It is 
firstly important to stress that parties operating in Northern Ireland have 
significantly less resources than those in, for example, the rest of the UK and 
there is, therefore, a greater need for them to target their campaigns with a view 
to maximising their potential for electoral success. However, whilst ethno-
nationally based parties do cover some mixed areas, which are most likely to be 
middle class, they almost exclusively only canvass areas with a majority of 
voters from the community they are affiliated with. Unsurprisingly, this strategy 
is perhaps most acute amongst the traditionally more hard line DUP and Sinn 
Fein. The DUP is a party that focuses its appeal on the basis that elections in 
Northern Ireland are yet to move away from the traditional unionism versus 
nationalism split (personal interview, 12th June 2013). Therefore, whilst the party 
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canvasses mixed areas, even those with a slight nationalist majority, it does not 
do so in staunchly republican areas such as the Falls in Belfast and the 
Creggan in Derry, as it is ‘common sense’ that there would be ‘no point’ due to 
the party having little appeal in these areas (personal interview, 27th November 
2013).  
 
This approach has been justified by comparing campaign techniques in 
Northern Ireland to those in the rest of the UK, with the argument put forward 
that the Conservative Party would not canvass former mining communities 
(personal interview, 27th November 2013). Whilst this may or may not be the 
case, for the Labour Party there are no ‘no-go’ areas and whilst greater 
resources are likely to be concentrated in working class areas, the party does 
indeed canvass more middle class, traditionally Conservative neighbourhoods. 
Although much of the DUP’s campaign strategy is based on the need to 
effectively deploy resources, as the party believes that there are few votes to be 
obtained from majority nationalist areas (personal interview, 25th November 
2013), its approach is also the result of concerns for personal safety and 
historical factors, as the party does not have a tradition of receiving votes – for 
elections contested using PR-STV, either first preferences or transfers – from 
the nationalist community (personal interview, 12th May 2014). Whilst it is 
important not to wholly conflate Catholics and nationalists/republicans, it is 
interesting that the DUP has demonstrated an explicit interest in attracting more 
support from the Catholic community (personal interview, 11th September 
2013), yet does not canvass majority nationalist areas. This is further evidence 
that the DUP, by and large, has only unionists and loyalists in mind when 
planning its election campaigns.  
 
Sinn Fein’s approach bears many similarities in that it tends to only canvass 
predominantly nationalist/republican areas. Firstly, the party recognises that it 
garners little trust from the unionist community, which has not been helped by 
issues such as it supporting the restricted flying of the union flag on Belfast City 
Hall, and it is highly unlikely that this will translate into any significant electoral 
support from unionists (personal interview, 12th June 2013). Whilst Sinn Fein 
claims that its elected representatives do indeed carry out work for unionists, it 
nevertheless believes that even this is at present unlikely to achieve anything 
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more than a handful of votes from this community (personal interviews, 26th 
November 2013; 17th June 2014). The party, therefore, considers canvassing 
loyalist areas such as the Shankill in Belfast to be a ‘pointless’ exercise that 
may jeopardise the personal safety of its members, though it does express an 
interest in making inroads into the loyalist Blacks Road area of west Belfast in 
the future (personal interview, 26th November 2013). In addition to concerns for 
the safety of party members, Sinn Fein also highlights its duty to ensure the 
safety of voters residing in mixed areas who may be threatened if they are seen 
to be engaging with a party representative, even if the voter in question is a 
Sinn Fein supporter (personal interview, 8th April 2014). This indicates that 
whilst Sinn Fein may demonstrate a willingness to canvass beyond its 
traditional nationalist/republican constituency, current conditions in Northern 
Ireland mean that this is largely not possible. 
 
The situation with smaller parties is a little different in that there is a greater 
willingness from the parties themselves to canvass areas beyond their 
traditional unionist or nationalist support base. Whilst the UUP focuses the vast 
majority of its resources on unionist areas, its candidates do canvass some 
republican communities, such as the Short Strand in east Belfast, where a party 
candidate hoped to attract around forty votes at the 2014 local elections 
(personal interview, 14th May 2014). Although the support the UUP receives 
from this area is very limited, it is worth mentioning as an example of an ethno-
nationally based party campaigning in an area mostly populated by the opposite 
community. A desire to canvass areas where the opposite community make up 
the majority of voters is also prevalent within the SDLP, although the party 
recognises that it is rarely able to do so (personal interview, 25th November 
2013). An activist recalls a rare occasion when she canvassed a loyalist estate 
in south Belfast and was chased out, with one member of the campaign group 
being assaulted, and the party attracted just 18 votes out of around 1,100 
registered voters in the area (personal interview, 25th November 2013). This 
further demonstrates how both concerns of personal safety and the need to 
effectively deploy resources play a significant role in election campaigns in 
Northern Ireland. The SDLP does nevertheless canvass mixed areas, even 
those with a composition weighted 60 per cent to 40 per cent in favour of 
unionists (personal interview, 25th November 2013). 
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When participating in an exercise with the SDLP group at Queen’s University 
Belfast for the 2014 European and local elections, I was instructed not to send 
campaign leaflets to areas that were known to be largely unionist and was 
instead asked to look for Irish names on an address list (participant observation, 
13th May 2014). Whilst it is probable that the SDLP would like to send a leaflet 
to every voter in Northern Ireland, this is an example of a party attempting to 
maximise its electoral success by targeting its resources on the community it is 
traditionally affiliated with. It is interesting to compare the canvassing strategies 
of ethno-nationally based parties with those of the cross-communal Alliance 
Party. Whilst the party will canvass areas that are traditionally considered to be 
either loyalist or republican, it recognises that it has the greatest electoral 
potential in middle class areas of suburban Belfast, that are often shared 
between unionists, nationalists and ethnic minorities, and Alliance, therefore, 
concentrates much of its resource pool there (personal interviews, 4th 
November 2013; 25th November 2013; 2nd December 2014). It would thus 
appear that whilst personal safety is less of an issue for Alliance than it is for 
ethno-nationally based parties, there is a certain constituency that the party is 
most likely to focus its campaign activities on. 
 
To summarise, this interview data has demonstrated that parties in Northern 
Ireland perceive there to be little electoral benefit in canvassing areas 
comprised primarily of voters outside of the ethno-national bloc they are 
affiliated with. Whilst most parties claim this to be a cost/benefit issue in that it 
requires too great an effort for too few votes, there are also significant personal 
safety and historical context dimensions to this. Traditionally more moderate 
parties, such as the UUP and the SDLP, nevertheless indicate a willingness to 
canvass mixed areas, however as these are most likely to be middle class, it is 
improbable that their members face any significant safety threat in doing so. 
This suggests the presence of an often overlooked cleavage between working 
class and middle class communities in Northern Ireland, which manifests itself 
in electoral politics and has some impact on the way in which parties campaign.  
 
The DUP, for example, tailors its canvass techniques to each community. In 
working class areas it emphasises its ‘pro-British, anti-Irish nationalist rhetoric’, 
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whilst in middle class areas the focus is on more on bread and butter issues, as 
it is argued that those in the latter are more likely to be sure of their British 
unionist identity and the former less so due to the probability of this being 
challenged by republicans in interface areas (personal interview, 27th November 
2013). Sinn Fein also acknowledges that some voters are more interested in 
socio-economic issues, whilst others are more concerned with what the party is 
doing to achieve a united Ireland, and this impacts upon how it canvasses 
(personal interview, 26th November 2013). The argument has also been made 
that ethno-symbolism, such as flags, are not needed in order for candidates to 
be elected in largely middle class, single community constituencies such as 
North Down (personal interview, 10th July 2013). Whilst the middle 
class/working class cleavage does in some cases defy divisions between 
unionists and nationalists, demonstrated by, for example, mixed residential 
areas in some middle class communities, its existence does not indicate a 
mitigation of the importance of ethno-national identities due to 
consociationalism as this cleavage predates the Good Friday Agreement and is 
in any case far less significant than the unionist/nationalist divide in Northern 
Ireland. 
 
It is clear that voters are, on the whole, drawn to parties that base their election 
campaigns around largely exclusive ‘ethnic tribune’ appeals, as they want the 
stoutest defender of their community to represent them in government, which 
has been demonstrated in previously mentioned election results data. It is, 
therefore, in the interests of parties to continue making highly charged, 
sectarian appeals, instead of focusing their campaigns solely on socio-
economic issues, as divisions between unionists and nationalists remain more 
significant than the working class/middle class cleavage in Northern Ireland. 
Although this thesis disagrees with the arguments of scholars such as Aughey 
(2005, quoted in Taylor, 2009b, p. 321) and Taylor (2009b, pp. 320-21) that the 
provisions of the Good Friday Agreement have aided the electoral fortunes of 
the political extremes in Northern Ireland, it nevertheless recognises that the 
Agreement has not yet brought about any significant shift away from 
predominantly unionist versus nationalist elections. This is corroborated by the 
election results analysis of Chapter Five demonstrating that very few inter-bloc 
transfers are being cast, which is an interesting finding as PR-STV undoubtedly 
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has some potential to transform elections beyond a sectarian headcount. Whilst 
it is important to acknowledge that the Agreement made no guarantee that this 
would happen, it has been argued that its consociational character may help to 
overcome the two ethno-national blocs in Northern Ireland (McGarry and 
O’Leary, 2009a, p. 83). The comparatively low levels of support for cross-
communal parties also corroborates this finding, as at the 2011 Assembly 
election Alliance Party candidates received 7.7 per cent of first preference 
votes, whilst over 85 per cent of first preferences were cast for candidates of 
unionist or nationalist parties (Whyte, 2011). Consideration will now be given to 
factors explaining why ethno-national identities remain so salient in Northern 
Ireland. 
 
 
The continuation of divisions in Northern Ireland 
It is firstly important to mention that since the implementation of the Good Friday 
Agreement there have been some, albeit small, efforts to bridge divisions 
between unionists and nationalists in grassroots society. Nolan (2014, p. 14) 
argues that there is greater evidence of reconciliation at this level than at the 
higher levels of society. The opening of an Irish language centre on the 
predominantly working class loyalist Newtownards Road and collaboration 
between the women of Falls Culturlann and the Shankill Women’s Centre are 
cited as examples to support the argument that grassroots reconciliation is 
taking place in Belfast. Whilst moves such as these are occurring, it is important 
not to overestimate their extent. Northern Ireland remains a deeply divided 
society. Although sectarian incidents in interface areas – where one community 
meets the other – have been much commented on, they are by no means 
restricted to these areas and segregation is the norm for many, particularly in 
housing and education (Farry, 2009, p. 172). Some working class residential 
areas in cities such as Belfast and Derry remain divided by ‘peace walls’ 
designed to keep the two communities apart and prevent violence, with reports 
that eleven new walls have been erected since the paramilitary ceasefires of 
1994 (Jarman, 2006, p. 5, quoted in Wilson, 2009, p. 222). Whilst it is not the 
intention of this thesis to claim that polarisation has increased since the Good 
Friday Agreement, this is nevertheless an important finding, although it is likely 
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to be more a result of an increase in low level crime due to paramilitary 
organisations losing their foothold in some areas than an increase in divisions.  
 
Housing in Northern Ireland remains significantly segregated, with the 2011 
census indicating that 37 per cent of local government wards are ‘single identity’ 
(comprised of more than 80 per cent of residents from one religious 
background) (Nolan, 2014, p. 115). Whilst this represents a decline from 55 per 
cent in 2001, it is probable that this is more so due to Catholics being required 
to take housing in predominantly unionist areas as a result of changes in the 
Protestant/Catholic population ratio and the impact of immigration than any 
conscious attempt at community integration (Nolan, 2014, p. 115). Despite this 
decline, between 2010 and 2013 the percentage of the population preferring to 
reside in a neighbourhood comprised only of people of their own religion 
increased from 12 to 20 per cent (NILT, nd), which supports this assumption, 
although more research would need to be conducted in order to test its 
accuracy. Segregation is not limited to housing and is also prevalent in areas 
such as education, with 93.5 per cent of children of school age attending non-
integrated schools (Nolan, 2014, p. 120). This evidence suggests that within 
grassroots society Northern Ireland remains segregated in the post-Good Friday 
Agreement era and divisions between unionists and nationalists retain their 
salience at this level. 
 
There is a perception, particularly in working class areas, that the Good Friday 
Agreement has brought very little beyond a significantly reduced threat of 
bombings (personal interview, 4th December 2014). This belief is especially 
acute amongst loyalists, many of whom feel that they have got a raw deal from 
the Agreement and have ceded too much ground to nationalists (personal 
interview, 4th December 2014). The aforementioned flag protests of 2012-13 
demonstrate this sentiment, as whilst they were organised in opposition to 
limiting the number of days on which the union flag is flown on Belfast City Hall, 
the protests were ultimately the result of loyalists perceiving their culture to be 
threatened. It is widely believed that a lack of emphasis on education and an 
inability to find work are the main contributors to why some loyalists consider it 
necessary to ‘cling to a flag’ and engage in this behaviour, as they consider it to 
provide them with a purpose (personal interview, 4th December 2014). This 
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phenomenon is compounded by the perception amongst many that 
nationalists/republicans have superseded unionists/loyalists as the more 
successful ethno-national bloc, particularly in terms of education and 
employment, with members of the former often being higher academic 
achievers, which translates into enhanced career prospects (personal interview, 
4th December 2014). The protests have, unsurprisingly, had a detrimental 
impact on inter-communal relations at grassroots level, with the effect of 
establishing no-go areas more associated with the pre-Good Friday Agreement 
era (personal interview, 2nd December 2014). Prior to the protests, 
representatives of the republican community would go into the loyalist Sandy 
Row area of south Belfast to meet with their counterparts, however this activity 
has now ceased due to concerns over personal safety (personal interview, 26th 
November 2013).  
 
Whilst violent bombing campaigns have largely ceased, loyalist paramilitaries, 
although perhaps not as strong as they once were, continue to operate in many 
working class areas and undertake illegal activities such as extracting protection 
money from local businesses, dealing drugs and carrying out punishment 
beatings (personal interview, 4th December 2014). Although some loyalist 
community leaders encourage local residents to engage with the PSNI, many 
remain reluctant to do so as they perceive the police to be ineffectual and 
powerless (personal interview, 26th November 2013), with some going as far to 
claim that the PSNI do not represent loyalists and notices in some shops in the 
Shankill area of west Belfast stating that they do not serve police officers 
(personal interview, 27th November 2013). Many in the loyalist community are 
instead inclined to turn to paramilitary organisations as they believe that they 
can provide the summary justice they seek (personal interview, 26th November 
2013), which demonstrates some appetite for the continued operation of these 
organisations. Whilst this focuses on the working class level of society, it is a 
significant demonstrator of unionist/loyalist opinion of the Good Friday 
Agreement, their perception of the nationalist/republican community and of 
post-Agreement institutions in Northern Ireland. The evidence here suggests 
that very little has changed in these communities in the post-Agreement era. 
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There is a general consensus that the nationalist community has benefitted 
more from the Good Friday Agreement than unionists, with a 2005 
questionnaire indicating that 49 per cent of respondents considered this to be 
so, whilst only five per cent believed the opposite to be true (NILT, 2005). Whilst 
this may indeed be the case and is unsurprising given the aforementioned 
unionist dominance of Northern Ireland until at least the suspension of Stormont 
in 1972, the nationalist bloc nevertheless faces many of the difficulties 
experienced by unionists, particularly in working class areas. There is a 
widespread perception in, for example, Ballymurphy in west Belfast that the 
Good Friday Agreement has brought very little change: levels of deprivation 
remain high and the community is still without essential services such as a café, 
a free cashpoint or an evening bus service (personal interview, 12th June 2013). 
As is common in many loyalist communities, there is also an unwillingness to 
engage with the PSNI as it is seen as ineffectual, and this sentiment is perhaps 
even more acute in nationalist areas due to the force being perceived by many 
to have made little transition from the unionist dominated RUC (personal 
interview, 12th June 2013). Whilst it is now official Sinn Fein policy to engage in 
policing, some of the party’s local councillors do not believe that they are in a 
position to advise residents to do this as they do not consider the PSNI to be 
effectively tackling crime (personal interview, 12th June 2013). 
 
There is, therefore, a belief that the community was safer prior to the Good 
Friday Agreement, as paramilitary organisations such as the IRA and the INLA 
were more efficient in dealing with criminal activity (personal interview, 12th 
June 2013). Whilst the operations of dissident republicans are limited, their 
presence and potential recruitment power nevertheless poses a threat in 
republican communities. This demonstrates that although nationalists are 
considered by many to have benefitted from the Good Friday Agreement more 
than unionists, they do nevertheless face many similar difficulties, which are 
especially acute in working class areas. The experiences and opinions of both 
unionists and nationalists included is evidence of the Agreement having had 
little impact at the grassroots society level, not least in overcoming the salience 
of the two identities, as Northern Ireland remains a deeply divided place. 
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In interviews undertaken for this research, most participants were asked the 
broad and unspecific question ‘What do you think the situation in Northern 
Ireland will be like in 25 years’ time?’. The responses demonstrate how 
important the constitutional position of the region still is, as almost all 
interviewees referred to it in some context. Despite the Good Friday Agreement 
clearly setting out how the constitutional future of Northern Ireland will be 
determined, it remains a highly divisive issue. For unionists there is no question 
that Northern Ireland will still be part of the UK in 25 years’ time, despite 
aforementioned demographic shifts indicating that nationalists may have 
surpassed unionists as the largest bloc by this time and the Agreement 
requiring only a 50 per cent plus one ‘Yes’ vote in referendums in the North and 
South of Ireland to bring about a united Ireland (personal interviews, 12th June 
2013; 13th June 2013). On the other hand, Sinn Fein representatives believe 
that in 25 years’ time the island of Ireland will either be reunified or well on its 
way to being so (personal interviews, 12th June 2013; 13th June 2013; 26th 
November 2013).  
 
Representatives of other parties, such as the SDLP and Alliance, are, however, 
less concerned with the constitutional position of Northern Ireland in their 
responses and instead draw greater attention to the importance of reconciliation 
between unionists and nationalists, regardless of whether that is in the UK or in 
a united Ireland (personal interviews, 14th June 2013; 25th November 2013). 
Moving away from representatives of political parties, interviewees active in 
local communities hope that ethno-national divisions will be less salient in 25 
years’ time but are, on the whole, cynical about the prospects of this being 
realised (personal interviews, 27th November 2013; 2nd December 2014; 4th 
December 2014). The responses to this question are a useful indicator of the 
current state of divisions in Northern Ireland and the importance of its 
constitutional position. That so many chose to focus on this demonstrates that 
there is very little vision for the region beyond whether it will remain part of the 
UK or whether a united Ireland will be realised. This is further evidence of the 
continued salience of ethno-national identity in Northern Ireland, which is so far 
showing few signs of abating. 
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Having already explained that parties continue to base their election campaigns 
around making appeals to the ethno-national bloc they are affiliated with 
because voters are still drawn to these parties to represent them, this chapter 
has considered why this is the case. Ultimately it is due to divisions between 
unionists and nationalists remaining strong well into the post-Good Friday 
Agreement era. A number of factors are behind this and have already been 
explored, however most are tied to the identities proving to be largely 
impossible to surmount. On the whole, this is a result of the competing 
collective identities and historical memories of unionists and nationalists, which 
are explored in depth in Chapter One. It is clear from this analysis that both 
continue to feel in opposition to one another, whilst historical events such as the 
plantation of Ulster, the Battle of the Boyne, the Easter Rising, the partition of 
the island of Ireland and the legacy of the ‘Troubles’ remain very much in the 
minds of the people. It is this divisive and insurmountable collective identity and 
historical memory that is the driving force behind the continued salience of 
ethno-national identities in Northern Ireland and which explains why they are 
not showing any meaningful signs of diminishing. 
 
 
What does this tell us about consociationalism? 
As has been reiterated throughout this thesis, the Good Friday Agreement has 
been very successful in achieving what it was designed to achieve. In the 
seventeen years since its implementation, the paramilitary ceasefires have 
been maintained, despite the continuation of comparatively low level activity by 
some groups, and there has been a significant reduction in violent conflict 
(McGarry and O’Leary, 2009b, pp. 369-70). Notwithstanding several 
suspensions of the Northern Ireland Assembly whilst it was in its infancy, the 
Agreement has also been very effective in establishing and maintaining power 
sharing and the elite level cooperation between unionists and nationalists that is 
necessary for this, much of which would have been unprecedented prior to the 
Agreement. The significance of this cross-communal interaction has been 
discussed in greater depth in Chapter Two. Consociationalists such as McGarry 
and O’Leary (2009a, p. 83) are also accurate in their assertion that only an 
accommodative approach to conflict management, which recognised the 
significance of the unionist and nationalist communities in Northern Ireland, had 
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any possibility of success. However, although this thesis disputes the claims of 
some critics of consociationalism that it has brought about an increase in 
incidents of violence (Wilson, 2009, p. 229), it does nevertheless agree with 
Taylor (2009b, p. 312) that the Good Friday Agreement has not overcome what 
he calls ‘sectarian dualism’ between the two main ethno-national blocs in 
Northern Ireland, and considers it to be highly unlikely to do so in the 
foreseeable future. 
 
It is first important to emphasise that this is not a failure of consociationalism, as 
it was not designed with transcending ethno-national blocs as its main purpose. 
However, McGarry and O’Leary (2009a, p. 83) argue that because 
consociational power sharing facilitates cooperation between unionist and 
nationalist political actors at the elite level, it is thought that this may, over time, 
trickle down and contribute to reducing the salience of ethno-national identities 
within wider society, although they provide no guarantee that this will occur. 
This thesis considers this prognosis to be too optimistic. It also disagrees with 
Nolan’s (2014, p. 14) argument that there is greater evidence of reconciliation at 
grassroots level than at the higher levels of society. Many in local communities 
are very sceptical of the elite level cooperation and interaction that has become 
commonplace today, and instead view it only as a necessity in order to ensure 
the continued maintenance of power sharing and to present Northern Ireland in 
a positive light internationally (personal interviews, 27th November 2013; 14th 
May 2014).  
 
This alone does not necessarily indicate that local people consider interacting 
with the opposite community to be a negative activity, only that they are cynical 
when political leaders engage in it. However, many who are active in local 
communities report that there is very little or no willingness, particularly in 
working class areas, to engage in inter-communal interaction (personal 
interviews, 26th November 2013; 27th November 2013; 4th December 2014). 
Whilst there is recognition that this willingness may be greater within, for 
example, universities (personal interview, 27th November 2013), its absence in 
working class communities is ultimately due to an inherent fear of ‘the other’ 
that has often been ingrained in people’s minds from a young age (personal 
interview, 4th December 2014). This is evidence to suggest that although 
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unionists and nationalists are willing to cooperate and interact at the political 
elite level, this is showing few signs of trickling down to grassroots society as 
McGarry and O’Leary predict may happen. 
 
The Good Friday Agreement has clearly had much greater success in 
facilitating cooperation and engagement between the two communities in 
Northern Ireland amongst elite actors than it has within wider society. Whilst this 
phenomenon is not a failure of consociationalism, it does raise the question of 
whether the Agreement has provided a transformative solution to the conflict, as 
is argued by scholars such as McGarry and O’Leary (2009a), or whether it is 
simply frozen it in time, as suggested by, for example, Taylor (2009b, p. 320). 
This thesis errs towards the latter, as it ultimately argues that no method of 
conflict management would have the ability to transform Northern Ireland’s 
ethno-national divisions away from conflict and towards a genuinely shared, 
Northern Irish national identity in which being a unionist or nationalist no longer 
has any significance. The consociational arrangements implemented by the 
Good Friday Agreement, despite their imperfections, are nevertheless the most 
effective means of managing conflict, as the two distinct ethno-national blocs 
are too salient to be overcome in the foreseeable future. McGarry’s and 
O’Leary’s prognosis that consociationalism may have the potential to achieve 
this is simply too optimistic, as there have been few signs of this occurring thus 
far. It could of course be argued that an insufficient amount of time has elapsed 
since the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement to effectively determine 
whether unionist and nationalist ethno-national identities will become all but 
irrelevant in the future. It is expected, however, that much greater progress 
would have been made in seventeen years if the salience of the two distinct 
blocs is indeed likely to be overcome. 
 
This conclusion indicates the presence of a dissonance between elite level, high 
politics and grassroots, low politics in Northern Ireland. At the level of the 
former, unionist and nationalist political actors cooperate and engage on a daily 
basis. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, this activity is not restricted to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly, as it also involves engagement in each other’s 
culture and heritage at, for example, ceremonial and sporting events. Within 
wider society, however, the situation is altogether different. Through the 
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analysis of interview data and secondary sources, this chapter has shown that 
there is very little engagement and cooperation between unionists and 
nationalists at local community level, nor any significant willingness for this to 
take place. Some communities remain divided by ‘peace walls’, with residents 
using different services and children attending different schools than their 
unionist or nationalist counterparts. Political parties are still unable to canvass 
some areas that are predominantly populated by members of the opposite 
community to that which the party is affiliated with, often out of concern for 
personal safety. It is for these reasons that Northern Ireland continues to have 
an ethno-nationally based political system and why parties continue to base 
their campaigns around ethno-national and constitutional issues, whilst making 
largely exclusive appeals to one community. This is a necessity as voters are, 
on the whole, drawn to the party that they believe will most effectively represent 
the interests of their ethno-national community in a multi-party, multi-ethnic 
coalition. Whilst the consociational Good Friday Agreement has provided 
exemplary management of violent conflict in Northern Ireland, it has not brought 
about conflict transformation of traditional identities, which this thesis has 
demonstrated through an analysis of how parties present their election 
campaigns. 
 
 
Comparative analysis 
Whilst it has been shown that the Good Friday Agreement has not brought 
about any meaningful mitigation of the salience of ethno-national identity in 
Northern Ireland, it will be demonstrated that consociationalism does not have 
the ability to achieve this in any divided society. A comparative element is 
necessary in part to refute the probable argument of potential critics that 
consociational power sharing has not been operational in Northern Ireland long 
enough to accurately test whether unionist and nationalist identities are showing 
any significant signs of mitigation. It is also necessary to enable conclusions 
drawn from an analysis of Northern Ireland to be generalised to other divided 
societies where a consociational model has been implemented, or 
recommended, as a means of conflict management. The cases of Malaysia and 
Brussels will, therefore, be analysed in order to support these conclusions. The 
rationale behind the choice of these is principally because they both have a 
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comparatively long experience of consociational government relative to that of 
Northern Ireland.  
 
Consociationalism in Malaysia began in 1957 with independence from Britain 
(Brown, 2005). Brussels’s consociational history, which should be understood 
within the wider context of Belgium, dates from 1918 but its current form is 
largely the result of the constitutional amendments of 1970, which divided the 
state into three federal regions along linguistic lines (Taylor, 2009a, p. 6; 
Deschouwer, 2006, pp. 901-02). The cases of Malaysia and Brussels have also 
been selected because, as in Northern Ireland, there is little strict territorial 
organisation to the distribution of respective ethnic, ethno-linguistic and ethno-
national communities. There are, nevertheless, significant differences between 
all three cases, as it is impossible to find identical cases of divided societies and 
models of consociational power sharing. Firstly, Northern Ireland and Brussels 
are divided between two communities, unionists and nationalists, and French 
speakers and Flemish speakers respectively. Malaysia, however, is multi-ethnic 
and includes the majority indigenous Muslim Malays, and the migrant Buddhist 
Chinese and Hindu Indians, in addition to numerous smaller indigenous groups 
(Brown, 2010, p. 33). Secondly, Northern Ireland and Malaysia have some 
history of inter-ethnic violence, which is largely absent in Brussels.  
 
Regarding the consociational arrangements of each, in Northern Ireland and 
Brussels these are enshrined in an agreement or constitution, whilst in Malaysia 
they are exercised within the governing coalition, Barisan Nasional. Within 
these arrangements there are different methods of coalition formation, with 
Northern Ireland exercising a post-election mandatory executive configuration 
and Brussels a post-election voluntary formation, whilst Malaysia has in recent 
years featured two pre-election multi-ethnic coalitions. The three cases also use 
different electoral systems. PR-STV in multimember constituencies is used for 
most elections in Northern Ireland, semi-open list PR is employed in Brussels 
as a single multimember constituency, with Malaysia using first past the post in 
single member constituencies. Finally, although the number of seats that can be 
won by a certain community is fluid in Northern Ireland and Malaysia, it is fixed 
in Brussels based on the population size of the respective linguistic groups. 
These differences will later be explored in greater depth and whilst they could 
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be considered to be limitations to the generalisability of conclusions drawn from 
the case of Northern Ireland, they nevertheless allow for it to be demonstrated 
that consociational power sharing does not facilitate the overcoming of identities 
in divided societies regardless of their context or the consociational 
arrangements in place. 
 
Brussels 
In order to sufficiently explore consociationalism in Brussels, it is first necessary 
to consider it within the context of Belgium. The country has experienced 
primarily non-violent ethno-linguistic conflict since its inception as a state in 
1830 between Flemish speakers in the northern region, Flanders, and French 
speakers in in the southern region, Wallonia, with the capital, Brussels, bilingual 
despite its geographical location within Flanders (Deschouwer, 2004, pp. 1-9). 
This was ultimately a result of the predominance of the French language in 
public life. After the language issue gained salience in the post-World War II 
era, Belgium was territorially divided in 1970 into three federal regions: Flemish 
Flanders, French Wallonia and bilingual Brussels, each with their own regional 
parliament alongside a federal parliament, with the latter featuring an equal 
number of government ministers from both linguistic communities, with 
legislature seats allocated proportionally from each of the three regions 
(Deschouwer, 2004, pp. 14, 17). 
 
The vast majority of political parties in Belgium are strictly organised along 
ethno-linguistic lines and identify with one of the main two communities, with 
only Flemish-speaking parties contesting elections in Flanders and only French-
speaking parties standing in Wallonia, but with all contesting bilingual Brussels 
(Deschouwer, 2004, pp. 9-11). It is for this reason that the focus is on Brussels 
rather than the wider example of Belgium, as only in this region do voters have 
the option to transcend their linguistic community and vote for a party not 
belonging to it, should they choose to do so (Pilet, 2005, p. 403). Although most 
parties are ethno-linguistically based, it is important to mention Pro Bruxsel, a 
minor party exclusive to Brussels, which has been hailed as ‘the first and only 
bilingual political party in Belgium’ and which contested the 2009 and 2014 
Brussels regional elections (Euractiv.com, 2009). Despite its bilingual status, 
due to Belgium’s strict linguistic electoral requirements the party must submit 
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lists to both Brussels’s French and Flemish linguistic group electoral 
designations, the mechanisms of which will shortly be explained in more depth. 
 
Whilst in Northern Ireland parties form a post-election mandatory coalition, at 
both federal and regional levels in Belgium parties form a voluntary post-
election coalition, with the aforementioned ethno-linguistic executive 
designation in Brussels ensuring that both communities are represented 
(Deschouwer, 2004, pp. 19-20). Legislature seats are proportionally pre-
allocated to both communities depending on their numerical size, whilst 
consociationalism is also a feature of the cabinet of the Brussels Government, 
with the prime minister elected by a majority of both language groups in the 
parliament (in practice this position is occupied by a member of the French 
speaking community), with two further ministers for each of the two linguistic 
groups and a simple majority required for the passage of legislation on regional 
matters (Deschouwer, 2004, pp. 19-20). Consociational arrangements in 
Brussels, and in the wider context of Belgium, are thus highly complex, due to 
the complicated ethno-linguistic composition of the state. 
 
In Brussels, and in the wider context of Belgium, elections are contested using 
PR with semi-open lists, in which voters have a degree of intra-party candidate 
choice, with Brussels a single multimember constituency (Pilet, 2005, p. 406). 
The electorate can, therefore, vote for one party’s list or indicate intra-party 
preferences for candidates. Significantly, however, they can only cast a vote for 
one party and/or candidates representing that party. This differs to Northern 
Ireland, which uses PR-STV for most elections, allowing voters to transcend 
party lines. Most importantly, for all elections in Belgium there are no bilingual 
lists (Pilet, 2005, p. 406). In the Brussels-Capital region, voters are presented 
with a ballot paper that includes parties that are designated as Flemish-
speaking and as French-speaking, with this distinction indicated, and are able to 
select a party from either designation, as there is no linguistic pre-identification 
for voters (Pilet, 2005, p. 403). However, whilst in Northern Ireland the 
electorate can make inter-party votes on a ballot paper, meaning they can vote 
for candidates both in and out of their own communal bloc, this is not possible in 
Brussels as voters must choose only one party, which is likely to impact upon 
whether parties appeal beyond their own community. Unlike in Northern Ireland, 
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seats in the Brussels regional parliament are proportionally pre-allocated on an 
ethno-linguistic basis, with 72 assigned to the French-speaking community and 
17 to the Flemish-speaking (Deschouwer, 2004, p. 19). There are, therefore, 
limits to the number of seats each party can win, regardless of how many votes 
it manages to attract. 
 
Despite Brussels’s strict consociational arrangements in comparison to those of 
Northern Ireland, it is nevertheless in the interest of parties to seek to maximise 
their electoral support and win as many seats as possible, regardless of the 
source of its votes. As aforementioned, there are no obstacles to a French 
speaker voting for a Flemish language party and vice versa. If 
consociationalism is overcoming ethno-linguistic identities in Brussels, it would 
be expected that party election campaigns would be almost exclusively 
concerned with socio-economic issues affecting all members of society, with 
little or no reference to linguistic differences. This argument will be tested by 
analysing the manifestos for the 2014 election to the Parliament of the Brussels-
Capital region of the largest French and Flemish speaking parties in Brussels: 
Parti Socialiste and Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Open VLD) 
respectively. The manifesto of Parti Socialiste is a highly policy specific 
document with great emphasis placed on socio-economic issues (Parti 
Socialiste, 2014). This includes proposals on broad areas such as health, 
education and the economy, and also policies on more nuanced issues, for 
example private rental housing and the promotion of sustainable waste 
management.  
 
The party, nevertheless, makes significant reference to the promotion of the 
French-speaking community and its language, and in common with many 
parties in Northern Ireland, often intertwines this focus with socio-economic 
issues. The manifesto, for example, refers to the need for non-Belgian citizens 
of Brussels to speak French as a prerequisite for employment and social 
integration, and calls for the abolition of fees imposed on Belgian booksellers to 
stock French-language texts published in France. It also emphasises a 
perceived sense of ‘otherness’ towards the Flemish-speaking community by 
stressing links with Wallonia, the French-speaking region of Belgium, and 
making reference to, for example, the Belgian Francophone population. Parti 
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Socialiste does, however, indicate some, albeit limited, support for integrative 
measures, such as encouraging citizens to learn Flemish and English. It is 
evident from this analysis that the party’s election campaigns are geared almost 
exclusively to appeal to the French-speaking community and demonstrate little 
interest in attracting support from beyond this cohort. 
 
The approach of Open VLD is similar. Its manifesto is very policy specific and 
focuses on many of the socio-economic issues emphasised by Parti Socialiste 
(Open VLD, 2014). It nevertheless makes significant reference to the needs of 
the Flemish-speaking community in Brussels. As is the case with Parti 
Socialiste, many of Open VLD’s policies in this area are intertwined with bread 
and butter issues, such as the need for Flemish language schools, libraries and 
community centres. It also stresses the need for Flemish to be spoken in 
hospitals to improve the service offered to patients. The manifesto does, 
however, make limited reference to some integrative policies. These include the 
need for Flemish-speaking children to learn French and vice versa, and the 
establishment of a ‘culture dome’ to bring together cultural organisations of all 
communities in Brussels. As is the case with Parti Socialiste and its almost 
exclusive appeal to the French-speaking community, it is clear that Open VLD 
plans its election campaigns primarily with Brussels’s Flemish speakers in mind 
and meeting the needs of this community is the ultimate objective of the party.  
 
Whilst the potential to maximise their share of the vote has the ability to induce 
parties to appeal to all members of society regardless of their ethno-linguistic 
group, in practice this is not occurring. Although data detailing the number of 
voters from the French-speaking community who voted for a Flemish-speaking 
party and vice versa is not available, at the 2014 election to the Parliament of 
the Brussels-Capital region the cross-communal Pro Bruxsel party received just 
1.24 per cent of the French linguistic group vote and 0.72 per cent of the 
Flemish linguistic group vote (Elections 2014, 2014). This demonstrates that 
there is very little appetite for non-ethnically based parties, as is also the case in 
Northern Ireland. The lack of support for cross-communal parties and the 
continued single identity focus of parties affiliated to one community suggest 
that consociationalism is not facilitating a mitigation of ethno-linguistic identities 
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in Brussels, despite its comparatively long history of this arrangement of 
governance. 
 
Malaysia 
Consociationalism in Malaysia differs from Northern Ireland in that rather than 
being constitutionally enshrined, it is exercised within the governing multi-party 
coalition, Barisan Nasional, which has been in power since independence in 
1957 (Brown, 2005). The need for consociational structures arose as a result of 
the presence of three main ethnic groups: the Malays, the Chinese and the 
Indians, with the majority of the latter two ethnicities having settled during the 
era of British rule (Brown, 2005, p. 430; 2010, p. 33). Similarly to Northern 
Ireland, there is little strict territorial organisation to the distribution of Malaysia’s 
ethnic communities, with Malays comprising around two-thirds of the population, 
the ethnic Chinese approximately a quarter and ethnic Indians making up seven 
per cent (Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, 2011). Despite the 
dominance of the Malay majority in executive arrangements, the minority ethnic 
Chinese and Indians do participate in cabinet and have a degree of influence 
over legislation, although this is much more malleable than the consociational 
executive formation procedures in place in Northern Ireland (Mohd Sani, 2009, 
p. 99). As is the case in Northern Ireland, there is no stipulation of how many 
seats in the national parliament must be occupied by members of a particular 
community. Consociationalism in Malaysia is, however, less strictly structured, 
as it is exercised only within the ruling coalition.  
 
Elections in Malaysia are contested using first past the post in single member 
constituencies, a legacy of British colonialism (Loh, 2013). As aforementioned, 
first past the post is not recommended by consociationalists as an appropriate 
voting system for plural societies, as it fails to guarantee minority and smaller 
party representation, and does not offer as many incentives as preferential 
systems to facilitate the transcendence of ethnic blocs (Mitchell, 2014). Whilst 
centripetalists argue that non-proportional electoral systems are more effective 
in divided societies, the preferential AV is usually recommended ahead of first 
past the post, as candidates are often required to reach a higher quota to be 
elected, increasing incentives for parties to embrace inter-ethnic campaigning 
(Horowitz, 2003). 
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The ethnic composition of political parties in Malaysia is complex, with some 
identifying with a particular community and others claiming to be multi-ethnic 
(Mohamad, 2008, pp. 444-45). Most parties subscribe to a pre-election 
coalition: either the incumbent Barisan Nasional or, between 2008 and 2015, 
the oppositional Pakatan Rakyat. The former has governed in the federal 
parliament since independence in 1957 and operates as a consociational 
structure of many parties, of which three have traditionally been dominant – the 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese 
Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), who each 
represent their respective communities (Brown, 2005, pp. 430-31; Mohamad, 
2008, pp. 444-46). Whilst oppositional coalitions in Malaysia have a shorter 
history than the incumbent, Pakatan Rakyat was, until its dissolution in 2015, a 
successor to Barisan Alternatif, an informal grouping of parties established in 
1999 to challenge the dominance of Barisan Nasional (Mohamad, 2008, pp. 
444-45; Liow, 2015, pp. 101-02). As is the case with Barisan Nasional, the 
parties that made up Pakatan Rakyat are ethnically based, with the opposition 
coalition comprising the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and the Democratic 
Action Party (DAP), who respectively represent the Malay and Chinese 
communities, in addition to the multi-ethnic Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR). These 
former constituent parties continue to operate despite the dissolution of Pakatan 
Rakyat. 
 
In contrast to Northern Ireland, electoral competition in Malaysia is, therefore, 
ultimately between two inter-ethnic coalitions, comprised of many different 
parties. Candidates are fielded strategically depending on the ethnic 
composition of a constituency, which often results in a candidate from a party 
representing a particular community from one coalition pitted against a 
counterpart from the other (Balasubramanim, 2006, p. 82, quoted in Mohamad, 
2008, p. 445). This is not always the case, however, as many constituencies 
have no dominant community, which can impact upon this strategy and result in 
candidates from different communities contesting a seat (Mohamad, 2008, p. 
446). As in Northern Ireland but unlike in Brussels, seats are not pre-designated 
to a particular community, meaning that there is no fixed representation for 
each. 
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Although parties campaign alongside their coalition partners, some 
nevertheless also publish their own literature. For example, several months 
before the 2013 Malaysian general election, the Barisan Nasional affiliated MCA 
published a document comparing its policies to its Chinese community rival, the 
DAP, at the time a constituent party of the oppositional Pakatan Rakyat coalition 
(MCA, 2013). The literature is dedicated to emphasising the ways in which the 
MCA’s policies further Chinese needs and interests, such as by providing 
scholarships for ethnic Chinese students and promoting Chinese languages in 
schools. In contrast, the MCA argues that the DAP is not encouraging Chinese 
ideology and interests. Whilst inter-coalition competition is undoubtedly 
important, this example demonstrates the significance of intra-communal party 
competition, with parties keen to demonstrate that they are the stoutest 
defender of their community due to a fear of outflanking by intra-ethnic rivals. 
Evidence suggests that these fears are not unfounded. In 1986, for example, a 
crisis within the MCA led to a significant rise in the DAP’s share of the vote and 
seats won, at the expense of the MCA (Brown, 2005, p. 440). This 
demonstrates that despite the presence of multi-ethnic coalitions, there is 
considerable intra-bloc party competition in Malaysia. The PKR are the only 
significant multi-ethnic party and won just 30 of the 222 seats in the Dewan 
Rakyat, or lower house, at the 2013 general election (Khoo, 2013, p. 1). The 
low level of support for cross-communal parties and the continued use of ethno-
symbolism by ethnically based parties indicate that despite Malaysia having a 
history of consociationalism dating back to 1957, ethnic identities retain their 
salience. 
 
Summary 
This comparative analysis has expanded research beyond Northern Ireland to 
divided societies more generally. Whilst it is not intended to be a 
comprehensive study of ethnic identities and politics in Brussels and Malaysia 
as this would require the work of a much larger and more in depth project, it has 
nevertheless made some interesting findings. Despite the existence of 
incentives to encourage ethnically based parties in Brussels to make almost 
exclusively socio-economic appeals to all members of society and maximise 
their electoral potential, this, on the whole, is not happening. Neither are voters 
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opting for cross-communal parties in any significant numbers, as the example of 
Pro Bruxsel demonstrates. Similarly, although electoral competition in Malaysia 
is ostensibly between two multi-ethnic coalitions, in practice the parties that 
make up these coalitions compete with their opposite ethnic counterparts for 
support, as shown by the way in which the MCA presents its campaign 
literature. Electoral support for the PKR demonstrates that, by and large, voters 
are not being drawn away from ethnically based parties. The conclusions from 
both Brussels and Malaysia that elite level cooperation between political actors 
from different ethnic backgrounds is not trickling down to wider society are 
attributable to the insurmountable character of identities.  
 
It is, however, important to note that the prognosis of McGarry and O’Leary 
(2009a, p. 83) that consociationalism may work to overcome the significance of 
divisions and bring about a shared identity is only applied to Northern Ireland’s 
consociational arrangements and not necessarily to those of divided societies in 
general. Their form in Brussels and Malaysia is different to that in Northern 
Ireland, despite the three cases sharing many similarities, as has been 
demonstrated. Although this could be considered to be a limitation to this 
comparative analysis, there is strength in the argument that its findings 
ultimately support the conclusion from Northern Ireland that whilst 
consociationalism has been very effective in managing violent conflict between 
different communities, it has not facilitated conflict transformation towards a 
shared identity. As McGarry and O’Leary (2009a, p. 83) believe that this 
phenomenon may happen over time, it has been useful to consider the cases of 
Brussels and Malaysia, which have a longer history of consociational power 
sharing than Northern Ireland. This is evidence to suggest that this prognosis is 
too optimistic, as the salience of ethnic identity persists even after a long 
association with consociationalism due to communal blocs being largely 
insurmountable. Whilst having recognised several limitations to this comparative 
analysis, it is nevertheless possible to cautiously apply the conclusion that 
consociational power sharing has not facilitated conflict transformation away 
from the importance of identities in Northern Ireland to divided societies in 
general. 
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Summary 
Through an analysis of election campaign strategies, it has been demonstrated 
that, on the whole, political parties in Northern Ireland perceive there to be little 
electoral benefit in canvassing beyond the ethno-national bloc they are affiliated 
with. For the few who demonstrate a willingness to do so, concerns for personal 
safety are usually too significant for this to be done. This is ultimately due to 
divisions between unionists and nationalists retaining their salience into the 
post-Good Friday Agreement era. It has been shown that Northern Ireland 
remains a deeply divided place, with segregation permeating almost every 
aspect of society. In working class areas in particular, there is a perception that 
the peace process has brought about few changes, with paramilitary 
organisations still active, despite ceasefires, and the belief of many that the 
PSNI are ineffectual in tackling crime. For many in these areas there is no 
greater willingness to cooperate and interact with the opposite community than 
there was prior to the Good Friday Agreement. This can be explained by the 
principles of ethno-symbolism explored in Chapter One. The phenomenon is 
due to the competing nationalisms, identities and collective historical memories 
of unionists and nationalists, which, although malleable over time, cannot be 
overcome. For this reason voters, on the whole, remain drawn to parties that 
stoutly represent and defend their respective ethno-national community. This 
explains why parties consider it to be of little electoral benefit to tone down the 
ethno-symbolic characteristics of their campaigns towards an almost exclusively 
socio-economic focus and attempt to appeal beyond their own bloc, as 
demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six, despite the incentives provided by PR-
STV for them to do so. 
 
The continued significance of divisions in Northern Ireland, which are showing 
few meaningful signs of subsiding, indicate that the argument of McGarry and 
O’Leary (2009a, p. 83) that consociationalism may work to overcome conflict 
and unite the two communities around a common identity is simply too 
optimistic. As they argue that this could happen over time, a comparison with 
Brussels and Malaysia has been drawn to enable this argument to be tested, as 
both have a considerably longer experience with consociational arrangements 
than Northern Ireland. Although it has been recognised that there are limitations 
to this comparative analysis and that more in depth research would need to be 
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undertaken in order to verify the findings, neither case has demonstrated any 
significant moves away from the salience of distinct ethnic communities. This 
has led to the conclusion that whilst consociationalism offers a very successful 
means of managing violent conflict by enabling elite level inter-communal 
cooperation, it does not provide conflict transformation through the facilitation of 
a shared identity. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
PR-STV 
Through an analysis of political party manifestos and data obtained from 
interviews, it has been demonstrated that, on the whole, the PR-STV electoral 
system is not inducing political parties to significantly moderate the ethno-
symbolism of their election campaigns that the architects of the Good Friday 
Agreement thought it may do. Despite the potential to attract inter-bloc 
transfers, this analysis has shown that there is little or no difference between 
how ethno-national parties campaign for elections contested using PR-STV or 
first past the post in terms of the symbolism and rhetoric of their literature. 
Although the campaigns of some parties, particularly the DUP, have become 
less strident in the post-Good Friday Agreement era, whilst maintaining a 
significant ethno-nationalist focus, this is not due to any potential moderating 
effect of PR-STV to attract inter-bloc transfers and, rather, is attributable to a 
significant reduction in violent conflict and the participation of these parties in 
government. 
 
It is, however, important to note that although there is no significant difference in 
how parties campaign for elections contested using PR-STV and those to the 
Westminster Parliament, parties such as the DUP may have become more 
receptive to the need to attract intra-bloc transfers in the post-Good Friday 
Agreement era. Whilst Horowitz (2003) argues that AV offers greater potential 
than PR-STV for campaign moderation due to the system requiring candidates 
to reach a higher vote threshold in order to be elected, this thesis disagrees with 
this prognosis primarily because smaller, single member constituencies are 
more likely to be made up of a large majority of people from one community, 
which could actually work to strengthen the ethno-national appeals of parties. In 
any case, AV is not proportional. Proportionality is essential in divided societies 
as there is a need for as many groups as possible to be represented. Exclusion, 
after all, is a cause of conflict (McGarry and O’Leary, 2004, p. 32, quoted in 
Coakley, 2009, p. 144).  
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In defence of PR-STV, unlike most other forms of PR and first past the post, it 
at least allows the electorate to vote for candidates of more than one party and 
ethno-national bloc, even if this often does not happen in practice. Elections in 
Northern Ireland, therefore, offer greater potential for inter-bloc voting and 
campaign moderation than those in other consociational societies, such as 
Belgium, where elections are contested using semi-open list PR, with voters 
only being able to vote for one party. That PR-STV uses multimember 
constituencies is also significant, as it reduces the incentive for parties to 
engage in ‘sectarian pacts’ whereby one candidate is selected by two or more 
parties to stand for election and represent their respective ethno-national bloc. 
Unionist pacts have been used for some constituencies in elections to the 
Westminster Parliament and were a feature of the 2015 general election, with 
pacts agreed in four constituencies where the DUP and the UUP did not field 
candidates against each other (BBC, 2015). The use of PR-STV in Northern 
Ireland should not, therefore, be changed. It is just the case that no electoral 
system is able to induce parties to significantly moderate their campaigns to 
make almost exclusively socio-economic appeals, as the importance of ethno-
symbolism is simply too great. 
 
 
Consociationalism 
Consociational power sharing is the most effective means of managing violent 
conflict in divided societies. In Northern Ireland, it has successfully achieved a 
reduction in levels of violence, and has facilitated elite level cooperation 
between unionists and nationalists. Whilst the Good Friday Agreement includes 
provisions that are beyond the remit of traditional consociationalism, such as 
institutionalising British-Irish intergovernmental regulation through North-South 
and East-West bodies, it is ultimately an accommodative settlement. This 
research has, however, demonstrated that the prognosis that consociationalism 
may work to overcome the salience of ethno-national blocs and bring about a 
genuine Northern Irish identity that is shared by the majority of the population is 
simply too optimistic (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009a, p. 83). By using the focus of 
party manifestos as a proxy, this study has concluded that no significant moves 
towards this are taking place and nor are they likely to in the future. Whilst 
recognising that further, more substantial, research is required and that their 
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forms of consociationalism are not identical to Northern Ireland’s or to each 
other’s, results from Brussels and Malaysia indicate that a shared identity has 
not been achievable in either case, despite comparatively long experiences of 
consociational power sharing.  
 
It is improbable that any of the suggested amendments to Northern Ireland’s 
governmental arrangements, such as the abolition of the community 
designation system and mandatory coalitions, and the introduction of the 
requirement of a weighted majority of MLAs for the passage of legislation in the 
Assembly (Farry, 2009, pp. 175-79), would facilitate any significant moves away 
from the importance of unionism and nationalism. Consociationalism in 
Northern Ireland has, nevertheless, brought about some moderation of political 
parties, primarily the DUP and Sinn Fein. This, however, principally takes the 
form of a willingness to negotiate and cooperate with representatives of the 
opposite bloc within a power sharing government. As most parties continue to 
make substantial use of ethno-symbolism in their election campaign literature 
and do not canvass areas that have a majority of members from the opposite 
community suggests that this cooperation is not being replicated within wider 
society. This indicates a dissonance between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics in Northern 
Ireland. 
 
In testing the important hypothesis of whether consociationalism has the 
potential to significantly reduce the salience of group identities in divided 
societies, this research questions the profoundness of consociational theory. It 
argues that whilst the approach can be highly successful in managing violent 
conflict, as the case of Northern Ireland demonstrates, this is, by and large, the 
extent of its abilities. Beyond this, it does little to break down divisions between 
different groups and does not have the ability to bring about a genuinely shared 
identity that transcends these divisions. In reaching this conclusion, this thesis 
identifies a middle path between consociational proponents and its critics. On 
the one hand, it recognises that only consociationalism can achieve the 
successful management of violent conflict in divided societies. On the other, 
however, it is sympathetic to concerns that recognising and accommodating 
different groups simply freezes the conflict in time. This research nevertheless 
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argues that identities in divided societies are too great to be successfully 
overcome and therefore does not propose ways in which this may be achieved. 
 
 
Ethno-symbolism and national identity 
An ethno-symbolist approach to nationalism effectively explains the continued 
importance of national identity in divided societies. Nations and nationalisms are 
not solely a product of contemporary movements that are deliberately 
constructed by elites, as modernists claim (Smith, 1998). Neither are they 
simply ‘inbreeding super-families’, as argued by primordialists (van den Berghe, 
1978, pp. 403-04, quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 146). Rather, their roots lie in a 
perennial process whereby the nation has occurred and/or recurred throughout 
history, with pre-modern era myths and memories of the collective bridging the 
gap, both forward and back, between pre-modern and modern (Githens-Mazer, 
2006, p. 7). Meaningful and potent collective myths, memories and symbols, 
such as language, religion, flags and historical events, play a crucial role in 
uniting people around a common culture and identity, and remain significant to 
the present day (Smith, 1986, p. 198, quoted in Githens-Mazer, 2006, p. 8).  
 
These characteristics are especially important in divided societies as they are a 
means of identifying one group (‘us’) from the other (‘them’) (Smith, 2009, p. 
25). This study has shown that nationalist history in Ireland dates back to the 
first Norman invasions in 1169 and unionist history to the beginning of the 
plantation of Ulster in 1609 (O’Leary and McGarry, 1996, p. 54), although both 
groups utilise myths, memories and other characteristics that pre-date these 
years. It is the endurance of ethno-symbolism that explains the continued 
salience of unionism and nationalism in Northern Ireland to the present day. 
Ethno-national identifiers, such as religion, language, flags, myths and 
memories, have the ability to unite people in a way that political institutions, for 
example, are unable to. It is, therefore, simply too optimistic to believe that a 
genuine Northern Irish identity may come to be shared by a majority of the 
population as a result of consociationalism, as it underestimates the power of 
nationalisms. Whilst they are malleable over time, their perpetual salience 
means that they are highly unlikely to ever be fully surmounted (Smithey, 2011, 
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ch. 2). Conflict transformation in Northern Ireland, in the form of moving beyond 
the salience of unionism and nationalism, is thus not taking place.  
 
It is through the application of ethno-symbolism to demonstrate that the 
preferential method of PR-STV is not inducing party campaign moderation, 
which in turn demonstrates the continued salience of ethno-national identities in 
Northern Ireland well into the post-Good Friday Agreement era, that this study 
makes an original contribution to knowledge. This research has demonstrated 
the existence of a disparity between what the theory of political science 
considers to be possible and what actually happens in the practice of politics. 
Whilst some believe that a consociational approach to conflict management has 
the potential to break down communal identities in divided societies, the 
practical reality is that it is unable to do so. This conclusion demonstrates the 
practical impact of consociationalism in Northern Ireland and can also be 
cautiously applied to other divided societies with this arrangement for conflict 
management. It is a significant finding, as it is a clear example of divergence 
between the academic study of political theory and the real world practice of 
politics.  
 
 
Further research 
It is possible that political party election campaign literature may continue to 
move in a less strident direction, with increased emphasis on socio-economic 
issues. It is, however, highly unlikely that campaigns will come to be almost 
exclusively based around non-ethno-national issues with little or no utilisation of 
ethno-symbolic characteristics. As the ‘ethnic tribune appeals’ thesis suggests, 
it is the ability of parties to successfully present themselves as the stoutest 
defender of their respective bloc that maximises their electoral support (Mitchell 
et al, 2009). Reaching out to a particular community by using ethno-national 
flags, emblems, history, memories and other attributes remains, and is highly 
likely to remain, an essential component of the effectiveness of this appeal. As 
this study has demonstrated, voters have not yet shown any significant signs of 
moving away from ethno-nationally based parties in the post-Good Friday 
Agreement era. It is still, therefore, in the interest of parties to retain their 
distinctive unionist or nationalist identity and this is unlikely to fade.  
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It will, nevertheless, be interesting to see how changes in Northern Ireland 
influence politics and the impact that this may have on party election campaigns 
in the future. With the 2011 census indicating that Protestants have lost their 
numerical majority, with 48 per cent of the population to Catholicism’s 45 per 
cent, there is a genuine possibility that Sinn Fein could soon unequivocally be 
the largest party in Northern Ireland (Devenport, 2012). This would undoubtedly 
increase the likelihood of a united Ireland being achieved. How unionism and 
nationalism would respond to this prospect, both politically and socially, remains 
to be seen. It would, however, be interesting to analyse the effect of potentially 
seismic events such as this on party election campaigns as a gauge of their 
impact on communal relations in Northern Ireland. Future analysis of the 
electoral trends of cross-communal parties such as Alliance would be a useful 
indicator of whether a Northern Irish identity is coming to be shared by the 
population. Whilst evidence from the post-Good Friday Agreement era does not 
suggest any significant increase in support for these parties (see Whyte, nd) 
and it is thought that this will be unlikely to occur, ascertaining this will 
nevertheless be the work of future examination. These, therefore, constitute 
avenues of further research. 
 
In order to increase the generalisability of the results of this study, it would be 
beneficial to undertake empirical research, in the form of interviews, in other 
consociational societies. Whilst Chapter Seven includes a comparative analysis 
of Brussels and Malaysia, this draws only on secondary sources and political 
party election campaign literature, and is only intended to provide an indication 
of how results from Northern Ireland may also be evident in these cases. It is, 
however, important to reiterate that the prognosis of McGarry and O’Leary 
(2009a, p. 83) that consociational institutions may work to reduce the salience 
of ethnic divisions and bring about a genuinely shared identity is only applied to 
Northern Ireland. Given the comparatively short period of time since the 
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, it would, nevertheless, be 
interesting to conduct a comprehensive study into the impact of consociational 
institutions in other such societies, whilst recognising that there are likely to be 
many differences to the arrangements in Northern Ireland. Consociational 
institutions in Brussels and Malaysia not only differ to those in Northern Ireland 
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but also to each other’s, and both cases have a comparatively long history of 
power sharing. Examining divisions in both within the context of consociational 
arrangements would increase the generalisability of this study’s results from 
Northern Ireland and this, therefore, constitutes a particularly important avenue 
of further research. 
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